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ABSTRACT 
A modest attempt has been made in the thesis, "Social Justice and the 
Role of Supreme Court : A study of Nehru Era", to investigate the basic tenets 
of social justice to enquire how far the provisions of the Supreme Coun 
conform to the principles of social justice. The relevant provisions of the Indian 
judiciary were empirically tested in the light of the hypothesis so evolved, 
especially in regard to their working in the background of the Indian social, 
economic and political life. The present study has been divided into seven 
chapters. The first chapter gives the conceptual framework of social justice. It 
will gleaned from the foregoing study that social justice, in essence, represents 
a logical synthesis of the principles of liberty equality and fraternity. It 
transcends the formal aspects these principles where liberty may be interpreted 
merely as 'absence of restraint', equality merely as 'absence of discrimination', 
and fraternity merely as charity of the strong and privileged towards the weak 
and the underprivileged; thus preserving the existing order. On the contrary, 
demand of social justice tends to issue from the mouth of reformers who seek to 
make an effective dent in the prevailing socio-economic structure. Thus as 
principles of social justice 
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(a) liberty in the political sphere demands the due representation of the 
citizens in decision making bodies, and to make this representation real it 
is essential that electoral system is so designed that political power vests 
in true representatives of the people so that manipulative or money 
power does not serve as gateway of political office; 
(b) equality in the economic sphere demands that equality of consideration 
and equality of opportunity are not reduced to an empty form due to vast 
disparities in economic capacities, particularly in the matter of seeking 
justice in the law courts, and availing of education and other 
opportunities for self development; 
(c) fraternity in the social sphere can become a real force only when the 
spirit of fraternity ensues from the feeling of mutual dignity, especially 
from appreciation of each other's importance in social life, related to the 
function performed, not from special privileges whatsoever, nor from 
affinities based on narrow sectarian interest; incidentally it also requires 
that there are not deprived of their due representation in the decision 
making organs and role in national life because of their minority 
character; that the weaker sections are given special consideration in the 
Abstract 
distribution of benefits so as to enable them to compete with other 
sections of equal footing; and that 
(d) the right to property is so regulated that an individuaPs sphere of wealth 
is closely related to the function presently peifomied or service rendered, 
that major portion of wealth which is largely of social origin accrues 
back to society for reinvestment in expanding and strange thing social 
services, and that production of goods and services is undertaken 
primarily to subserve the social needs rather than for earning huge 
private profit. 
The second chapter covers social justice and Constitutions of India, 
as explained by eminent members of the Constituent Assembly, means rejection 
of the existing social structure, promise of social security', provision for equality 
of opportunity and a smooth and rapid transition from a state of serfdom to one 
of freedom. In short, it has envisaged a far reaching social changes, a socio-
economic revolution, through mechanism of political democracy and individual 
liberty. Some members of the Constituent Assembly felt that since the social 
justice enunciated by them and embodied in the Constitution could be achieved 
only through socialism and in a socialist state, that fact should be specified in 
the Constitution. However, at the end, they avoided mentioning specifically 
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socialism or socialist state, for they felt content with the pharase "social justice" 
which was said to have embodied contents of socialism. After the 
commencement of the Constitution, the major agrarian reform legislations ran 
up against conservative stance of judiciary on property and on the question of 
compensation. So, a few amendments were made to the Constitution to enable 
the state to forward with agrarian reforms and to facilitate the proper 
distribution of property and economic rights in the society. Besides, with 
respect to Preamble the judiciary changed its view and started using it as a tool 
to mterpret the provisions of the Constitution. Because of these facts Parliament 
by the Constitution, (forty-second) Amendment Act introduced the word 
"social is t into the Preamble. Thus, it has been made clear that social justice 
and Constitution of India envisages not merely the contents of socialism but 
also it format or what may be called it infrastructure. In other words, the social 
justice and Constitution of India envisions distributive justice oriented equal 
dispersal of ail social primary goods coupled with protective discrimination in 
favour of "the least favoured members" of the society to achieve a new social 
order within the framework of socialist democratic republic. 
The third chapter deals with the essence of socio-economic justice as tlie goal of 
planned development means reduction in the equality and removal of poverty . These two 
objectives are interrelated; it need not automatically lead to reduction in 
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inequality. Both the goals would have to be pursued simultaneously and 
incordination. Socio-economic inequality in India is a heritage of long history. 
India is the world's classic unequal society from the time immemorial. 
Inequality in India's past was sanctified by the rigid caste system that had 
ordained by professions by the accident of birth in a given family or jati. 
The genesis of Article 16 (4) and scrunity of debates in the 
Constituent Assembly over the contents of reservation clause in Article 16 (4) 
revealed two significant ideas. First, the exact use and connotation of the world 
"backward" must be understood in the context of an attempt made to reconcile 
the opposing views of perfect equality of opportunity reservation-promoted 
equality of opportunity in the matter of government employment. Second, the 
reservation of posts and appointments in service under the state were meant for 
communities, which hither-to had no "proper look-in" into the administration. 
Thus, the state authorities were expected to determine or bring with in the fold 
of "backward classes" those Classes or communities, which hitherto had no 
berth in the administration and the determination of Backward classes and the 
scheme of reservations of posts were such that they did not destroy the principle 
of equality of opportunity. The ideas that emerged from debates in parliament 
and constituent Assembly over Article 15 (4) and Article 16 (4) respectively 
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would show that makers of the Constitution did not consider "caste" as a 
dominant criterion for determing the backwardness of the people. 
A close survey of reports submitted by vanous class commissions 
during the period of 1955 and 1990 has revealed that most of the commissions 
harped on "caste" as an inevitable test to determine the backwardness of people. 
The Mandal Commission, which was latest commission constituted by the 
Central government, made caste as a unit or what it called a recognisable and 
persistent collectivities for dealing with the problem of backwardness. Further, 
It said that since Article 340 of the Constitution spoke of "socially and 
educationally backward classes", the application of economic tests" for their 
identification seemed to be misconceived. It virtually discarded the economic or 
poverty test to determine the Backward Classes of people. This view of the 
commission is narrow and the caste test may perpetuate caste system instead of 
eradicating social evil of backwardness. 
Equality in law in the sense of absence of discrimination of any kind 
has been embodied in clauses (1) and (2) of Article 15. Equality in fact in the 
sense of different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an 
equilibrium between different situations has been stipulated in clause 4 of 
Article 15. The concept of equality in fact is essentially different treatment in 
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order to attain a result which establishes an equation between two different 
situations in which the weaker sections and forward communities are found in 
the society-. This, in other words in known as "protective discnmination" and 
"compensatoiy discrimination". But, whether the compensatoiy discrimination 
stipulated in favour of weaker sections is creative in nature or destructive in 
character depends on two factors, namely, (1) the quantum of compensatory 
benefits conferred on weaker sections and (2) the duration for which they have 
been given. 
The idea of compensatory state action was to make people who were 
really unequal in their wealth, education or social environment, equal in 
specified areas Equality of opportunity guaranteed by Article 16 (1) could be 
gauged only by the equality attained in the result Article 16 (1) only a part of a 
comprehensive scheme to ensure equality in all spheres. It was an instance of 
the application of the larger concept of equality under the law embodied in 
Article 14 and 15. Therefore, Article 16 (1) permitted classification just as 
Article 14 did. 
The forth chapter analysis the views of the judicial response to social 
justice has revealed that they accorded prime importance to it. They described the 
social justice as the signature tune of the Constitution. The Court discussed all aspects 
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of the concept of social justice and explained its various connotations. First, 
social justice means socialism, because its goal is to bring national wealth and 
means of production under state control to subserve the common good. But, at 
the same time in a mixed economy interests of private enterprise cannot be 
stifled unjustly. So, necessarily a just balance must be maintained between 
conflicting interests. With such a role assigned to socialism it become more 
dynamic than doctrinaire. As indicated by the judiciary-, social justice is 
dynamic socialism which aims at a just socio-economic order. 
Second, social justice demands the existence of reasonable and just 
procedures which are conducive to the pursuit and protection of the rights of 
ordinary people. Therefore, procedures must necessarily be freed from stifling 
technalities in order to render access to justice a meaningful concept to common 
man. Third the concept of social justice envisages creation of a new human 
order and egalitarian society, wherein gender justice, dalit justice and equal 
justice among the chronic unequal, were assured. Forth Fundamental Rights 
must be construed in the light of Directive Principles and the Preamble, which, 
in effect, means that they have to be construed in the light of the concept of 
social justice. It is also said that the dynamic Directive Principles energies the 
static provisions of the Fundamental Rights. This rule of interpretation has 
rendered the social justice a vibrant concept of the Indian Constitutional 
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jurisprudence. Fifth, socio-economic justice stemmed from the social morality 
and then became an enforceable formula and hence it abhors economic 
exploitation. Finally, social justice contemplates comprehensive social security 
schemes and also lays stress on distributive justice. Thus meaning attributed to, 
and the unique role designed by for, the concept of social justice by the 
judiciary have made the social justice a multi-dimensional vibrant concept of 
for reaching importance. 
The fifth chapter deals with Public Interest Litigation: A Post Nehru 
Phenomena which has significantly broadened the sphere of judicial activity, is 
a notable aspect of social justice. Under this concept any one can bring a 
disputed issue, a public grievance, or any other such matter direct to the notice 
of the Supreme Court merely by sending a post card briefly stating the case and 
thus avoiding the elaborate and costly procedure that is prescribed for raising a 
matter in a Court. The variety of cases decided by the Courts is itself evidence 
of the wide scope of judicial activism. Some examples are bonded labour, 
displacement and other grievances of tribals, child adoption and ecological 
threats to society. These indicate the broadened view of the judiciary role in a 
democracy. 
There is no denying that Public Interest Litigation has increased the 
quantum of work of High Courts and the Supreme Court, especially of the 
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latter. The judiciary also enters the field which is strictly that of the executive 
and tlie legislature. Infact, in some cases the Supreme Court has given 
suggestions and even issued directives to the legislature concerned to follow up 
a particular matter and ensure that the cause of social justice is always upheld. 
There is of course a lunit to which Public Interest Litigation and 
judicial activism can go, otlierwise its own workload, which is now much too 
heavy, will increase beyond measure. While it is true that society has a moral 
and Constitutional obligations to ensure that injustice is not done to any section, 
such as the tribal, bonded labour, women or any other suppressed category, the 
system cannot be strained to disconcerting limits. 
There is also a question of availability of financial resources for 
carrying out social and economic, reconstruction programmes, even though 
these programmes are dictated by the concept of social justice. India is a poor 
country and has a vast percentage of neglected, deserving people whose plight 
arouse sympathy in every human heart, except the most callous. However, 
neither social reform nor social justice can be ensured in a short time. An 
outstanding instance is that of colossal poverty. Justice demands that all socio-
economic inequalities should be redressed. But it is not possible to remove 
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poverty and bring everyone to the same level, with a magic ward as it mere. 
Social justice, therefore, is an ideal which we should all promote earnestly. 
The sixth chapter cover the Nehru's Ideas on social justice. Nehru 
conccm for national unify, equalit}/. dignih'. justice and the socio-economic 
upliftment and welfare of the people was well known. He understood the needs 
and ethos of his people. His fascination for socialism, and economic 
development was bom out of his deep concern for the suffering Indian masses. 
He was firmly committed to planned economy which, he left, could alone 
resolve the socio-economic disparities of the modem world. Nehm viewed that 
socio-political independence of Afro-Asian countries could only be safeguarded 
through economic and progress. 
In the tribal and rural sphere, Nehru laid emphasis on tribal 
integration, that is integration of tribal communities with the rest of the Indian 
population and protecting and respecting the tribal autonomy and identity from 
outside interference. He unassisted on apt utilization of tribal genius embodied 
in the techniques of production process. He adopted vital measures aimed at 
elimination of the economic backwardness of the mral populace. He was 
opposed to discrimination of any kind against any citizen anywhere on groimds 
of religion, caste beliefs and sex. He planned impleiRented developmental 
schemes for the promotion of the welfare of the weaker sections. On women, 
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disabilities and handicaps, lie was staunch supporter of women's education and 
firmly believed in equality of men and women, l ie was deeply perturbed by the 
social absurdities like dowry system, growth of purdah and seclusion of women 
from day to day life. 
Nehru looked upon socialist pattern of society as an extension of 
democracy and freedom. Democracy, he left had no meaning without equality 
and equality cannot be established so long as the principal instruments of 
production are not owned by the state. 
The last chapter, which is the seventh chapter, is the concluding 
chapter. In this chapter the ideas discussed in the preceding chapters have been 
summed up. 
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ABBREVIATIONS 
'DAe cons/iitilion oj- ^ticfia^ wht'c/i £as ()een (Jescrt6&(J 6y an 
emineni wriler as a ^''corner s/one of a na{ion^\ £as ()esloa)e(J 
stjfj-icieni ifiov^fii on ifie vnci<2rprivile(^eJ. ntimher ojprovisiom 
incorporaiQ(l in ii for l/ieir Sanefii iell l/ie (ale of slaiesmansliip oj-
i£e framers of {£e Gonsliiulion^ for ihe oilalil^ of a Gonslilulion 
depends on {£e exieni /o w£ic£ ii affords proieciion io i£e under 
prioife^edone sucJi laadaGIe prouision refaies io poor andne^Iecied 
sec Hons of ihe socieiy, a)£ic£ £as direcied i£e siaie io promo ie a)ii£ 
special care i£e educaiionaf and economic inieresi of suc£people. 
CBesides^ i£e Gonsiiiuiion £as laid^reai sir ess on social jus iice. DCo 
compre£ensiue analysis in a single a)or£ seems io £aoe £een made so 
far of i£e connoiaiions of social jusiice and i£e scope of i£e 
consiiiuiional safeguards prouided in faoour of i£e poor and 
ne^lecied seciions of i£e Socieiy. 3£is i/iesis is i£e resuli of an 
aiiempi io analyse i£e connoiaiions of socialfasiice and i£e scope of 
{£e Gonsiiiuiionalprooisions made for i£e Senefii ofi£e poor seciions 
and role playedi£e Supreme Gouri in i£is field. 
Dfie expression "poor anc/necjlecledseciiom of l/iepeople^"" 
/s no! Jej-inedin l/}e (jons///a//on. iSai^ cerlain indications £aoe been 
c^ioen in (/le Gonsli/aiion (o identify (hem. cSo aiiempi Aas Seen made 
in t/je i/jesis /o ideniifi^ l/iem. Ui scraiimy of l/ie provisions of i£e 
L 'jonsd/ation^ par/icalaxdy oj- 'J^arl 999 in l/ie Gons/i/ai/on, /jas 
revealed i/ie use oj four f)fiarases^ namely., women., (^c£eJaled 
Oas/es and <:^c£edaled 9ri6es, 9)acAwaTd Glasses. 9I is confinedh 
(/le 
ascertainment of meaning and contents of social justice^ 
identification of certain weaAer sections., particularly t£e socially 
and educationalltj 9jacliward Glasses, and examination oft£e extent 
to a)£ic£ social justice £as 6een rendered or made meaningful to t£e 
said four groups of weaker sections. '9'urt£er, i£e enquiry £as Been 
focussed mainlij on t£e decisions of t£e Supreme Gourt 6eariny on 
t£e suBject. 9£e 
concept of social justice £as Been discussed in t£ree 
succeeding chapters. 9£e f'rst c£apter deals ivit£ t£e social justice. 
D£e 
conceptual framewor/z. 9n t£is c£apier uarious t£eories of 
social justice., princijiles and aspects of social justice £aoe Been 
examined and t£e more oiaBle and seroiceaBle t£eory £as Been 
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icfen^ified. Soc/aJ fash'ce and i/ie Gom/i/u/ion of 9ndia £as (}een 
Jeafl in i^ie second c£ap{er. Tjiews of (he framers of Gons/z'/u/ion on 
suf}jec( and releoan( Gonsh'iu/tonafproo/s/ons anddeueiopmenls 
£aoe f)een ideniijied conc fusion reached (herein is (he sociaffusdce 
and consdiudon of 9ndia envisions es(af)Iishznen( oj- dis(ri()a(ioe 
jus (ice orien(ed^ non-exploiiadoe and e<jafi(arian social order in 
Dndia. 
Uhe pharase ^''Socio-economic jus (ice and remouaf of 
inec^ua[i(t^ in ^rdcle 1-5 (4) and ihe (erm hachward classes in 
C^dcle 16 (4) haue no( defined. Uo de(ermine (he backwardness of 
(he people for (he purpose of ^rdcfe 
IJ ( j ) and 16 (4). 
Goa2pensa(ory discriminadon in faoour of O^achward classes of 
cidzens in (he field of educadon is esseniialin an imSalancedsocio-
economic order (o ensure social jusdce (a (he under privileged 
classes. Such impor(an( aspec(s as e<^uali(y in law and aSolidon of 
un(oucha6ili(y. 
Uhe for(h chap(er deals wi(h (he meaning a((ri6u(ed/o, and 
(he unique role designedfor., (he concep( of social jusdce S^ (he 
S)t/pre.me Clot/ri in //s oar/oi/s dec is ions. J/ie fifi/i cJ^iapier cJeats (vii/j 
piif)lic inieresl li(i(^aiion. JiOiifj aciioc assislance of l/ie social 
aciio/s/s andptif)lie liiic^aiors, l/ie ft/drctart^ is pr-omisinc^ innooa/ioe 
remedial aKenlion for oindicalion of l/ie cjooernmenl lo ivelfare and 
relief of l/je oppressed. J I is nom rvideltj helieoed i/ial iJtrot/c^/i 
annoancemenl of neat ric^hls and entillemenls lf}e fudiciart/ is slorvltj 
andsleadifi^ emercjin(^ as l/iepeople couris prornisim^ lo mipe eoerry 
learn j-rom eoertj etje. }Cum6eroas paf)lie adoocacuj (groups are 
pro[iferalin(j lo mobilise j^aooarafjle pidicial response on 6e/ialf oj-
l£e oiclimized (^roaps.^ Bonded fafiourers., anderlrial prisoners^ 
inmales of /lomes for ne(jlecled^irls.^ pauemenl dwellers l/irealened 
f>y relocalion indi(^enl accussed denied fx^e le<^al aid ajid mantj 
ol£ers. udloncjside a>il/i l/ie commanilty aciioisls f j v proac/ive fas I ices 
also are en(ya<yed in induein(y or inoilin^ idte brincyiricj oj- peoples 
miseries Sefre l/ie couris., loJ^ adalals and lec^al aid cells. 
sixl/j cAapler deals a)il£ .X.e/iru\s [Ideas on social 
J us lice. Un I/is c/apler one imporlanl as pec I of \ y/eLru' v wor/ is 
uplifl oj- l/ie counlrij\s IrifjaJpopulalion. lAs a person closeltj inuoloed 
in l/ie wor/i of IriSal weljare 9 admire l/ie sensilive and ima<yinalioe 
approac/t aciopied f}tj yCe/iru /o /lelp ({lese nec^iedGxlseciionsp)in (ha 
main s/reain of national Jeoelopmeni^ /teepin<^ iniaci i/ieir 
iraJiiionaJ values. J f e planned and implemenied Jeoelopmenlal 
sc/iemes for {lie promo/ion oj- (veai^er sec/ions. On women., \X^e/iru 
iiaxf GYiialhj enli(j/:itenQ(f oiems. J f e mas a staunch supporier oj-
rvomen \s educaJion and firmltj hefieoed in ihe ec/aafiitj oj men and 
women. 
Ulie /as/ cfiapier^ wAic/i is i/ie seoeni/i c/iapier., is ifie 
concludin<j c/mpier. 9n ifiis cfiapier idie ideas discussed in i£e 
precedincj c£apiers /laoe fjeen summedup. 
S/ woufd io i/ianA oj^ my supervisor.^ 1)r. Syed Ti})aseem 
O^/imad^ Dreader., Deparlmeni ofJ^ofiiical Science., UUHyU^ 9shall 
s/jorl oj words io express my deep sense oj- c^raliiude j^or /lis presence.^ 
ever wiili /lis scliolarltj (guidance., sincere su^(jesiions.^ Iiefp and 
/ire/ess coopera/ion i/iroucjdi oui course ofsiudy. 
7 woufd fiAe io express mtj profound sense of^raiiiude io 
'T^roj. UT.uriaza Jilian whose inspiring guidance andencoura^emeni 
helped me io compfeie ihis ias/z. J f e has aiwatjs moiivaled me and 
\ I 
maxli^ ai>atlaf)le acfotce ai various jiinciure for fv /nc/^ 9 cannol j-imJ 
.stifficieni worxh h i/ianf^ [itm. 
ain deeply (/janAfti I io T^rof. J.. A. X^/zami] G/ia/rman, 
/)eparimen{ oj- y-^olHica! ^^cience as (ned as I)irecior^ C>enlre for 
yCefira ^'^iacfies^ yiftc/ar/i TKiisfim Q.fnioersr/ty^ Afi(^ar/i j-or wor r/v of 
encotirac^emenl ancf acfoice {/m/ /le afrvatjs (yesioiDecf /o me^ (vLich 
fiaoe siooflon me in cfoocf sleeJcJurincj my research wor^. 
9 am happtj (o acAnouifeclt^e my incle(){e(fness to aJf iLose 
w/jo /lefpeJ me in carryin<^ otil i/iis researcJi wor/?. prsi of all^ 
(^raiefifftj ac^nowlecfc^ecf l/ie academic Lefp^ cooperation ancf 
encourax^emeni (^iven lo me^ from lime lo lime^ Sy l/ie ieac£ers of i£e 
cfeparimeni oj- J^ofaicaf Science^ CdJK^lf l7ifi(^ar/i. 9 am sincerefty 
i/ian/ftif fo aff of i/iem. 
'JfCy (^raiiiudes afso c^o lo my friends wflo £e(peJ me in 
compfedon oj- (his wor/i. 3[iey aj^e many. 9i is no/possible lo name 
eac/i and eoeryone of i / j em. 9 (hanA aff of i/iem. 9 wonfcf Se failing 
in my duly., ij- 9 do nol recognize l/ie Sfessint^s^ looe andIzindness 
hes lowed upon me f j y my j-amify. Cvery hefp a)£ic/i 9 eoer sou^£lfor 
vu 
was cjioen io me. ^nfaci my family f)oosk'xl me in various mays (o 
compleJe i/iis mor/^. ^pay my sincere rec^ards io euery memfier oj- my 
f-amiiy. 
^ can not over loo/^ ilie appreciaSle j-aciliiies and /lelp 
e\len((e(f hy i/ie siajj members oj- (ifjrary oj- '7C 
ItSrary of II Xea> Dellp TKaufana Jizad fifjrary, 
/Hiyarjf) and ^"Seminar^ factifiy of law., Tl'jK^lf .Aliyar/i. 
Basi^ fnii noi feasi, 9 
sincerely ac/ino(vle(J(pe i/ie suppori of 
non-^ieac/iincy siaff of i/ie I)eparimeni of CPofi/icaf Sciencej TlTHJll.^ 
\Ali(yarli. 
Dated •3.0.1/^1.2.002-
C M o b 4 . A s b r g f A l l ) 
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CHAPTER - 1 
SOCIAL JUSTICE: THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Justice 
It has not been possible, as yet, to give an universal acceptable 
definition, and it has defined all attempts made by thinkers, jurists and 
sociologist etc. Harold potter has rightly said that "most men think that they 
understand the meaning of justice but in fact their notions prove to be vague".' 
Generally this ends in the definition that what seems to be just to a just man. 
This type of definition merely begs the question as it nowhere informs as how 
to recognize or distinguish a just man fi-om the other. In India 'justice' has 
always been associated with 'Dharma' a term which could not be properly and 
appropriately translated into other languages. U.C. Sarkar^ referred to four 
senses in which the term 'Dharma' has been used viz :-
(i) It means 'religion' in the category of 'theology', 
(ii) It means 'Virtue' as oppose to 'Vice' in the category of 'ethics'; 
(iii) It means 'law' in the category of law; and 
(iv) It means 'justice' and 'duty' in the category of one's actions. 
According to Hindu 'Dharmanyaya' i.e. equity or justice was given 
precedence over 'Dharma' i.e. law-whenever there was any conflict between 
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them. Dharmanyya prevailed. Generally speaking there was no separation 
between law and religion, the terms 'law' and 'justice' were used as 
interchangeable. According to Aristotles justice was either 'distributive justice' 
or 'corrective justice', the former required equal distribution among equals and 
the later applied wherein remedy was provided. This mention of 'equal 
distribution among equals in the distributive justice represents to earliest 
manifestation of the modem concept of equality. This Aristotle an concept of 
'distributive justice' was utilized by the House of Lords in England to 
invalidate an expensive welfare scheme which gave benefits to small section of 
people at the cost of other section of the people.' The doctrine of precedents is 
based on this notion of 'equality' in the administration of justice, as it imports 
certainly and predictability to the law, but rigid adherence to it can sometimes 
result in 'perpetuation of injustice'. Benjamin Cordozo'' has rightly 
administered a caution. 
" adherence to precedence should be the rule 
but adherence to the precedent ought to be in 
some degree relaxed when a rule has been found to 
be inconsistent with social welfare, there should be less 
hesitation in frank avowal and flill abandonment. That court 
best serves the law which recognizes that the rule of law grew 
up in a remote generation may serve another generation badly 
and it ought not to tie, in helpless submission, the hands of 
successions".' 
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The 'distributive justice' should be simple and free from 
technicalities of law and its administration the court should interpret these so as 
to distribute benefits to the largest number of persons and to confine the 'harsh 
effect ' within the narrowest limits. In the field of conective created by law. In 
the area which is not covered by any enactment, the courts have an authority to 
bridge up the gap and prevent the wickedness of many who disrupt the order of 
the society and the courts can, in the interest of Justice, exercise 
superintendence over the offences contra bonus m o t e s . W h e n the justice is 
associated with morality it also acts as social 'virtue' which requires that in 
order to get respect and recognition individual must respects and recognize the 
similar rights in others. The teirn 'justice' has been assigned different meanings 
at different times. What was regarded as 'justice' in past may be treated as 
sheer 'injustices' to day, or what is regarded as 'just' in one society may be 
regarded as 'unjust ' in another society. A further difficulty arises in reconciling 
the abstract notions of justice and its practical manifestation. The justice may be 
divine justice, moral justice but it will not be conformable to any set of 
standards and are not capable of practical application. When the state or society 
attempts to crystallize these absti act or vague notions of justice the resultant 
ruler are known as law. These rules may be fixed by statutory enactments or 
may )3y made-law. Justice no doubt can be administered 
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without these fixed rules i.e. law, but such justices will change with every 
judge, Devlin. J. has referred to it when he observed. 
"In the administration of justice choice always lies between 
the application of the fixed rules that are designed to be 
genera!!} fair and to ensuie uniformity of treatment, and the 
investigation in each case on its merits, leaving the result to 
the length of judge's f o o t " / 
The basic purpose of law is tlie quest for justice. Which is to be 
administered without passion as "when passion comes at the door, justice flies 
out of window'".*' The 'justice' has been regarded by anarchists as merely a 
'mask' to perpetuate the dominance of the weak by the strong. Communist 
regard ' law' as 'bourgeois' instrument for the domination of the proletariat by 
the capitalists. Inspite of this view regarding law even the communist nations 
have not been able to find a 'substitute' for ' law', rather on the contrary these 
nations have used the instrumentality of law more stringently than others. 
According to Paton, it is futile to hope or except that there will be no need of 
law when the communism is achieved, and he pointed it out with razor-sharp 
intellect when he remarked;-
"Even if no one covets his neighbour possessions, he may 
still covet his neighbour's wife, law may be change its 
function a socialist state, but no pornipunjty can exist 
without it".''^  
Social Justice: The Conceptual Framev.'ork 
For the puiposc of the present study the term justice' shall, of 
necessity, be justice according to law. 1 would, therefore, define 'justice' as :-
The fulfillment of the legitimate expectations of individual 
under existing laws and ensuring him the benefits promised 
therein and t-^  afibrd him protection against any violat'on of 
his rights or against any encroachment on his rights. 
To administered justice to an individual, firstly he shall be assured 
that he shall, whenever any violation by him is alleged, have the rights to fair, 
full and impartial adjudication; secondly he shall neither be discriminated nor 
any obstruction shall be placed on way to his progress in society and bettennent 
of his position career and fortunes; and thirdly, he shall be entitled to full 
benefits of laws applicable to him. In areas other than which are covered by 
laws, the gap is supplied by the concept of natural justice which the Courts have 
used in the administration of justice. 
Concept of Socia] Justice 
Social Justice, as it is commonly understood is a quest for achieving 
justice for those who are oppressed, suppressed, crushed, exploited, 
discriminated, deprived and the disadvantaged. The exercise is not easy. It calls 
for new methodologies and strategies to bring the depressed and the deprived at 
par »v?fh other segments of society. Social justice goes beyond mere reciprocity 
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or reciprocal reialionships between and among interacting human beings, either 
as individuals or groups. It also includes social, economic, professional and 
occupational relations. The purpose is to create an organically united and 
cohesive society with indiA-idual having an equal opportunity to grow and 
develop according to one's own talents and abilities. However, when viewed 
comprehensively, it includes economic and political matters of society too. 
Thus social justice implies social equality, which in turn implies absence of 
special privileges on grounds of religion, caste, creed, equal opportunity to all 
in economic matters-right to employment and political equality which implies 
political rights. The preamble to the constitution of India embodies the true 
spirit and better of the term social justice. Social justice is not a new concept. 
We find a glimpses of it in the writings of almost all the philosophers 
commencing from Plato. According to Plato justice lies in doing one's own 
work. He did not subscribe to notion of natural equality. Nature itself has 
created inequalities, some are bestowed with more qualities of head and heart 
than others. Therefore everyone is not fit for every type of work. The concept of 
egalitarian justice, thus entails the notion of just distribution, not equal 
distribution of benefits. Vlastor asserts, egalitarian justice has a direct stake in 
equalizing the distribution of those goods whose enjoyment constitute well 
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b e i n g . H u m a n considered greatest happiness of the greatest number is the 
supreme moral end of political justice. 
Social justice is dominated by three accounts of justice. There are the 
proprietarian account, the utilitarian account and the contractarian account. The 
first assimilates justice to letimacy, the second to welfare and the third to 
fairness. 
Justice as Letimacy 
Pre-supposes the existence of right and wrong, proper and impower. 
Its justice consists in its propriety in respect of assumed principles. This brand 
of justice owes its origin to the seventeenth century theory of natural rights 
(right to life, property and liberty) receiving a classic formulation in the work of 
John Locke in his two treaties of Government (1963). But the most powerful 
statement of it has been made by Robert Nozick in his Anarchy, state and 
Utopia (1974). The leading proporelarian theme is that individuals have certain 
rights independently of the form of social organization under which they live 
and those rights put constraints on the institutional arrangement that could be 
made for individuals. 
Social Justice: The Conceptual Framev.'ork 
Justice as Welfare 
Emerges from the idea of J. Bentham, J.S. Mill and Henry Sidywick 
following Bentham, the utilitrarians have regarded natural rights as nonsense. 
They emphasized the notion of welfare, in paiticular, human welfare in the line 
with the pleasure or 'happiness'. The conception of happiness is equivalent to 
the satisfaction of wants and desires. This want satisfaction approach to social 
justice present utilitarianism. It proposes to maximize aggregate happiness by 
often dealing people unevenly. It often justifies unequal allocation of social 
benefits. 
Justice as Fairness 
Identifies social justice as "fairness". The concept comes directly 
fi-om the contemporary American philosopher John Rawls (in his theory of 
Justice). Rawls proposed that all primary social goods - liberty and opportunity, 
income and wealth and the bases of self respect are to be distribute equally 
unless and unequal distribution of any or all these goods is to be advantage to 
the least favoured. He argued for arranging social and economic inequalities in 
a manner so that they work to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged 
members of the society. Here he qualifies his position and says that the concept 
of justice put out as optimal a character which serves people's interest in some 
non - arbitrary way. 
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In his elaboration to the principle "fair equality of opportunity". Rawl 
treats on difficult ground and concedes that equal opportunity is the principle of 
efficiency, since it is assumed that filling offices on the basis of ability and skill 
leads on the whole to more competent performance of the task attached to the 
office. In order to make his principle of justified equality" more receptable, he 
opines that justified inequalities might serve as incentive to effort and might 
have positive net effect. He however, adds that justified inequalities must not be 
continued by arbitrary contingencies or the relative balance of social forces. 
Rationality ought to be sole criterion concluding his argument he wrote "the 
soundness of theory of justices is shown as much as its consequences in the 
prima facie". 
On the basis of these three theories of justice, these emerge three 
principal criteria: 
(1) To each according to hi s right 
(2) To each according to his desert 
(3) To each according to his need. 
Principles of Social Justice 
Liberty, Equality and Fraternity are the three basic principles of 
social justice. Each of then) has been interpreted and re-interpreted by the social 
and political reformers, from time to time, with the principal object of 
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promoting the interests of the have nots, the oppressed, suppressed and 
downtrodden sections of societ)' to buildup a social order the free from 
oppression and exploitation in society, it would be proper to discuss each of 
these principles separately. 
Principles of Liberty 
According to L.T. Hob house "Common Good", is the rational or 
ideal object in pursuance of which liberty is granted." Early liberal thinkers 
uphold "Labsez Faire" as an essential attribute of liberty. This meant non-
interference by the state in economic activities to enable the market forces to 
operate freely. Thus early liberalism stood for negative liberty as "Absence of 
Restrainf that is absence of undue or arbitrary interference with individual 
action on the part of the government. Since this concept of liberty led to 
exploitation of working class and other vulnerable sections of society, the 
positive role to the state was assigned for sanctioning favourable conditions for 
the under-privileged sections, e.g. protection of the workers and other weaker 
sections and making provisions for their welfare including provisions for 
schools, hospitals, transport, housing etc. Liberty as positive concept comprises 
liberties or rights which are essential to the development of the individual and 
the perfection of national fife for example liberty of thought and expression. 
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The negative and positive concept of liberty exists side by side in the present 
day society with varying emphasis on each under different system. 
Principles of Equality 
Equality is a veiy vital pnnciple of social justice while it is a boon to 
the poor the oppressed and the down-trodden, it is dreaded by the rich and 
prosperous section of the society, because it can be stretched beyond the limits 
of justice. A Hobhouse has observed. 
"Justice is a name to which every knee will bow. Equality 
is a word which may fear and de t e s f 
The problem of equality has baffled political thinkers and social 
reformers from the earliest time. Aristotle defined equality as treating equals 
equally and unequals unequally. The modem idea of equality on the contrary 
focuses attention on its substantive aspect and seeks correction of inequalities in 
so far as they are unjust and alterable according to prevailing social 
consciousness. 
Law is the expression of the general will. It must be the same for all 
whether it protects or punishes. All citizens, being equal in its eyes, are equally 
eligible to all public dignities, places and employments according to their 
capacities and without any other distinction then that of their virtues and talents. 
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Mere forma! equality is not enough for oppressed and exploited 
sections of the society which not only need to protection but in substance it 
requires removal of unjust and oppressive conditions which are capable of 
alteration. The principles of equality demands that we may concede to only 
such discrimination as is based on rational grounds what is rational depends on 
the level of prevailing social consciousness. 
Principles of Fraternity 
The ideal of fraternity is no less important than liberty and equality. 
According to Barker the principle of fraternity consists in distributing among 
members of the state the various rights which are conditions of personal 
development, ffe said all of us need liberty and equality for om"selves. All of us 
need collectively a common equipment for our common benefit such as 
communication, transport, sanitation, housing, medical service, development of 
forest, miner, electric-power etc., which go beyond the reach of private 
enterprise and meant for common benefit.'^ 
The ideal of fraternity involves an emotion rather than principle of 
Government Barker prefers to call "Cooperation or Solidarity". It is a kind of 
cohension in the society which bring about emotional integration of the people 
within a state as a nation. Barker define fraternity with all ideals which 
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legitimizes a modem welfare state. The principles of fraternity should not only 
transcend the limits of liberty but even of equality to provide a humanistic base 
for a social organization. 
Social Justice is primarily conccmed with the claims of 
underprivileged sections of society those who have been deprived of their 
rights, freedom and opportunities of development because of a defective social 
system. Fraternity of course denotes a sentiment, but, in association with liberty 
and equality, signifies the conditions which inspire a feeling of universal 
fellowship which mark an end of all conflict. 
Problem of Social Justice 
David Miller in his erudite article on the Ideological Backgrounds to 
Conceptions of Social Justice''^ has identified the problem of social justice as 
that of the 'principles which should be chosen to govern the distribution of 
wealth, prestige and other benefits among the members of society'. He has 
discerned three speciality criteria which have been evolved by various schools 
of thought to decide the issue. The first criterion insists on the principle of 
'protection of acknowledged rights. It corresponds to a model of society, which 
M i ^ has termed as 'hierarchical order'. The chief advocate of this principle is 
David Hume. The second crit^j-jpn subj^ribes to the principle of 'distribution 
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according to desert. The conesponding model of society in this case is that of 
'competitive market'. The chef exponent of this model is Herbert Spencer. 
Finally, the third criterion is characterized by the principle of 'distribution' 
according to need. This leads to the model of 'solidaristic community'. 
Kropotkin may be regarded as pioneer of this model. 
In identifying these speciality criteria Miller seems to have travelled 
from the sphere of social justice proper to the realm of the various concepts of 
mere justice by which conflicting claim are sought to be 'justified'. The first 
two models, whatever their merit, could hardly be accepted as ones that 
approach the idea of social justice at all. The 'hierarchical order' demanding 
protection of acknowledged rights is, properly speaking, an antithesis of social 
justice, rather than a thesis thereof D.D. Raphael has rightly observed that the 
term 'social justice' tends to issue from the mouths of reformers who are not 
satisfied with the prevailing system of distribution of rights.'^ The very demand 
for protection of the existing rights emanates fi-om a theory of origin of rights 
which are either based on a wrong logic (as in the case of Aristotle's defence of 
slavery on the assumed inborn individual differences in the capacity to attain 
virtue) or on such grounds which are no longer tenable. A deeper analysis will 
show that the system of rights, alleged to be acknowledged rights, was evolved 
by a tiny class which managed to comer major portion of the resources of the 
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community, and forced the rest of the community to acknowledge this system 
by administering a strong dose of religion. The demand of social justice strikes 
at the very root of this system of so-called acknowledged rights. 
The second model, namely, that of 'competitive market', is also 
inconsistent with the idea of social justice because such competition takes the 
existing disparities in opportunities and powers to compete for granted. It is 
ahead of the model of 'hierarchical order' in the sense that it adds an element of 
effort and desert for determining one's share in the advantages accruing from 
organized social life. But the element of desert is introduced so cleverly that it 
re-establishes the theory of the acknowledged rights in disguise. This may be 
proved by a reference to Locke's defence of the right to property. Locke regards 
property as 'fruit of labour'. He builds up his theory with reference to 'manual 
labour' because man has absolute right on his hands and other parts of body by 
which he puts his labour. To this intellectual labour may also reasonably be 
added on the same ground. But with the changed circumstances, especially 
under the modem system of highly mechanized and capitalistic form of 
production, the extent of property that could really be described as fruit of one's 
labour is very difficult to determine.'^ Here manipulative labour comes into 
play and the process of production leads to increasing control in fewer a fewer 
hands not only over the productive resources of the community but over the 
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lives of a large body of citizens, thus depriving them of their liberty, which was 
so much valued by Locke. Any such theory that acquiesces in the existing vast 
disparities in opportunities open to the different classes, and still regards the 
criterion of 'distribution according to desert' as fool-proof is bound to fall to 
ground, when analysed from the point of view of social justice. 
The third model, which insists on 'distribution according to need', no 
doubt represents a substantial advance in the direction of social justice, but it is 
by far an insufficient criterion if exclusively applied. The need can be adopted 
as the sole criterion of allocation only in a society in which there is abundant 
production and human beings have learnt to take only what they need, and to 
put their best without any temptation for a distinctive reward. Since such a 
society exists in idea only, not in the real world, an elaborate scheme must be 
worked out to meet the wider requirements of social justice. 
Aspects of Justice 
'Social Justice' is the concern of moral philosophy and jurisprudence 
on the one hand, and of political philosophy on the other. Accordingly it is 
necessary to distinguish this term from two sets of terminology, namely, that of 
moral philosophy and jurisprudence, such as, distributive justice, natural 
justice, and that of political philosophy, such as, welfare state, socialism, etc. 
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Moral Philosophy and Jurisprudence 
In the realm of moral philosophy it is important, at the outset, to 
distinguish between formal and substantive justice. Thus in the formal sense, 
justice consists in the ordering of human relations in accordance with genca l 
principles applied impartially.'^ It is called formal justice because it deals with 
the outer form. It simply suggests the mode of applying the rules and principles 
without indicating what the rulers should be. For instance, the statement that 
equals should be treated equally and unequals unequally, as suggested by 
Aristotle, throws no light on what is to be done by, to, or for equals and 
unequals. Moreover, equal and unequal are relative terms; there are no absolute 
standards by which they could be measured. People may be treated according to 
their merits or their needs, and formal justice simply insists that they should be 
treated in the same way in respect of their merits or needs. It does not inquire as 
to whether 'merits' or 'needs' constitute any valid criteria for treating persons 
equal or unequal. Similariy, Ulpian defines justice as 'giving each man his due'. 
But this formula, too, does not help us to determine the standards to measure 
what is due to each man. Campbell, therefore, suggests that the doctrine of the 
form of justice requires to be supplemented by a doctrine of substance of 
i H justice. This leads us to the other important aspect, viz., substantive justice. 
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The substantive justice, therefore, concentrates on the content and 
substance of justice. In other words, whereas formal justice belongs to the 
domain in application of the rules, the substantive justice deals with end of law 
itself The judges and magistiates are generally concerned with the foniial 
justice in deciding the cases before them, though with the increasing role of 
judiciary in social reconstruction, they might have to invoke the end of law 
also. The legislations, on the other hand, must essentially concern themselves 
with the substantive aspect of justice so that the laws enacted by them conform 
to the essence of justice. The problem of substantive justice is a complex one. 
Discovering substantive justice may call for determining absolute truth or 
absolute good, but in practice the ideal of justice will always be reflected in a 
system that a society has chosen for itself and the ideals that a nation has 
cherished. It is significant that social justice particularly belongs to the domain 
of substantive justice. 
Another important set of terminology in the realm of moral 
philosophy consists in that of distributive, retributive and commutative justice. 
The traditional distinction between distributive, retributive (also called 
corrective, rectificatory or remedial) and commutative justice owes its origin to 
Aristotle, who suggested that the legislator should be concerned with the 
distributive justice whereas the judge should ccncem himself with the 
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commutative justice. Political rights and goods should be apportioned according 
to distributive justice; punishments should be imposed and damages paid 
according to commutative justice. Distributive justice gives each person his 
proper position and due share in the political community, whereas commutative 
justice determines the portion of one sort of goods or services to be rendered in 
return for another sort in voluntary transaction of buying and selling, or letting 
and hiring. Corrective or rectificatory justice, which is again the concern of the 
judges, purports to correct a loss of position and rights involuntarily sustained 
in the course of transactions between individual members of the community. In 
short, the justice of transactions demands restoration of the status quo or its 
equivalent. 
Some thinkers have pronounced a modem version of these important 
aspects of justice. Thus L.T. Hobhouse suggests that the distributive justice 
deals with apportionment as between members of a community, especially as 
considered from the point of view of needs, as it insists on 'equal satisfaction of 
equal needs of all members subject to the adequate maintenance of useful 
functions.''^ S.R.Lucas has pointed to a still another shade of the modem idea of 
distributive justice: 'Distributive justice in modem states is concerned with 
distribution of burdens more than of benefits. Taxes and military service are 
what the state is most concerned to share out... The one benefit which the state 
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may have available for sharing out among its citizens is participation in the 
process of decision-making. This is pre-eminently, although not exclusively, 
constituted by the right to vote in parliamentary elections.^" However, for a 
fuller idea of distiibutive juiiicc, all the advantages accruing from organized 
social life must be taken into account, whether they consist in political rights or 
in such economic and social rights as the right to work, right to a reasonable 
standard of living, right to education, social security and other benefits. It 
would thus come close to the concept of social justice, although still it would 
not become synonymous of social justice. 
Retributive justice, on the other hand, seeks by a mechanism of 
rewards and punishments to make each man share in the fruits of his action and 
bring home to him what he has done. The pure retributive theory, however, 
which makes a man the sole bearer of the consequences of his acts implies a 
quite impossible individualism.^' 
Commutative justice, according to Hobhouse, deals particularly with 
economic reward or what has been termed as 'the payment of service', and 
regulates transaction between the individuals on the basis of 'equal values'.^^ 
In any case these sub-divisions do not represent water-tight 
compartments and it is not easy to carry through them without over-lapping. 
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Jurisprudence it is customaiy to draw a distinction between legal 
justice and natural Justice. Raphael observes that justice is a complex concept 
and that in the realm of law the term 'justice' is used to cover the whole field of 
principles and procedures that ought to be followed. The system of law as a 
whole is often called, in legal parlance, the system of justice.^'' When justice is 
bestowed in accordance with the prevalent law, it may be termed as 'legal 
justice'. Thus legal justice determines the disputes in regard to legal rights, 
property rights and the rights of status between citizen and citizen, or the 
disputes between the citizen and the state. Legal justice, therefore, corresponds 
to formal justice. 
When no specific rule may exist, the judges are expected to act 
according to their sense of justice, equity and good conscience. In other words, 
when the letter of law is found to be silent or inadequate, the spirit of law must 
be followed: 'Justice, equity and good conscience are captivating terms; but 
before a judge applies what may appear to him at first sight to be in accordance 
with justice, equity and good conscience, he must be careful to see that his 
views are based on sound general principles, and are not in conflict with the 
intentions of the legislation and with sound principles recognized by 
authority'.^'* This leads to recognition of a 'law behind laws', the principles of 
which as usually described as natural justice. It is called natural justice because 
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it derives its authority from the nature itself. Natural justice regards man as a 
rational being, endowed with the power of reasoning. Hence natural justice 
emanates from the dictates of reason. Being natural, it is also universal. It is, 
therefore, binding both on 'the bench' as well as on the legislative organ of the 
state; it organizes them and determines their respective jurisdictions. Thus it lies 
on the periphery of formal justice and substantive justice. 
Natural justice seems to correspond to the concept of natural law of 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries originating from the stoic conception 
of jus-naturals. But, as Marshall has pointed out, in recent years it has acquired 
a restricted meaning and come to be used as a compendious phrase to describe 
certain rules of judicial procedure.^^ In this context, he has enumerated two 
essential elements of natural justice, viz., (a) no man shall be judge of his own 
cause; and (b) both sides shall be hear, or audi alteram partem.^^ Lucas has 
given a still more comprehensive definition of natural justice as applied to 
judicial procedure: 
The rules of Natural Justice require that no man shall be 
judge in his own cause; that the judge shall hear both sides 
of the case, that the judge shall give flill consideration to 
the case, that the judge shall exclude all irrelevant 
considerations from his mind while reaching a decision; 
that like cases shall be decided alike; that cases once settled 
shall not be reopened, though, according to some 
authorities, there shall be some right of appeal; that not 
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only shall justice be done but that it shall be seen to be 
done, that the judgement shall include not only the bare 
decision, but the reason which lead to it .. ^^ 
Lawyers may recognize the principles of natural justice as a 
relatively smali, though fundamental, part of the legal system, but in wider 
sense, natural Justice constitutes the essence of justice. In this sense, it may 
come close to substantive justice and may be distinguished only firom the 
remaining superstructure of law which is dependent on custom, precedent and 
enactment. If the sphere of natural justice is extended so as to afford special 
protection to the weaker party and impose social responsibility on the stronger, 
it may come close to the concept of social justice. 
Political Philosophy 
Coming to the do of political philosophy, it will be advisable, at the 
outset, to point to the usage of the terms social, economic and political justice. 
Broadly speaking, the terms 'social justice', 'economic justice', and 'Political 
Justice' are usually applied to elaborate what is compendiously described as 
social justice. In fact, social justice represents a comprehensive idea which 
operates throughout the social, economic and political spheres. Sometimes a 
comprehensive term 'social, economic and political justice' is applied, as in the 
Preamble to the Constitution of India, in order to ensure that the wider scope of 
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social justice is not lost sight of. In terms of the modem system theoiy, social 
justice may be considered as an attribute of social system in the wider sense, in 
which associational, economic and political relations constitute respective sub-
systems. Social justice in the restricted sense, which may be described as 
'associational justice' with a view to distinguish it from the term 'social justice' 
in the wider sense, economic justice, and political justice, then, should be 
identified as the attributes of associational, economic and political sub-systems 
respectively. In order to make the whole system work properly, it is imperative 
that all the three sub-systems described here operate in such a manner that they 
support and strengthen the main system. In other words, the associational 
justice, the economic justice and political justice shall, taken together in a co-
ordinated form, constitute and strengthen the social justice. 
However, when we refer to the terms 'economic justice' and 
'political justice' separately, we are either pointing to the application of the 
principle of social justice primarily and particularly in the economic and the 
political spheres respectively, or to the whole concept of social justice in the 
comprehensive sense. Thus, according to one opinion, economic justice consists 
in 'the provision of equal opportunity/ to the citizens to acquire wealth and to 
use it for their living; it implies too that those persons who are disabled or old 
or unemployed, and, therefore, not in a position to acquire wealth should be 
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helped by society to iive'.^^ This definition is, however, subject to further 
scrutiny. Help for the helpless is more akin to humanitarianism than to the idea 
of justice. Justice in economic sphere must also put a question mark on the 
existing vast disparities of wealth, and seek to reform and reconstruct the whole 
system as to modes of acquiring wealth. 
Similarly, political justice, according to the same authority, is 
'essentially the right to participate in the control over conditions of one's own 
and others' living, i.e., political participation.® This definition, again, suffers 
from imperfection, political justice must confer, not only the right to participate 
freely in the election of political representatives, but also an equal opportunity' 
to acquire and hold political office through constitutional means; provided that 
this opportunity is not rendered ineffective due to vast economic disparities or 
social inhibitions. 
Economic factor is so important in society that a major area of social 
justice is concerned with restructuring of economic relations to make them 
more fair. Thus, according to a famous jurist 'in a more restricted sense, the 
requirements which are indicated as those of social justice are those which 
concern the distribution of economic wealth, the organization of work, and the 
fehilihefMtion of workers; requirements which, according to the traditional 
ttibdi^, iielong to particular justice in one or the other of its two varieties 
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(distnbutive and commutative)'.'^' Similarly, when we speak of 'economic 
growth with social Justice', our main concern remains the economic sphere of 
social life, and this expression becomes co-terminus with 'economic justice'. 
Sometimes the term 'political justice' is also applied in the 
comprehensive sense, althourh the modem trend is to use the term 'social 
Justice' in such contexts. Godwin used the term 'political Justice' to denote a 
moral principle whose object was 'general good', and which was especially 
invoked to evolve a genuine system of property.^' Otto Kirchheimer has 
conceived of 'political justice' as 'the search for an ideal order in which all 
members will communicate and interact with the body politic to assume its 
highest perfection'.^^ 
In the present work the term 'social justice' will be used to denote the 
principle of just society in all its spheres - social, economic as well as political. 
In considering the sphere of social justice it would be convenient to discern the 
implications of social justice in national sphere on the one hand, and in 
international sphere on the other. 
International Sphere 
We may first consider the essentials of social justice in the 
international sphere, which must be indicated in a study dealing with the 
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concept of social justice. Thereafter the requisites of social justice in the 
national sphere could be considered in greater detail since they pertain to our 
main field of investigation. 
It is significant that a number of international insHtutions, e.g.. 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 
and international Labour Organization (ILO), etc. have included social justice 
among their objectives. In some respects the objects of social justice in the 
international sphere may coincide with those in the national sphere, e.g., in the 
matter of securing humane conditions of work for the labour, as sought by the 
Internationa] Labour Organization. Yet in broad perspective, social justice in 
the international sphere aims at bridging the gap between the advanced and the 
underdeveloped nations.^^ as also securing their co-operation in maintaining a 
clean and peaceful atmosphere in the interest of the whole world. In the national 
sphere, on the other hand, the idea of social justice operates in very complex 
forms so much so that it is difficult to demonstrate or delimit the whole range of 
activities in which this ideal is likely to be invoked. 
Securing social justice in the international sphere largely depends 
upon a voluntary effort of the nations, especially of the rich and powerful 
nations. Thus Gunnar Myrdal has insisted on the advanced nations to strive for 
welfare of the whole wodd. He has come out, as a result of inference from 
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analysis, with the thesis that once the Welfare State has come into existence in 
the Western Countries, and once the under developed countries are becoming 
independent and are launching upon individual national economic policies in 
the interests of their national development, there is, as a matter of fact, no 
alternative to continued international economic disintegration, except to strive 
for a Welfare W o r l d . H o w e v e r , before proceeding to this lofty ideal, it is 
necessary to ensure that the strong nations have no right to establish their 
suzerainty over the weak nations; that the conflicting claims of different nations 
should be settled according to peaceful means under international law on fair 
terms and conditions so that no nation, whether endowed with rare natural 
resources or otherwise strong, will make use of its economic or political power 
to hold other nations to ransom. Social justice in international sphere, therefore, 
not only insists on maintaining just and honorable relations between nations, 
but also on the duty of the rich nations to share their rare possessions on 
reasonable terms with other nations who may be in need. 
Keeping the atmosphere clean and free from pollution is also a 
problem of social justice in the international sphere since atmosphere 
transcends all national boundaries. The famous American Ecologist Professor 
Commoner,^^ for instance, considers the problem of universal atmospheric 
pollution essentially as an enormous problem of social justice. Elimination of 
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war, if secured, will no doubt keep away one potential factor of atmospheric 
pollution. But there are other factors also. Nuclear tests must be banned in so 
far as they result into atmospheric pollution in any part o the territory inhabited 
by human beings. Besides, indiscreet dumping of factory wastes into sea or air 
should be stopped forthwith so as to preclude any environmental pollution. 
Initiative in this direction must come from the advanced nations themselves 
since such dangers largely. 
Concept of Welfare State 
The concept of social justice is closely related to that of the welfare 
state, although it will not be proper to treat them as co-terminus. Honor, for 
instance, points out that the development of welfare state is generally thought of 
as an application of the notion of social justice.^^ In the Indian Constitution, too, 
the idea of welfare state is intertwined with that of social j u s t i c e . I n order to 
understand the distinction between social justice and welfare state. According 
to D.L. Hobman, the welfare, state is a compromise between the two extremes 
of communism on the one hand, and ubridled individualism on the other, and as 
such, inspite of all its imperfections, it sets a pattern for any humane and 
progressive society. Historically, since the decline of laissez-faire doctrine the 
modem states have been showing greater concern with the welfare of the 
citizens, which is responsible for the emergence of the welfare state. According 
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to Robert M. Mac Iver, the welfare state pursues the goal of adequate provision 
of protection against want and insecurity and safeguarding the health and 
general well-being of the people. In this sense, all modem states are 
increasingly welfare states.''^ Marsh has presented a still more comprehensive 
view of the welfare state: i n looking at welfare states throughout the world it 
seems that there are at best some common basic aims. If for example, one looks 
at the Scandinavian countries, or New Zealand, Australia, or Britain, there it 
seems as though they all attempt :-
(a) to ensure the maintenance of employment so as to guarantee the right to 
live for most of us; 
(b) to ensure the maintenance of a minimum income at all times; 
(c) to ensure the right to leam; and 
(d) the right to protection and community' support when one is incapacitated 
physically or mentally.'*® 
It is significant that the welfare state strives to achieve tbesQ broad 
objectives by (a) regulation of activities of men and institutions, e.g., quality of 
food and sanitation, hours and conditions of work, and so on as also the matters 
affecting public morals, such as, quality of our entertainment (e.g., censorship 
of films and other media of mass communication), and (b) provision of certain 
implements and services for common use and for the benefit of the needy either 
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free of charge or at nominal fee, as also of immediate and effective help for 
victims of accidents, natural calamities, like drought, flood, cyclones, 
earthquake, fire, epidemics or war, mainly at the expense of the tax-payer. 
Similarly, the welfare state concerns itself not only with protection of our 
person, property and public order against possible offences but also with 
maintenance of essential services and utilities (such as, water, electricity, 
sewage disposal, fuel, transport and communication), sanitation and public 
health, supply of essential commodities at reasonable rates; maintenance of 
schools, libraries, hospitals, roads, play-grounds, community halls, picnic 
spots,museums, art galleries and other archaeological treasures, etc. In short, 
the welfare state simply diverts some money from possession of the richer class 
and from the pocket of the ordinary consumer, usually according to a system of 
progressive taxation, to common use, or for the benefit of the needy. It does not 
seek to transform the whole of social order; it does not question the right of the 
rich to hold and multiply their riches so long as they continue to pay taxes 
according to law; nor does it challenge the vast economic disparities - the 
disparities of wealth, income and levels of consumption, so long as nobody is 
allowed of die of hunger, malnutrition or natural calamities. In other words, the 
welfare state seeks to ensure welfare of the people without demanding 
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sweeping changes in the existing slnictiire. Thus, by and large, it is an extension 
of the pnnciple of the so-called liberal democracy. 
Wider Objectives 
Social justice, on the other hand, seeks to achieve still wider 
objectives through revision of the existing social order and a redistribution of 
rights to suit the current ideas of fairness, although measures of progressive 
taxation as prevalent in the welfare state are considered as a part of the scheme 
of social justice. The philosophy of welfare state and that of social justice co-
incide in a large measure, but there is a difference of outlook. Broadly speaking, 
social justice insists on the claims of the poor and weaker sections of society to 
a fair share in the wealth of the society so that this wealth is distributed as a 
reward for the service rendered to the society, not on the basis of any privileges 
related to birth or status. The recipients of any benefits under this scheme are 
not required to compromise their freedom or dignity since these are extended to 
them as a matter of right, not as charity. Payment for service in this context is 
not accepted according to the existing rates and standards, but according to an 
objective criterion evolved on the basis of a fresh assessment of the value of 
their service. It rules out the existing system of extremely wide disparity in the 
rewards for the manual and intellectual labour on the one hand, and 
manipulative capacity and element of chance or speculation of the other. It 
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demands that the chances of birth and station shall not incapacitate men and 
women in developing their personalities. This idea was nicely expressed by 
Bakunin (1814-1876) in these words: 'Society must be so organized that all, 
man or woman, have the same chance to develop their faculties and use them in 
their work. To ensure this fully will doubtless take centuries; but history has set 
the problem and to ignore it now would be to accept our impotence.'" 
It is significant that social justice seeks material compensation for 
any material loss and does not entertain such religious assurances that an 
earthly loss is a heavenly gain. 
Departure from Communism 
Social justice as a principle of government differs in its modus 
operandi from communism. In the history of socialist thought Proudhon (1809-
1865) introduced the idea of social justice as an alternative for the charity on 
the part of the capitalists as preached by the earlier socialists Robert Owen and 
Saint Simon. For Saint Simon and many later socialists, the moral basis of 
socialism was not the ideal of justice, but rather the ideal of human brotherhood 
or love. Proudhon, on the contrary, pronounced that not love of others, but 
respect for their dignity as persons was the proper basis of morality. And the 
formula for morality was justice, defined as mutual respect for human dignity. 
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Thus Proudhon pleaded for tiansfonnation of the economic order to secure 
mutual co-operation of the workers, and subordinated political rights to 
economic rights. However Karl Marx (1818-1883), his contemporary, branded 
Proudhon and other earlier socialists as 'utopian' in contrast to his own 
philosophy which he termed as 'scientific socialism'. Marx went to the extent 
of deprecating social justice as it sought to ameliorate the conditions of workers 
which would cause industrial unrest to subside, and thus weaken the forces of 
revolution. It is significant that Lenin and other Russian revolutionaries at the 
turn of the century used the term 'economism' to denigrate the social democrats 
who relied on those trade-unionist movements which the working classes 
develop spontaneously in response to their living and working conditions and 
which tend to exhaust themselves in struggles for immediate economic and 
social improvements instead of advancing the cause of revolution.''^ 
Inspite of this criticism, most of the progressive states have sought to 
secure social justice through constitutional method as a means of transformation 
of the social order. A large number of democratic countries of the world have 
adopted the policy of social justice as an instrument of eliminating the vast 
disparities in the social and economic status of their people. According to 
Carew Hunt, the conception of social justice evolved by the socialist 
movement, particularly in Britain, and generally accepted by a large number of 
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socialist countries, has been the outcome of three main demands on the part of 
the masses: 
(a) for the establishment of a society in which the workers will be 
guaranteed not only the political rights they already possess, but also a 
degree of economic security, including latterly full employment, such as 
is thought unattainable under the 'free market' system of private 
enterprise (this has led to a great measure of state intervention in 
industry); 
(b) for a 'welfare state' to be brought about by a large-scale extension of 
social services; 
(c) for such a redistribution of income as is necessary to iron out class 
distinctions, and at the same time to enable the living standards of the 
wage-earners to be maintained and improved.''^ 
Social Justice and Socialism 
Social justice and socialism, however, should not be treated as co-
terminus. In the first place, socialism generally aims at or advocates the 
ownership and control of the means of production - capital, land, property, etc., 
by the community as a whole and their administration in tlie interests of all. 
That is why sometimes it is alleged that socialists in the West, or for that matter 
in India, have ceased to be socialists because they have begun to pay greater 
importance to social justice than to ownership and conliol of means of 
36 
Soda! Justice: The Conceptual Framework 
production. The reason advanced here is that social justice is possible within the 
capitalistic economic framework. 
This dilemma, in fact, arises from taking an extreme view of 
socialism and a very superficial view of social justice. G.D.H. Cole regards 
socialism as a movement as much as an idea, thought it is an idea as well as a 
movement. This idea, as nearly as it can be expressed in a sentence, is that the 
affairs of the community shall be so administered as to further the common 
interests of ordinary men and women by giving to everyone, as far as possible, 
an equal opportunity to live a satisfactory and rounded existence, coupled with 
a belief that such opportunity is incompatible with the essentially unequal 
private ownership of the means of production, and requires not merely 
collective control of the uses to which these can be put, but also their collective 
ownership and disinterested administration for the common benefit. This basic 
idea of socialism involves not only the socialization of the essential instruments 
of production, in the widest sense, but also the abolition of private incomes 
which allow some men to live without rendering - or having rendered - any 
kind of useful service to their fellows, and also the sweeping away of the forms 
of educational preference and monopoly which divide men into social classes. It 
involves, in effect, whatever is needful for the establishment of what socialists 
call a "classless society"; and in pursuance of this aim its votaries necessarily 
11 
Social Justice: The Conceptual Framett'ork 
look for support primarily, though not exclusively, to the working classes, who 
form the main body of the less privileged under the existing social order.'''^ A 
very large number of socialists strive to achieve these aims within the 
democratic framework in a slow and steady pace, without insisting on complete 
overthrow of the existing order in a single violent attempt. 
On the other hand, pursuit of social justice does not end with 
concessions to the capitalistic economic framework. It could be feasible to 
establish a 'welfare state', with its limited objectives, within a capitalist system. 
But the quest for social justice would raise more fundamental questions; is there 
substantive equality of opportunity for all men and women, irrespective of their 
birth, station, or faith to develop their inherent faculties, and to lead a dignified 
life? Social justice further requires that there shall be no concenfration of 
economic and political power which enables one class or group to confrol the 
lives of others. In short, social justice purports to convert formal liberty and 
formal equality into a real or substantive liberty and equality, fortified by the 
spirit of real fraternity. These conditions are enough to rule out any collusion 
between social justice and laissez-faire capitalism. In any case, social justice 
does not shed off democracy to achieve the objectives similar to those of 
socialism. It is significant that so many decisions of the United States Supreme 
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Court constitute the quintessence of social justice whereas that country does not 
profess socialism. 
Prevailing Confusion 
The concept of social justice is obscured due to the fact that even the 
advocates of extremely conflicting ideologies do not forget to pay tribute, or in 
some cases lip-service, to social justice. The champions of 'free enterprise', for 
instance, assert their exclusive claim to secure social justice on the ground (a) 
that their ideology is best suited to ensure maximum economic growth without 
which social justice is impossible, and (b) that it provides for unrestrained 
industrial expansion and consequent increase in job opportunities for the masses 
which are indispensable for, or even synonymous of, social justice.''^ They 
altogether ignore or divert our attention from the consequent evils 
accompanying the concentration of economic power which defy social justice. 
On the other hand, the advocates of violent revolution claim that there can be 
no social justice unJess you throw off the so-called democracy which allows the 
capitalists and exploiters to thrive under the garb of a fraudulent form of liberty. 
The protagonists of this method forget the evils of the wide-spread disaster and 
mass sufferings that are bound to accompany any violent revolution. In any 
case inevitability of an organized struggle for restoration of the rights of the 
underprivileged classes cannot be ruled out since the privileged classes cannot 
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be ruled out since the privileged classes will be instinctively determined to 
perpetuate their privileged position with ample resources at their disposal for 
securing it as also magnificent tactics to misguide the underprivileged by 
extending petty concessions to give an impression of their generosity and by 
preaching high-sounding pseudo-religious ideals. Class consciousness is, 
therefore, a primary condition of this struggle but the form of the struggle 
remains a debatable point. 
This confusion is by no means new or unique. Similar confusion 
attaches to other social values like liberty, fraternity, democracy as well, which 
by themselves are devoid of any doctrinaire overtones. In fact social justice, 
too, cannot be tied with any particular doctrine or ideology: It represents a 
combination of and balancing between true forms of liberty, equality and 
fraternity, which will be examined in greater detail in the subsequent part of this 
work. 
Another point of confusion about social justice is that it is invoked in 
so many and so widely different contexts that it becomes difficult to identify it 
with definite principles. We have already indicated the connotation of social 
justice in the international sphere. Thus when the President of the World Bank 
persuaded the members of the Bank to give more development loans to the 
underdeveloped nations, he invoked the need for social justice. When 
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somebody advocates slum clearance and provision of better housing, then too, 
social justice is invoked. Increases in wages of workers are conceded in the 
name of social justice. Welfare measures for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes are claimed to serve the cause of social justice. Laws securing certain 
rights for women or providing certain safeguards for minorities are passed in 
pursuance of the goal of social justice. Nationalization of banks, big business or 
industry is sought in a bid to ensure social justice. We also hear that the 
'inflation' is the worst enemy of social justice. Servodaya leader Jayaprakash 
Narayan, speaking of the dacoit menance, remarked that the ultimate solution of 
the dacoit problem lay in providing social justice to the masses.'^^ 
There is no doubt that the sphere of social justice is very wide and a 
reference to this term in all the above and other similar contexts is by no means 
irrelevant. But this should not be taken to suggest that social justice has no 
definite character. In all the above contexts it should not be difficult to discover 
a central idea. And that idea is to secure a better deal for the underprivileged 
groups or sections, or nations so that they could lead a more comfortable and 
more dignified life. Inflation and spiraling prices are considered enemy of 
social justice because they tell adversely on the living standards of the poor 
people. Inflation causes erosion of real wages, weakens purchasing power of 
the ordinary people, and thus deprives them of the necessities of life. Hence it 
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obstructs social justice. As for the relevance of social justice in the contiol of 
crime, it may be observed that the lack of social justice has been responsible for 
forcing many poor people to take to crime as the only means of their 
subsistence and survival, and this evil can be remedied only through 
establishment of social justice. 
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CHAPTER-M 
SOCIAL JUSTICE ANB CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 
15 August 1947 was a great day in the long and eventful history of 
our motherland. For, it was on that day that the British rule of India was 
terminated and political authority was transferred to the representatives of the 
Indian people. In a memorable speech on 15 August 1947 at zero hour, Nehru 
said: "Long years ago, we made a tryst with destiny and now the time comes 
when we shall redeem our pledge, not wholly or in full measure but very 
substantially. At the stroke of the midnight hour, when the world sleeps, India 
will awake of life and freedom. This is no time for petty and destructive 
criticism, no time for ill will or blaming others. We have to build the noble 
mansion of free India where all her children may dwelve". 
The attainment of Independence was not an end in itself. It was only 
the beginning of new struggle, the struggle to live and independent nation and 
at the same time to establish a democracy based upon the ideals of justice, 
liberty, equality and fraternity. The need of new Constitution forming the basic 
law of land for the realization of these ideals was paramount. Therefore one of 
the important task undertaken was the framing of a new Constitution. The 
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present Constitution of India is the result. It presents the political, economic and 
social ideals and aspirations of the vast majority of the Indian people. 
No Constitution in the world is as comprehensive as ours. It has 
unique features. It is firmly based on the principles of equality and justice and 
prohibits discrimination of people on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or 
place of birth. The fathers of our Constitution were keen to see that not only 
economic progress was achieved at a fast rate but also resources of the nation 
were distributed equitably. The new Constitution was inaugurated on 26 
January 1950. 
One of the basic principles stipulated in the Preamble of the 
Constitution of India is the concept of social justice. The preamble states, 
among others, that the people of India "have solemly resolved to secure to all 
its citizens justice, social, economic and political". This is the firm resolution of 
the people of this great country. 
View of the Constitution Maker on Social Justice 
Preamble of the Indian Constitution is an abridged version of the 
"Objectives Resolutions" moved by Jawaharlal Nehru in the Constituent 
Assembly on December 1946 and adopted by the Constituent Assembly on 22 
January 1947 after much deliberation. The Preambular concept of social justice 
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has been from the relevant part of the Objectives Resolution. The views 
expressed by the Constitution makers on the socio-economic justice embodied 
in the Objectives Resolution would give an idea about the meaning of social 
justice. It is, therefore, necessary to refer to the Objectives Resolution and the 
Constituent Assembly debate on it. 
The Objectives Resolution, from which the Preamble was chiseled 
out, states thus: 
"This Constituent Assembly declares its firm and solemn resolve to 
proclaim India as an Independent Sovereign Republic and to draw up for her 
future governance a Constitution: 
Wherein shall be guaranteed and secured to all the people of India 
Justice, Social, Economic and Political; equality of status, of opportunity and 
before the law; freedom of thought, expression, belief, faith, worship, vocation, 
association and action, subject to law and public morality".' 
The socio-economic-political justice stipulated in the Objectives 
Resolution received enthusiastic support from a large number of members of 
the House. The views expressed by them indicate the connotation of the 
concept of social justice. M.R. Masani supported this part of the Resolution 
relating to socio-economic justice on two grounds.'® It rejected the existing 
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social structure, promised social security aiid provided for equality of 
opportunity. It envisaged far reaching social changes through the mechanism of 
political democracy and individual liberty. 
Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar said that "the expression 'justice, social, 
economic and political' while not committing this country and the Assembly to 
any particular form of polity coming under any specific designation, is intended 
to emphasize the fundamental aim of every democratic state in the present 
day".^ So, according to M.R. Masani, the concept of socio-economic justice not 
only connotes rejection of the existing social structure, which is manifestly 
unjust and oppressive but also heralds far reaching social changes or 
transformation have to be brought about through the mechanism of political 
democracy and guarantee of individual liberty. In other words, social 
transformation or just social order has to be achieved within the framework of 
political democracy and without jeopardising the individual liberty. But, 
according to Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar, social justice is a fundamental aim of 
every democratic state in the present day irrespective of a designation it bears 
as to the nature of its polity. That is to say the social justice is a sine qua non for 
a true and purposive democratic state, particularly in India wherein the social 
stratification perpetrated for a long time resulted in an oppressive and 
exploitative social order. 
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Speaking on the Resolution, Dr. S. Radhakrishnan pointed out the 
responsibility of the Constituent Assembly "to effect a smooth and rapid 
transition from a state of serfdom to one of freedom"/ referred to the socio-
economic revolution contemplated in the Resolution and emphasized the need 
to make the material conditions and to safeguard the liberty of the human 
sprit. According to him, it was no good creating conditions of freedom without 
producing a sense of freedom.'^ Another member, Seth Govind Das, said that 
"keeping in view the condition of the world and the plight of India, we can say 
that our Republic will be both democratic and socialist....if true peace is to be 
realized, it can only be realized through socialism. No other system can give us 
true peace".^ 
However, B. R. Ambedkar expressed his disappointment at the 
content of the Objective Resolution relating to socio-economic justice, for he 
expected in it a clear enunciation of the doctrine of socialism. He said that if the 
Objectives Resolution, which spoke socio-economic-political justice, had a 
reality behind it and sincerity, it should have made specific provisions to the 
effect that socio-economic justice would be achieved through nationalization of 
industry and land. Also he said that it would not be possible for any fiiture 
government to achieve socio-economic justice unless its economy is a 
socialistic economy.'' 
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Another member, Vishwambar Dayal Tripathi, held a similar view 
and said that there should be a declaration before hand to the effect that the 
Constitution should not be framed without laying stress on socialism and the 
state created under it should not be estabhshed on a capitalistic basis. ^  
Obviously, according to them, everybody in the modem world, including 
staunch capitalists, swear by "social justice", but its realization is possible in a 
socialistic state only. Hence they pleaded that socialism must be given due 
emphasis in the Objectives Resolution, which purported to lay the basic 
framework and principles of the Constitution of India. 
There are a few other members who did not agree. In the opinion of 
M.R. Masani, the Constituent Assembly had no sufficient mandate to 
incorporate in the Constitution such economic policy of doctrinaire character.^ 
According to Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar, the Constitution should not be 
rendered rigid by incorporating explicitly a particular economic doctrine, and 
that it should "contain the necessary elements of growth and adjustment needed 
for a progressive society".^ Thus opposition to the use of the term "socialism" 
or "socialistic state" in the Objectives Resolution stemmed from the fear that 
use of such term or phrase in it might inject into the Constitution and 
undesirable rigidity. 
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Always as he was, Jawaharlal Nehru, the mover of the Objectives 
Resolution, was particular to avoid controversies. He said, "If, in accordance 
with my own desire, I had put in that we want a socialist state, we would have 
put in something which may be agreeable to many and may not be agreeable to 
some and we wanted this Resolution not to be controversial in regard to such 
matters. Therefore, we have laid down, not theoretical words or formula, but 
rather the content of the thing we desire"."^ Ultimately, the paragraph dealing 
with the socio-economic justice in the Objectives Resolution was approved 
without any change. Jawaharlal Nehru made very clear that he desired a 
socialist state, which would aid through its infrastructure the realization of the 
content and goal of social justice. He firmly believed that realization of its 
content, that is, fiill achievement of socio-economic justice, would eventually 
usher in a socialist state. 
Emergency use of Social Justice 
The debates in the Constituent Assembly makes it evident that the 
founding fathers made the social justice a predominant goal to be achieved. 
They gave broad hint on its connotation. Social justice, according to them, 
meant liberation of society from the existing social stratification, creation of a 
new and just social order, economic fi-eedom with social equality and, in short, 
an egalitarian society, which is imbued with democratic ideals and wherein all 
52 
Social Justice and Constitution of India 
institutions are impressed with socio-economic justice. In furtherance of this 
great ideal of social justice they made ample provisions in the Directive 
Principles of State Policy, but the basic principle is reiterated in a significant 
provision'®'' of the Constitution. It reads: 
1. The State shall strive to promote the welfare of the people by 
securing and protecting as effectively as it may a social order in 
which justice, social, economic and political, shall inform all the 
institutions of the national life. 
2. The State shall, in particular, strive to minimize the inequalities in 
income, and endeavour to eliminate inequalities in status, facilities 
and opportunities not only amongst individuals but also amongst 
groups of people residing in different areas or engaged in different 
vocations". 
Among all the duties imposed on the state, the one imposed by 
Article 38 is the basic duty, because it is in full and faithfull discharge of this 
basic duty lies the realisation of the goal of social justice set by the Preamble to 
the Constitution. Besides, Article 38 gives an indication of the lines in which 
the state should endeavour to reach the goal. It may be noted that clause (1) of 
the Article envisages a just social order encompassing all the three major fields 
of human activity, social economic and political and this is sought to be 
achieved by transfonning insWutiws, oCttw oaUQO^ Hfe to that end. 
• : ; - : , . 
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Then, clause (2) which was introduced into the Constitution by the 
forty fourth amendment indicates the lines in which the state has to proceed to 
reach the goal of just social order. It mentions, in this connection, two 
functions, namely, (1) minimization of inequalities in income; and (2) 
elimination of social inequalities in status, facilities and opportunities. The 
second function has greater bearing on social justice. These two lines of 
approach have to be pursued vigorously to establish equality, economic and 
social, among individuals, groups of people residing in different areas and 
groups of people engaged in different vocations. Evidently article 38 of the 
Constitution is a sheet anchor of the concept of social justice and is the 
reservoir of a host of social welfare legislations that came into force later on. 
Other Directive Principles contained in Article 39," 39-A,'^ 41,'^ 42,^^ 43,'^ 43-
A,'^ 45'^ and 46^^ modalities to achieve the goal of the just social order 
envisioned in Article 38 of the Constitution. 
Socialist Trend of Preamble 
In 1976, Parliament introduced through Constitution (Forty second 
Amendment) Act, 1976, two words, namely, "Socialist Secular", into the first 
paragraph of the Preamble. Since then the opening paragraph of the Preamble 
reads thus: "We the people of India, having solemnly resolved to constitute 
India into a sovereign socialist secular democratic republic". The Forty second 
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Amendment viv.ually spelt out the nature of the state and consequently, what is 
now contemplated is a socialist democratic republic of India. 
One of the objectives of the forty second Amendment, as explained 
in the statement of objects and reasons appended to the Amendment Act, is to 
quicken the pace of socio-economic progress of the people. This objective has a 
great bearing on the newly introduced preambular expression "socialisf . 
Introduction of the word into the Preamble became necessary because of two 
important factors, namely, (1) excessive concern shown by Supreme Court to 
Fundamental Rights vis-a-vis the socio-economic legislation, and (2) the new 
orientation in the juristic technique of the Supreme Court in interpreting the 
Constitution on lines of the Preambular mandate. 
Property' & Social Justice-Basis for Constitution Makers 
It may be noted that after the commencement of the Constitution the 
states were anxious to usher in a new social order in tenns of the Constitutional 
directives to the extent possible. The plethora of economic and agrarian reform 
laws met with stiff opposition by the affluent and propertied segments of the 
community and consequently had to pass the acid test of judicial scrutiny. The 
Bihar State Management of Estates and Tenures Act, 1949, was challenged 
before the Patna High Court in Karneshwar Singh v. State of Bihar^^ on the 
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ground that die provision made therein offend against the Fundamental Rights 
guaranteed by Articles 19(1) (f)^' and 
The Patna High Court held that the impugned law was 
unconstitutional because it imposed restriction of the most far-reaching and 
drastic kind on the property right guaranteed by Article 19 (1) (f) and it could 
not fairly be said tliat those restrictions were reasonable. In Uttar Pradesh, the 
validity of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1951 v/as 
challenged in Surya Pal v. State ofU.P.,^ but was dismissed by the Allahabad 
Higli Court. The divergence of views expressed by the High Courts on tJie 
validity' of socio-economic and agrarian reform legislation rendered their fate 
uncertain. 
In order to put an end to such imcertainty regarding the \^aiidity of 
socio-economic legislation. Parliament enacted the Constitution (First 
Amendment) Act, 1951 and inserted two new Articles, viz., 3 l A and 3 IB artd a 
new Schedule, viz., Schedule IX. Article 31A has immunized from attack uader 
any of the Fundamental Rights in Part III of the Constitution all laws providing 
for the acquisition by the state of any estate or any rights therein or for the 
extinguishments or modification of any such rights.—The scope of the Article is 
confined to "estates" defined in clause (2) (a) of the Article.'" 
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Article 3 IB has been inserted to save the specific Acts included in 
the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution from being declared unconstitutional by 
the courts.^'' Ninth Schedule has been added to the Constitution, wherein a 
number of legislations have been specified. 
A close scrutiny would show that they are intended to immunize 
socio-economic and agrarian reform laws from challenge under any of the 
specified Fundamental Rights. The Ninth Schedule served the same purpose, 
but was introduced as a measure of abundant caution. 
The tide of challenge on the groimd of violation of the rights of 
property could not be stopped. Subsequently another grave problem arose under 
Article 31 { i f regarding the compensation to be paid when property is 
acquired or requisitioned for public purpose. Article 31 (2) autliorized the state 
"to take possession o f or to "acquire" any property for "public purposes" on 
payment of "compensation". In this Article two important points involved are 
acquisition of property for "pubhc purpose" and payment of "compensation" in 
cases of such acquisition. 
Jawaharlal Nehru introduced Article 31 on the 10'^ September 1949 
in the Constituent Assembly by way of Amendment for its incorporation in Part 
III of the Constitution. Explaining the significance of the Article, he said there 
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were two approaches to the right to property embodied therein. One was from 
the point of view of individual right to property and the other from the point of 
view of community's interest in that property right and die Article made an 
attempt not only to avoid any conflict of interests but also to take into 
consideration both interests.^^ Then, he said that there was no question of any 
expropriation without compensation so far as this Constitution was concerned 
and the law was clear enough regarding acquisition of property for public 
purpose, compensation to be paid in such cases and method of judging the 
compensation. Normally speaking, he said, this principle applied only to, what 
might be called, petty acquisition or acquisition of small bits of property or 
even relatively large bits of property, for instance, for the improvement of a 
town. But today the community had to deal with large schemes of social reform 
and social engineering which could hardly be considered from the point of view 
of tlie individual acquisition of a small bit of land or structure. Further he said, 
if tlie chosen representatives of the people sitting in the legislature passed such 
a social reform legislation which affected millions of people, it would not be 
possible to leave such a piece of legislation to widespread and continuous 
litigation in the Courts of law without damaging the future of millions of people 
and the foundation of the state itself Obviously Jawaharlal laid stress on tlie 
implementation of large schemes of "social reform and social engineering" in 
58 
Social Justice and Constitution of India 
which cases question of payment of adequate compensation would not arise. In 
other words, where measures are taken to give effect to socio-economic justice 
schemes which will benefit tlie society as a whole, the state should not be 
burdened with the obligation of paying huge amount as compensation. 
In fact, he dealt with this point very clearly when he said that it was 
left to Parliament to determine various aspects of it and tliere is no reference in 
this to any judiciary coming into the picture. 
Jawaharlal Nehru had no doubt that judiciary's role was nil on 
determining the quantum of compensation. He said "Parliament fixes either tlie 
compensation itself or the principles governing that compensation and tiiey 
should not be challenged except for one reason where it is thought that there has 
been a gross abuse of the law, where in fact there has been a fraud on tlie 
Constitution. Naturally the judiciary comes in to see if there has been a fraud on 
tlie Constitution or not. But, normally speaking, one presumes that any 
Parliament representing the entire community of nation Mdll certainly not 
commit a fraud on its own Constitution and will be very much concerned with 
doing justice to the individual as well as the community". 
In tlie changing concept of property and problems arising from such 
change in the concept the question of protecting individual right to property was 
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by no means simple and no legal argument of extreme subtlety would solve it 
unless the solution took into consideration the human aspect of the problem and 
also the changes that were taking place in the world. 
In conclusion, he said, that the National Congress had laid down 
years ago that the Zainindari institution and big estate system in India must be 
abolished, which pledge would undoubtedly be honoured. Judiciary could not 
stand in judgement over the sovereign will of Parliament representing the entire 
community. The duty of the judiciary was only to see "in such matters that the 
representatives of the people did not go wrong".^^ Further, he said that in a 
detached atmosphere of the courts they should see to it that nothing is done tliat 
may be against the Constitution, that may be against the good of the country, 
that may be against the community in the larger sense of the term. Therefore, if 
such a thing occurs, they should draw attention to that fact, but it is obvious that 
no court, no system of judiciary can fimction in the nature of a third House, as a 
kind of third House of correction. So, it is important that with this limitation the 
judiciary should ftmction.^^ These views convey the idea that the 
Constitutionality or unconstitutionality of the state act must be judged not from 
the extent of dents it makes on the right to property alone, but from over-all 
consideration of the Constitution and the extent to which it succeeds or fails to 
implement the socic-economic policies and ideals embodied in the 
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Constitution/^'' In short. Article 31 (2) was designed mainly with a view to 
facilitating socio-economic policies and bringing a new social order envisioned 
in the Constitution. 
Many members supported the objectives that lay behind the Article 
31 (2). Holding that the House could not afford to ignore the social and 
functional character of property, Damodar Swamp Seth said that property was a 
social institution and like all other institutions, was subject to regulations and 
claim of common interest.^^ Then, speaking on "compensation" he said when 
the institution of slavery was abolished in America, no compensation was paid 
to the slave-owners although many of them had paid hard cash when they 
purchased them.- The doctrine of compensation as a condition of expropriation 
could not be accepted as a Gospel truth. In this connection he drew attention of 
the House to the death duty, which, he said, was a form of partial expropriation 
without compensation and it formed an essential feature of the financial system 
of many a progressive country in the world. It was impossible for the state to 
pay owners of property in all cases compensation at market value for the 
property requisitioned or acquired in times of emergency or for the purpose of 
socialization of big industries with a xiew of eliminating exploitation and 
promoting general economic welfare. What is more, even the suggestion to pay 
partial compensation in such cases, is viewed with certam amount of 
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disapproval, for, he thought that such payment would have no justification 
when general transformation of economic structure on socialist lines took place. 
What he could concede in such circumstances to persons with vested interests 
was a claim of an opportunity and a share on par with all other citizens of the 
state." 
The concept of compensation in the India's Constitution has always 
been an object of controversy between advocates of social justice and protectors 
of individual liberties. This conflict of dogmas was seen reflected even from the 
debates between founding fathers. According to one argument, tlie word 
"compensation" by itself carried with it the connotation that it must be 
equivalent in money value of the property on the date of the acquisition. But, 
the second argument was to the effect that the mere word "compensation" and 
other phrases in the Article gave much freedom to the legislature in formulating 
the principles on which and the manner in which the compensation was to be 
determined. Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar said that the ommission of the word 
" jus f in the Article was significant in that it showed that the language 
employed in the Article was not in pari materia with the language employed in 
corresponding provisions in the U.S. and Australian Constitutions, which 
stipulated acquisition of property on payment of "just compensation". So, 
according to him, construction of the word "compensation" in Article 31 must 
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vary from the construction put by the American and Australian Courts on the 
expression "just compensation" found in their Constitutions. Proceeding further 
he said that the principles of compensation by their very nature could not be the 
same in every species of acquisition. In this connection he said that in 
formulating the principles, the Legislature must necessarily have regard to the 
nature of the property, the history and course of enjoyment, the large class of 
people affected by the legislation and so on. ^ ^ 
Law, according to Alladi, must serve as an instrument of social 
progress. Riding back to the road of ancient philosophies, Alladi tried to justify 
that the institution of property had a role to play in achieving a social purpose 
and it is not an end in itself.^^ 
Thus, the views of the majority in the Constituent Assembly'^" on the 
right to property and compensation to be paid to persons affected by socio-
economic and agratian reforms were in consonance with their ideas on 
Constitutional goal of social justice. They firmly rejected concentration of 
wealth or consolidation of property in a few hands and resolutely looked 
forward for social justice oriented reforms in the agrarian and economic fields. 
They felt that in ushering in a new era of new social order with social justice the 
state should not be burdened with, or its efforts should not be hamstrung by, the 
obligation of paying huge compensation. 
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Declaration of Administration of Justice 
Despite all emphatic views expressed by eminent members of the 
constituent Assembly, the history of the decisions of the courts in the post 
independence era shows sheer apathy and total disregard to the social justice 
content of the provisions relating to rights to property. Drawn between the 
claims for inalienable rights to property and the demands of social control over 
vested interest in property, more often than not courts took a stand on the 
former and made a conscious (or unconscious) attempt to perpetuate 
monopolistic interest on private property and insatiable thirst of man for 
amassing wealth. Obviously this trend led to a musical chair performance 
between the legislature enacting Amendments and after amendments to 
override the impact of judicial decision and trying to usher in an era of welfare 
and social justice and the judiciary finding out new interpretative techniques 
with emphasis on the individual rights to property to apply brakes on state's 
quest for social justice. 
The catena of decisions by the Supreme Court and tlie host of 
Amendments effected by Parliament show the most fascinating history of the 
Constitutional conflicts that free India has ever seen. The starting point of this 
game with the Patna decision in Kameshwar Singh and the first amendment to 
the Constitution has already been discussed early."^' The next chapter of the 
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story is opened by the decision of the Supreme Court in State of West Bengal v. 
Mrs. Rela Banerjee.'^^ The dispute arose in respect of the word "compensation". 
Should compensation be only an amount determined by the executive or be an 
amount just equivalent to the market value of the property acquired? The words 
of the court are self explanatory. The court held that the legislature is given the 
discretionary power of laying down the principles which should govern the 
determination of the amount to be given to the owner of the property 
appropriated. Such principles must ensure tfiat what is determined as payable 
must be compensation, that is, a just equivalent of what the owner has been 
deprived of within the limits of this basic requirement or fiill indemnification of 
the expropriated owner. The Constitution allows free play to the legislative 
judgement as to what principles should guide the determination of the amount 
payable. Whether such principles take into account all the elements which make 
up the true value of the property appropriated and exclude matters which are to 
be neglected is a justiciable issue to be adjudicated by the court."^^ 
The observation of the Supreme Court was viewed by the states with 
great apprehension. They felt that it created a great impediment to socio-
economic reforms and a drag in their march towards a better tomorrow - their 
dreamland where social justice and welfare are guaranteed. It would be difficult 
for states to get enough resources m the near future to give full indemnification 
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to the owners of the expropriated property when property is acquired and socio-
economic reforms are introduced. Should social justice ideal of the Constitution 
remain in that event an unattainable goal? The representatives of the people 
thought that it should not. Quick was the reaction of Parliament which enacted 
in 1955 the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act and made suitable changes 
in Article 31 and inserted a new Clause 2 (A)"*^  in Article 31 of the 
Constitution. These changes brought into existence two categories of 
deprivation of property. One is the compulsory acquisition and requisitioning of 
property by the state for public purpose, which could be done by law and law 
must provide for compensation or specify the principles of compensation. The 
second category of deprivation constitutes cases wherein the ownership or right 
to possession of property is not transferred to the state, and such cases are not 
deemed to provide for compulsory acquisition or requisitioning within the 
meaning of Article 31 (2). Besides, the amended provisions of Article 31 (2) 
expressly made the adequacy of compensation non-justiciable. 
In Article 31 A, the Fourth Amendment Act substituted a much 
inflated new clause for old clause (1) by which a wider range of laws, which 
extend from the field of land reforms to the field of industrial and commercial 
reforms were made immune from challenge before the courts. It is also declared 
that they shall not be deemed to be void on the ground tha^ they are inconsistent 
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with, or take away or abridge any of the Fundamental Rights conferred by 
Article 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution.'^'' Thus, as pointed out by Prof 
Alexandrowicz, "this new category of laws which are made immune from 
judicial review extends from the field of land reform to the industrial and 
commercial fileds".'^^ 
It must be remembered that all these changes were made keeping in 
view the goal of social justice. Subsequently, a lacuna or deficiency in Article 
31A was brought to the fore by the Supreme Court in Kunhikoman v. State of 
Kerala,'^^ wherein Kerala Agrarian Relations Act of 1961 was impugned in so 
far as it related to ryotwari lands on the ground that it violated the right to 
property of the ryotwari pattadars and the law was not protected by Article 31A 
because the definition of "estate" given in the said Article did not cover 
ryotwari lands. The Supreme Court accepted the contention and quashed the 
law in so far as it applied to ryotwari lands. Consequently, the ryotwari 
pattadars escaped from the clutches of the land reform law and ceiling limits 
imposed by it. 
In order to plug the loophole found in Article 31 A, to remove 
impediments to land reforms and to save several land reform legislations, which 
were in imminent danger of being challenged before the Court after the decision 
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in Kidnhikoman, Parliament enacted Constitutional (Seventeenth Amendment) 
Act in 1964. 
The Seventeenth Amendment incorporated three provisions - (1) 
compensation at market value for acquisition of a land from cultivator who held 
lands within the ceiling limits of the l a n d , ( 2 ) inclusion of ryotwari and 
agricultural lands under the concept of 'estate' immune from judicial 
challenge^® and (3) Stuffing the Ninth Schedule with more laws.^"'' 
A number of writ petitions were filed before the Supreme Court 
challenging the validity of the Seventeenth Amendment Act, which came up for 
discussion in Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan!'^ But the Court approved the 
previous stand taken in Sankari Prasad v. Union of India^^ - That the power to 
amend the Constitution includes power to amend Fundamental Rights. The 
Court rejected the plea of the petitioners to review its Sankari Prasad decision. 
Consequently, the validity of the 1 A m e n d m e n t Act was upheld. 
Subsequently, the land ovmers made a second attempt to challenge 
the validity of the Seventeenth Amendment Act before the Supreme Court in 
Golaknath v. State of Punjab.^^ The Supreme Court, delivering its six to five 
judgement in this case, overruled its earlier decisions in Sankari Prasad and 
Sajjan Singh cases and held (1) that the power of Parliament to amend the 
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Constitution was denved from Articles 245,'^ 246^^ and 248^^ (from the 
residuary legislative field) which deal with the ordinary legislative powers of 
parliament and not from Article 368 ;" and (ii) that Constitution amendment 
was "law" within the meaning of Article 13 (2) of tlie Constitution, and, 
therefore, if a Constitution amendment took away or abridged Fundamental 
Rights it was void.^^ But, the court applied the doctrine of "prospective 
overruling" and said that its decision would have only "prospective 
o p e r a t i o n " . C o n s e q u e n t l y , the Seventeenth Amendment and earlier 
amendments to Part 111 of the Constitution continued to be valid, but any future 
amendment to Fundamental Rights would be invalid.'"'' Commenting on this 
decision a learned author has said that the decision has sufficient potentialities 
to effect adversely socio-economic measures in future. If the Supreme Court in 
future adopts, as in the past, a narrow and restrictive interpretation on the 
provisions relating to property right with little or no consideration for society 
benefiting or structure transforming socio-economic legislative measures 
Parliament will not be in a position to remove the impediment and to facilitate 
the speedy implementation of the socio—economic reforms by amending 
suitably the provisions relating to Fundamental Rights.^' 
Subsequently, parliament passed two amendments to remove the 
difficulties created by the Golaknaih decision. First is the Constitution (Twenty 
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Fourth Amendment) Act, which made necessary modification in Article 368 
and 13 to make clear inter alia, that notwithstanding anything in the 
Constitution, Parliament may in exercise of constituent power amend any 
provision of the Constitution^'^ and nothing in Article 13 shall apply to any 
amendment made under Article 13/'^ The second is the Constitution 
(Twentyfifth Amendment) Act, which incorporated a new Article 31C. This 
new Article said, among others, that notwithstanding anything contained in 
Article 13, no law giving effect to the policy of the state towards securing the 
pnnciples laid down in clauses (b) and (c) of Article shall be deemed to be 
void on the ground that it is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of 
the rights conferred by Articles 14, 19 or This was done because 
Parliament felt that an uninterrupted implementation of the crucial provisions of 
clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39 in Part IV of the Constitution was necessary for 
the realisation of social justice. 
After the Golaknath decision, a new and definite trend in the 
technique of interpretation of the Constitution with the help of Preamble 
emerged. Prior to that decision, the position of the Preamble as an aid to 
construe the provisions of the Constitution was in a nebulous stage. This was 
mainly due to the fact that the Indian Courts were influenced by the views of 
Prof. Willoughby aiid story and the earlier decisions of American and English 
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Courts. Prof. Willoughby was of the view that the value of the Preamble to the 
Constitution for purposes of construction was similar to that given to the 
Preamble of an ordinary statute and in that he said that the preamble "may not 
be relied upon for giving to the body of the instrument a meaning other than 
that which its language plainly imports, but may be resorted to in cases of 
ambiguity, when the intention of the framers does not clearly and definitely 
a p p e a r " . T h e great commentator, story, said that "the Preamble of a statute is 
a key to open the mind of the makers as to the mischiefs vs^hich are to be 
remedied, and the objects which are to be accomplished by the provisions of the 
statute".''^ A similar view was expressed by the American judiciary in Jacobson 
V. Masachnsetts^^ wherein a proposition was made to the effect that although 
the Preamble indicated the general purposes for which the people ordained and 
established the Constitution, it had never been regarded as the source of any 
substantive power conferred on the government or any of its departments. The 
English Courts had no difficulty in subscribing to the above mentioned views, 
because they were not troubled by an obligation to interpret written 
Constitution established by the people. So, in Powell v. Kempton Parke 
Company^'^ it was clearly stated that the rules of interpretation propounded by 
the judiciary did not permit the Preamble to qualify specific provisions. In other 
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words, the courts laid down a principle that general words should not be 
allowed to control the specific stipulations (generalia specialibus non derogant). 
The aforesaid views influenced the thinking of the Indian judiciary 
right upto the year 1967. As a matter of fact, the Preamble to the Indian 
Constitution is not of an ordinary run, for it is an abridged version of the 
"Objectives Resolution" adopted by the Constituent Assembly of India on the 
basis of which Constitution of India was raised subsequently. Naturally, 
therefore, prime importance has been attached to it. Nehru commending 
strongly the "Objectives Resolution" to the House Jawaharlal Nehru said: "It 
seeks very feebly to tell the world of what we have thought or dreamt for so 
long, and what we now hope to achieve in the near future. It is in that spirit that 
I venture to place this Resolution before the house and it is that spirit that I trust 
the house will receive it. And may I sir, also with all respect, suggest to you and 
to the house that, when the comes for the passing of this resolution let it be not 
done in the formal way be the raising of hands but much more solemnly, by all 
of us standing up and thus taking this pledge anew".^° At the final stage, that is 
when the "Objectives Resolution" was transformed and put as Preamble to the 
Constitution, the eminent laywer, Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar said that "so far 
as the Preamble is concerned, though in an ordinary statute we do not attach 
any importance to the Preamble, all importance has to be attached to the 
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Preamble in a Constitutional statute"/ ' Despite these facts, the Indian judiciary 
has not been quite clear at the initial stage as to which principle of interpretation 
has to be adopted regarding the use of Preamble in construing the specific 
provisions of the Constitution. Consequently, in a few cases the judiciary 
adopted the traditional and old views expressed by Prof Willoughby and others 
and in a few other cases it attached much importance to the Preamble in 
deciding Constitutional issues. 
In the first important Constitutional case, namely A.K. Gopalan v. 
State of Madras^^, Justice Patanjali Sastri said : "There can be no doubt that the 
people of India have in exercise of their sovereign will, as expressed in the 
Preamble, adopted the democratic ideal which assures to the citizen the dignity 
of the individual and other cherished human values as a means to the full 
evolution and expression of his personality".^^ Proceeding fiuther, he said that 
"this has been translated into positive law in Part III of the Indian Constitution, 
and I agree that in construing these provisions the high purpose and spirit of the 
Preamble as well as the Constitutional significance of a declaration of 
Fundamental Rights should be borne in mind. This, however, is not to say that 
the language of the provisions should be stretched to square with this or that 
Constitutional theory in disregard of the cardinal rule of interpretation of any 
enactment, Constitutional or other, that its spirit no less than its intendment 
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should be collected primarily from the natural meaning of the words used"/ ' ' In 
other words, Mr. Justice Patanjali Sastri refused to countenance the view that 
the Preamble or the Preambular concepts could be allowed to give meaning and 
contents to the provisions in Part III of the Constitution which might differ from 
what was apparent from the language of the Article therein. 
However a different note has been struck by Chief Justice Mahajan, 
in Behram Khurshid Pesikaka v. State of Bombay^ when he said: "We think 
that the rights described as Fundamental Rights are a necessary consequence of 
the declaration in the Preamble that people of India have solemnly resolved to 
constitute India into a sovereign democratic republic and to secure to all its 
citizens justice, social, economic and political; liberty of thought expression, 
belief, faith and worship; equality of status and of opportunity".^^ Proceeding 
further, he said: "These Fundamental Rights have not been put in the 
Constitution merely for individual benefit, though ultimately they come into 
operation in considering individual rights. They have been put there as a matter 
of public policy and the doctrine of waiver can have no application to 
provisions of law which have been enacted as a matter of Constitutional 
policy".^^ Here, Preamble has been used as an aid in construing the position of 
Fundamental Rights and the doctrine of waiver of Fundamental Rights has been 
1 ejected. 
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A similar attitude is evident in In re Kerala Education Bill 1957.'" In 
this case main question was whether the Kerala Education Bill enacted in 
furtherance of certain Directive Principles violated Fundamental Rights 
embodied in Articles 14, 15, 30 etc. Dealing with this question Chief Justice 
S.R. Das described the Preamble as "the inspiring and nobly expressed 
Preamble to our Constitution"^'^ and said that one of the most cherished objects 
of our Constitution embodied in the Preamble is "to secure to all its citizens the 
liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship. Nothing provokes and 
stimulates thought and expression in people more than education. It is education 
that clarifies our belief and faith and helps to strengthen our spirit of worship. 
To implement and fortify these supreme purposes set forth in the Preamble, Part 
III of our Constitution has provided for us certain Fundamental R i g h t s " . T h u s , 
in this case some attempt has been made to use the Preamble in construing the 
provisions relating to Fundamental Rights in Part III of the Constitution. 
But, subsequently in 1960 a different view was expressed by the 
Supreme Court in In re Berubari Union and Exchange of Enclaves.^^ In this 
case, dealing directly with the question as to how far the Preamble aids the 
construction of the Constitution, Justice Gajendragadkar said: "There is no 
doubt that the declaration made by the people of India in exercise of their 
sovereign will in the Preamble to the Constitution is, in tlie words of story, a 
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key to open the mind of the makers' which may show the general purposes for 
which they made the several provisions of the Constitution; but nevertheless the 
preamble is not a part of the Constitution, and as Willoughby has observed 
about the preamble to the American Constitution, it has never been regarded as 
the source of any substantive power conferred on the Government of the United 
States, or any of its departments. Such powers embrace only those expressly 
granted in the body of the Constitution and such as may be implied from those 
so granted". ^ ^ Then he opined that "it may perhaps be arguable that if the tenns 
used in any of the articles in the Constitution are ambiguous or are capable of 
two meanings, in interpreting them some assistance may be sought in the 
objectives enshrined in the Preamble".^^ Needless to say that this view is old as 
the one expressed by Prof. Willoughby. Consequently, by this decision the 
Preamble has been relegated to the background and its utility as a tool to 
interpret specific provisions of the Constitution has been put under much cloud. 
What is worse, the statement in the decision that "the Preamble is not a part of 
the Constitution" has created much confusion in themind of the people. Those 
who watched closely the proceedings in the Constituent Assembly and 
understood that the Constitution was framed on the basis of the "objectives 
resolution" which was later abridged and put as Preamble to the Constitution 
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might have read it with surprise and perhaps with certain amount of 
amusement.'^'' 
However, a definite departiire from the position adopted in the In re 
Bembari Union and Exchange of Enclaves has been made in golaknath v. Stale 
ofFunjab^^ In latter case. Chief Justice Subba Rao who delivered the majority 
opinion, has said that the scope and position of Fundamental Rights cannot be 
appreciated unless we have a conspectus of the Constitution, its objects and its 
machinery to achieve those objects. In this connection he has pointed out that 
"the objective sought to be achieved by the Constitution is declared in sonorous 
terms in its Preamble"^'' and it, according to him, "contains in a nutshell its 
ideals and its aspirations. The Preamble is not a platitude but the mode of its 
87 realisation is worked out in detail in the Constitution'. 
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Kesavananda Bharali v. Slate of Kerala^^ In this case, Chief justice Sikri, 
struck distinction between construction of an ordinary statute and interpretation 
of a Constitution and said that in the case of the former Preamble could be used 
only if lan2:uace is not plain and c l e a r b u t in the case of the latter, a s opined by 
A^iiaui iS.nSiiiiai>Wdini A y y a i , all linpOliaiiCC haS lO b c a l iachcU It) ihc PiCallibiC 
in a Constitution.^'^ Besides, he felt that Preamble t5 the Indian Constitution has 
an unique position. In this connection the learned Chief Justice stated "I may 
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here trace the histoiy oi" the shaping of the preamble because this would show 
that the Preamble was in conformity with the Constitution as it was finally 
accepted. Not only was the Constitution framed in the light of the Preamble but 
the Preamble was ultimateiy settled in the light of the Constitution''. "^ ' Then, 
tracing the history of the shaping of the Preamble, he concluded thus, "It seems 
to me that the Preamble of our Constitution is of extreme importance and the 
Constitution should be read and interpreted in the light of the grand and noble 
vision expressed in the Preamble"/^' The Supreme Court strongly reiterated in 
this case the proposition that all importance must be attached to the Preamble 
and it must be taken as an aid to interpret the Constitution, because the 
Constitution must always conform to and exude "the grand and noble vision" 
expressed in the Preamble. 
Naturally, therefore. Parliament felt that since the Preamble to the 
Constitution had been finally recognised as a tool to interpret the Constitution, 
it must necessarily indicate guidelines regarding the framework within which 
"the grand and noble vision" of the Preamble has to be realised and the nature 
of state which has to emerge and establish strongly on the realisation of such 
"grand and noble vision" of the Preamble. Besides, as pointed out earlier. 
Parliament was alarmed by the undue concern shovra by the Court to right to 
property vis-a-vis the socio-economic legislation and agrarian reforms. So it felt 
78 
Social Justice and Constitution of India 
the need to indicate not only the type of socio-economic framework within 
which "the grand and noble vision" of the Preamble has to be realised but also 
the complexion of the state which must come into being firmly on the 
realisation of the said "grand and noble vision'' of the Preamble. Therefore, by 
the Constitution (forty second Amendment) Ac t Parliament introduced the 
word "socialisf into the Preamble to make it clear that people of this country 
intended, among others, to establish solemnly a sovereign democratic 
"social is t republic. 
The foregoing analysis would show that one of the grand and noble 
visions expressed in the Preamble is "social justice" and it is expected to march 
forward hand in hand with "economic and political justice" towards the goal of 
"a new social order" wherein social, economic and political justice would 
inform all the institution of national life. Apart from that the introduction of the 
word "socialisf into the Preamble made abundantly clear that social justice, 
measures must be such as to strengthen the base of the socialist state and 
egalitarian social order. 
At this stage it may be convenient to state the main implications of 
the Preambular concept of social justice. First, it heralds, as explained by M.R. 
Masani, far reaching social changes or transformation within the democratic 
framework. It also eventually means removal of social-stratification and 
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exploitative social order. Second it connotes, as pointed out by Dr. S. 
Radhakrishnan, a "transition from state of serfdom to one of freedom". Third, it 
envisages a just social order encompassing all the three field of human activity, 
namely the social, economic and political fields. This is sought to be achieved 
as is evident from the specific provisions, particularly in Part IV of the 
Constitution of India, by transforming all the institutions of national life to that 
end. 
Finally, it envisages now not merely the contents of socialism but 
also its format or what may be called its infrastructure. That is to say, it has to 
be realised within the framework of socialist state to strengthen the true 
egalitarian social order. In other words, the Preambular social justice envisions 
establishment of a distributive justice-oriented, non-exploitative and egalitarian 
social order within the socialist democratic republic of India. 
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SOCIO-ECONOMIC JUSTICE AND THE REMOVAL OF 
INEQUALITY 
The Context of National Movement 
The dreams and aspiration of the national movement round an echo 
in the historic Objective Resolution moved by Jawaharlal Nehru on 13'^  
December 1946 and adopted by the Constituent Assembly on 22"'' January, 
1947. It was India's Charter of liberty & development, whose philosophical 
formulations were later incorporated into the Preamble and Directive Principles 
of State Policy of the Constitution. The Preamble to the Constitution of free 
India remains the beautifully worded prologue. It generates a hope of creating a 
new identity in this ancient land. The Preamble is basic mantra of our 
democratic Dhama. 
The message of Socio-economic justice has been translated into the 
clauses of the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles of State Policy 
of the Constitution and lateral into several other Acts of the Parliament 
Commenting on the dynamic nature of the Directive Principles of State Policy, 
Ivor Jenning say "those directives are embodied in the Constitution, with a view 
to evolving a society marked by humanism, tolerance and unity. 
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It was for the first time in the in the 45"' session of the Congress, held 
in Karachi 29 March, 1931, that a resolution on Fundamental Rights was 
adopted Granville Austin calls it "'a declaration of rights and a Humanitarian 
socialist manifesto". Jawaharlal Nehru considered it as a "short step in a 
socialist direction by advocating nationalization of key industries and services 
and various measures to lesson the burden on the poof ' . The 4?"' session of the 
Congress held at Calcutta April 1933, adopted a comprehensive resolution on 
"Fundamental Rights and Duties and Economic Programme". In 1945, under 
the chairmanship of Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, an unofficial committee examined 
the entire question on Fundamental Rights, for in corporation, in the future 
Constitution of India. It made a distinction, for the first time, between civil 
rights, which can be enforced through law Courts and social and economic 
rights, which cannot be enforced though Courts and, therefore, would involve 
positive action like new legislation and transformation of the social and 
economic environment. The committee recommended that the future 
Constitution of India must include both the classes of Fundamental Rights 
justifiable and non-justifiable. 
It was in this background that the Constituent incorporated Part IH as 
Fundamental Rights, that are justiciable and Part IV Directives Principles of 
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State Policy, that are non-justiciable bu t as the Constitution enjoins, would 
remain "neverthless fundamental in the governance of the country. 
Implications of Social Justice 
During discussion m the Constituent Assembly on the contents of the 
Objectives Resolution, two different tiends of opinions emerged on the issue of 
socio-economic justice. B.R. Ambedkar, chairman of the drafting committee, 
said "I do not understand how it could be possible for any future government 
which believes in doing justice, socially, economically and politically, unless its 
economy is a socialist economy", l ie pleaded for the acceptance and 
incorporation of the concept of socialism. On the other hand, Mino Masani 
argued that no purpose would be served if an economic policy of doctrinaire 
character was incorporated. Alladi Krishna Swami Ayyer suggested that the 
Constitution should not be made rigid by incorporating a particular economic 
policy, on the contrary, it should "contain the necessary element of growth and 
adjustment needed for a progressive society". Jawaharlal Nehru said that while 
he personally would prefer to use the term 'socialist State' but it might become 
controversial. He added "therefore, we have laid down, not theoretical would 
and formulae but rather the content of thing we desire" with this explanation the 
phrase 'socio-economic justice' was accepted. There was near unanimity that 
'socio-economic justice employs the rejection of the existing social structure 
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and social status quo. Social changes were to be brought about through the 
working of political democracy respecting individual's right and liberties. The 
Republic India was expected to be democratic in form but socialist in its 
objectives of socio-economic change. Dr. Radha Krishnan said that the 
Objectives Resolution was intended to effect a smooth and rapid transition from 
a State of serfdom to the State of freedom\ 
Directive Principles of State Policy and Social Justice 
The DPSP has three main categories, namely socialistic, Gandhian 
and liberal democratic. In their humanistic and welfare thrust, the categories 
sometimes overlap each other. The socialistic principles direct the State to 
provide for adequate means of livelihood to all citizens; distribution of material 
resources for common good or all; avoidance of concentration of wealth and 
means of production in the hands of few; right to work; equal pay for equal 
work to both men and women; living wages for all workers, protection of 
workers, especially children; humane conditions of work and maternity relief; 
right to education and public assistance, etc. The Gandhian provisions direct the 
State to organise village Panchayats; promote cottage industries in rural areas; 
provide economic and educational upliftment to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled 
Tribes and weaker sections of the population; introduce prohibition of drugs 
and liquor; protect animal wealth and ban cow slaughter. The liberal democratic 
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Articles direct the State to provide free and compulsory education for children 
upto 14 years of age; introduce uniform civil code; separate the judiciary from 
the executive; organise agriculture and animal husbandry on modem lines; 
protect historical monuments and promote international peace. In their totality 
these directives constitute an agenda of comprehensive social revolution. 
Removal of Inequality 
The essence of social justice as the goal of planned development 
means removal in inequality. Socio-economic inequality in India is a heritage of 
long history. India is the world classic unequal society from time immemorial. 
Inequality in India's past was sanctified by the rigid caste system that had 
ordained professions by the accident of birth in a given family or Jat. 
The Preamble to the Constitution of India assures to all citizens, 
Justice, social, economic and political; Liberty of Status and of opportunity and 
promotion among them all, fraternity assuring the dignity of the individual and 
unity of the nation. The spirit represented in the Preamble is further enshrined 
in the chapter on Fundamental Rights and Directive principles of State Policy, 
the purpose of which to promote the welfare of the people by securing and 
protecting as effectively as it may a social order in which justice, social, 
economic and political shall inform all the institutions of the national life. The 
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Amendment Act by incoiporating the word "socialist" in the Preamble has 
strengthened the Constitutional ethics and social and economic justice. 
Democracy as it is well known is not only a form of government but 
with focus on human rights and human dignity in turn implies rule of law, 
equality and liberty and freedom from oppression, exploitation and arbitraiy 
interference. The Constitution of India recognises and seeks to realise the 
various components of social justice Article 14 guarantees to every person 
"equality before the law or equal protection of the laws wthin the territory of 
India". Article 15 (1) prohibits discrimination against any citizen on grounds 
only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. In the same view 
Article 16 (1) provide equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating 
to employment or appointment to any office under the State. By Article 17 
"untouchability" the age old practice has been done away with all its 
manifestations. The enforcement of any disability arising out of untouchability 
has been declared an offence in accordance with law. A similar provision has 
also been incorporated in the Indian Penal Code. Article 46 constitutes the heart 
and soul of social justice. It provides that the State shall promote with special 
care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the 
society, and in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, and 
shall protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation. The 
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interests of the weaker sections of society are further safeguarded under Article 
335. The claims of the members of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled 
Tribes shall be taken into consideration, consistently with the maintenance of 
efficiency of administiation, in the making of appointments to services and 
posts in connection with the affairs of the union or of a Stale. 
Provision for a Commission 
Article-340 
1. The president may by order appoint a commission consisting of such 
persons as he thinks fit to investigate the conditions of socially and 
educationally Backward Classes within the territory of India and the 
difficulties under which the labour and to make recommendations as to 
the steps that should be taken by the Union or any State to remove such 
difficulties and to improve their condition and as to the grants that 
should be made for the purpose by the Union or any State and the 
conditions subject to which such grants should be made, and the order 
appointing such commission shall define the procedure to be followed by 
the commission. 
2. A commission-so-appointed shall investigate the matters referred to them 
and present to the president a report setting out the facts as found by 
them and making such recommendations as think proper. 
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3. The president shall cause a copy of the report so presented together with 
a memorandum explaining the action taken thereon to be laid before 
each house of parliament. 
Article 341 
1. The president may with, respect to any State or Union territory, and 
where it is State consultation with Governor Thereof, by 
public notification, specify the castes, races or tribes or parts of or 
groups within castes, races or tribes which shall for the purposes of this 
Constitution be deemed to be Scheduled Castes in relation to that State 
or Union territory as the case may be. 
2. Parliament may be law include in or exclude from the list of Scheduled 
Castes specified in a notification issued under clause (1) any caste, race 
or tribe, or part of a group within any caste, race or tribe, but save as 
aforesaid a notification issued under the said clause shall not be varied 
by any subsequent notification. 
The clause (1) of Article 15 directs the State aQt to discriminate 
against a citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth or 
any of them. Clause (2) prohibits citizens as well as the State from making such 
discrimination with regard to access to shops, hostels etc. and all places of 
public entertainment, of public resort, wells, tanks, road etc. clause (1) of 
Article 15 mentions the prohibited grounds in any matter which /s exclusively 
within the control of the State. The clause (2) prohibits both the State and the 
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private individual who so ever is in the control of the above mentioned places. 
Clause (3) empowers the State to make special provisions for the protection of 
women and children. Clause (4) which was added by the Constitution (1st 
Amendment) Act, 1951, enables the State to make special provisions for the 
protection of the interests of the Backward Classes of citizens and is, therefore, 
an exception to Article 15 and 29 (2) of the Constitution. 
By clause (1) of the Article 15 the State is prohibited to discriminate 
between citizens on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or 
any of them. The word 'discrimination' means to make an adverse distinction 
or to distinguish unfavourable from others.^ If a law makes discrimination on 
any of the above grounds it can be declared invalid. Thus in State of Rajasthan 
Vs Pratap Singh\ the Supreme Court invalidated a notification under the Police 
Act of 1951 which declared certain areas as disturbed and made the inhabitants 
of those areas to bear the cost of additional police station there but exempted all 
Ilarijans, and Muslims. The exemption was given on the basis only o f ' c a s t e ' or 
'religion' and hence was contrary to Article 15 (1). 
Article 15 (2) is a specific application of the genera prohibition 
contained in Article 15 p ) Article 15 (2) declares that no citizen shall be 
subjected to ^^y disability, restriction or condition on grounds only of religion, 
race, caste, place of birth or any of them with regard to (a) access to shops, 
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public restaurants, hotels and places of public entertainment, or (b) the use of 
wells, tanks, baths, roads and places of public resort, maintained wholly or 
partly out of State funds or dedicated to the use of the genera public. A place of 
'public resort' means place which are frequented by the public like public park, 
a public road, a public bus, feny, public urinal or railway a hospital, etc. 
It is to noted that while clause (1) of Article 15 prohibits 
discrimination by the State; clause (2) prohibits both the State and the private 
individuals from making any discrimination. The object of Article 15 (2) is to 
be eradicate the abuse of the Hindu social system and to herald a United Nation. 
The Madras Removal of Civil Disabilities Act punishes social disabilities. No, 
law, custom or usage could authorize any person to prevent any llarijans or 
person belonging to the sections from having access to the public places 
mentioned in the Act. 
Special Provision for Advancement of Backward Classes 
Article 15 (4) is an exception to clauses (1) and (2) of Article 15. It 
was added by the Constitution (1st Amendment), Act 1951 as a result of the 
decision of the Supreme Court in State of Madras Vs Champakam dorairajan\ 
The brief fact of the case were that the Madras Government had resei-ved sets in 
State Medical and Engineering Colleges for different communities on the basis 
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of religion, race and caste. The Slate defended the law on the ground that they 
were purported to promote social justice for all sections of the people as 
required by Article 46 of the Directive Principles of State Policy. The Supreme 
Court held the law void because it classified students on the basis of caste and 
religion. The Directive Pnnciples of State Policy cannot oveiride the 
Fundamental Rights. In another case an order requisitioning land for the 
construction of a Harijan Colony was held to void under Article 15 (1).^ To 
modify the effect of these two decisions, Article 15 was amended by the 
Constitution (1st Amendment) Act 1951. Under tliis clause the State is 
empowered to make special provisions for advancement of any socially and 
educationally Backward Classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes. After the amendment it would be possible for the State to put 
up Harijan Colony in order to advance the interest of the Backward Classes. 
A major difficulty raised by Article 15 (4) is regarding the 
determination of who are 'socially and educationally Backward Classes'. This 
is not a simple matter as sociological and economic considerations come into 
play in evolving proper critieria to designate 'Backward Classes', it leaves the 
matter to the State to specify backward dames, but the Court can go into the 
question whether the catena used by the State for the purpose is relevant." The 
question of defining Backward Classes has been considered by the Supreme 
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Court in a number of cases. On the whole, the Court's approach has been that 
State resources are limited protection to one group affects the Constitutional 
rights of other citizens to demand equal opportunit>^^, and efficiency and public 
interest have to be maintained in public services because it is implicit in the 
very idea of reservation that a meritorious person is being prefened to a more 
meritorious person. The Court also seeks to guard against the perpetuation of 
the caste system in India and the inclusion of economically well off strata in 
domain of Backward Classes. From the several judicial pronouncements 
concerning the definition of Backward Classes, several propositions emerge. 
First, the backwardness envisaged by Article 15 (4) is both social and 
educational, meaning thereby that a class to be identified as backward should be 
both socially and educationally backward. Secondly, poverty alone cannot be 
the test of back-wardness in India because by and large people are poor and, 
therefore, a large sections of population would fall under the backward category 
and thus the whole object of reservation would be frustrated. Thirdly 
back-wardness should be comparable (though not exactly not exactly similar) to 
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Fourthly, 'caste' may be relevant 
factor to define backwardness, but it cannot be the sole or even the dominant 
criterion. If classification for social backwardness were to based solely on caste, 
it amounts to peipetuation of caste system in the Indian society. Fifthly, 
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poverty, occupation, place of habitation etc. definitely contribute to 
backwardness and such factors cannot be ignored. Sixthly, backwardness may 
be defined without any reference to caste. As the Supreme Court has 
emphasised Article 15 (4) "does not speak of castes, but only speaks of 
classes", and that 'caste' and 'class' are not synonymous. 
In h4.R. Balaji Kv Stale of h4ysore,^ the Mysore Government, issued 
an order under Article 15 (4) reserving seats in the Medical and Engineering 
Colleges in the State as follows : Backward and more Back-ward Classes 50 
percent. Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes 18 percent. Thus 68 percent of 
the seats available in the colleges were reserved and only 32 percent was made 
available to the merit pool. Backward and more Backward Classes were 
designated on the basis of 'caste' and 'communities'. The Supreme Court 
declared the order bad. The defect in the Mysore order was that it was based 
solely on caste without regard to other relevant factors and this was not 
permissible under Article 15 (4). The Court held that the State was not justified 
in including in the list of Backward Classes all those castes of Backward 
Classes all those castes or communities whose average of student population 
per thousand was slightly above or very near or just below the State average can 
be regarded as backward else it would be inconsistent with Article 15 (4). The 
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Court declared that the special provision should be less than 50 percent 
depending upon the prevailing circumstances in each case. 
An order saying that family whose income was less than Rs.1200 per 
year, and which followed such occupations as agriculture petty business, 
inferior services, crafts etc. would be treated as 'backward was declared to be 
valid'. Here are two factors, economic condition and profession, were taken 
into account to define backwardness, but caste was ignored for the purpose. In 
Balaji, the Supreme Court had mentioned case as one of the relevant for 
determing social backwardness. The decision of the Supreme Court in Balaji 
was challenged in Chitralekha on the ground that caste had been completely 
ignored for purposes of reservation. The Supreme Court ruled that though caste 
is a relevant factor in ascertaining the backwardness of a class, there is nothing 
to preclude the authority concerned from determing special backwardness of a 
group of citizens if it can do so without reference to caste.^ 
In Both Balaji and Chitralekha the Court did not consider caste as the 
decisive factor in determing social backwardness of a community. However, 
subsequently the Supreme Court had revised its earlier decisions, and admitted 
that there are numerous castes in the country which are socially and 
educationally and it is imperative for the State to protect their interests. A caste 
is a 'class' of citizens and, therefore, if an entire caste is found to be socially 
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and educationally backward and its inclusion would not violate Article 15 (1). 
However when backwardness is defined apart from caste, that other factors 
should also be like socio-economic and educational backwardness. On the basis 
the Court upheld a Madras order defining Backward Classes with reference to 
castes and other factors. Looking at the histoiy as to how the list had come to be 
formulated, the Court felt satisfied that caste was not taken as the sole basis of 
backwardness; the main criterion for inclusion in the list was social and 
educational backwardness of the castes based on their occupations. Castes were 
only compendious indication of the classes of people found to be socially and 
educational backward.^ 
Clause (1) and (2) of Article 16 guarantee equality of opportunity to 
all citizens in the matter of appointment to any office or of any other 
employment under the State. No citizen can be discriminated against or be 
ineligible for any employment or office under the State on grounds only of 
religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth or residence. Clause 3, 4, and 5 
of Article 16 are the three exceptions to this general rule of equality of 
opportunity. It is to be noted that under Article 16 guarantee against 
djscnmination is liipited tp employment and appointment under the State. 
Article 15, however, is general and comprehensive and deals with all 
cases of discrimination whicJ? do not fall under Article 16. Aftiple 16 embodies 
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the particular application of general rule of equality laid down in Article 14 
with special reference for appointment and employment under the State.^ 
Article 16 guarantees equality of opportunity in matters of 
appointment in State services. It does not, however, prevent the State from 
prescribing the necessary qualifications and selective tests for recruitment to 
Government services. The qualifications prescribed may beside mental 
excellence, include physical fitness, sense of discipline, moral integrity, loyalty 
to the State etc. where appointment requires technical knowledge, technical 
qualification may be prescribed. The character and antecedents of candidates 
may be taken into consideration for appointments in government s e r v i c e s . T h e 
selective test, of course cannot be arbitrary. It must be reasonable and have 
nexus between qualifications and the nature of job and duties. 
Reservation for Backward Classes 
Article 16 (4) empowers the State to make special provision for the 
reservation appointments of posts in favour of any back-ward class of citizens 
which in the opinion of the State are not adequately represented in the services 
under the State. Thus Article 16 (4) applies only if two conditions are satisfied: 
(1) the class of citizens is socially and educationally backward and that the said 
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class is not adequately represented in the service of the State. The second test 
cannot be the sole criterion." 
The expression "Backward Class" in Article 16 (4) has been used in 
the same sense as in Article 15 (4). The Supreme Court has considered the 
measuring and scope of the expression in a number of cases. From these 
pronouncements the following propositions emerge. 
1. Article 15 (4) and 16 (4) speak of 'c lasses ' not 'caste'. 
2. 'Caste' by itself cannot be the determing factor of backwardness, though 
it may be one amongst several factors. So reservation can be made in 
favour of "Backward Class" and "Backward Castes". 'Caste' and 
Classes' are different expression. 
3. The Backward Classes in the matters of backwardness resemble the 
Scheduled Castes and Schedule Tribes. 
4. The backwardness must be both social and educational and not either 
social or educational. 
5. Social backwardness is the result of poverty. But poverty by itself is not 
determining factor of social backwardness poverty becomes relevant 
only in the context of social backwardness. 
6. Reservation should not be excessive 
7. Reservation cannot be made at the cost of efficiency of administration 
(Article 355). 
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fviandai Case 
The scope and extent or Article 16 (4) has been examined thoroughly 
by the Supreme Court in the historic case of Indhira Sawhrey Vs Union of 
India, popularly known as Mandal case 
The Union Government headed by Prime Minister V.P. Singh issued 
the Office Memoranda (called O.M.) on August 13, 1990, reserving 27 percent 
seats for the Backward Classes m government services on the basis of the 
recommendations of the Mandal Commission. A writ petition on behalf of the 
Supreme Court Bar Association was filed challenging the validity of the Office 
Memoranda and for staying its operation. In her petition, Ms. Indhira Sawhney, 
submitted that the Mandal Commission Report (called M.C.R.) and the office 
Memorandum of August 13, 1990, and September 25, 1991, were 
unconstitutional, illegal and void for the following reasons.'^ 
a) The identification of Backward Classes and the reservation of jobs in 
services under the State have been made by a mere executive order. 
b) The identification has been based on indicators which themselves 
contribute irrelevant criteria and the weightage given are arbitrary and 
unreasonable and do not disclose any classification which bears a 
reasonable nexus to the object of the classification and is the violative of 
Article 14 of the Constitution. 
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c) That the M.C.R. is based on conjectures and surmises because no report 
of the Technical Advisory Committee or of the Panel of Experts has 
been filed nor can the same be found from a persual of the expects has 
been filed more can the same be found from a persual of report. 
The petition further submitted that the identification of 3.743 castes 
apart from being unconstitutional is also erroneous on the face of it since the 
Anthropological Survey of India has given figures of 1,130 as castes which 
could not be traced. The result, therefore follows that the other remaining castes 
are non-existent either on the ground of not being traceable or on the ground of 
being synonymous, sub groups etc. 
The five Judge Bench of the Court stayed the operation of the O.M. 
till the final disposal of the case on October 1,1990, again the Union 
Government headed Sri P.V. Narsimha Rao issued another office Memoranda 
on September 25, 1991 but made two changes in the O.M. of earlier order 
issued on August 13,1990 by adding economic criterion in providing 
reservations to proper sections of Scheduled Castes and Schedule Tribes in the 
27 percent quote and reserved another 10 percent of vacancies for other 
commercialJy Backward sections of higher castes. 
The five judge bench referred the matter to a special Constitution 
bench of 9 judges in view of the importance of the matters so as to finally settle 
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the legal position relating to reservations as in several earlier judgements, the 
Supreme Court has not been very consistent. Despite several adjournments, the 
union government failed to elaborate the economic criterion speak out in the 
office memorandum of September 25,1991. 
The nine judge Constitution bench of the Supreme Court by six-three 
majority (Justice B P. Jeevan Reddy. C.J. M.H. Kania, M.N. venkatachaliah, 
A.M. Ahmadi with S.R. Pandian and S.B. Sawant) concurring by separate 
judgements held that the decision of the Union government to reserve 27 
percent government jobs for Backward Classes provided socially advanced 
persons-creamy layer among them eliminated, it is only confined to initial 
appointments shall not exceed 50 percent. The Court accordingly partially held 
the two impugned notifications (O.M.) dated August 13, 1990 and September 
25, 1991 as valid and enforceable but subject to the conditions indicated in the 
decision that socially advanced persons - creamy layer - among Backward 
Classes are excluded. However, the Court struck down the O.M. of Sri P.V. 
Narsimha Rao's government reserving 10 percent government jobs for 
economically Backward Classes among higher classes. The majority also held 
that the reservation should not exceed 50 percent. While 50 percent shall be the 
rule b«t it is necessary not to put out of consideration certain extraordinary 
situations inherent in the great diversity of this country and people. The Court 
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did not express any opinion on the correction or adequacy of the Mandal 
Report. In tlieir dissenting judgement by Justice T.K. Thommen Kuldeep Singh 
and R.M. Sahai, they struck down the two Office Memoranda's issued by the 
Union government as unconstitutional. It held also that the Mandal Report is 
unconstitutional and recommended for the appointment of another commission 
for identifying the socially and educationally Backward Classes of citizens. 
Justice Thommen held that whenever and wherever poverty and 
backwardness are identified it is the Constitutional responsibility of the State to 
initiate economic and other measures to ameliorate the conditions of the people 
residing in those regions. He said that poverty which is the ultimate result of 
inequalities and which is the immediate cause and effect of backwardness has to 
be eradicated not merely by reservation but by free medical aid, free elementary 
education, scholarships for higher education and other financial support, free 
housing self employment and settlement schemes, effective implementation of 
land reforms and strict and impartial operation of the law enforcing machinery. 
Nani A. Palkiwala is of the view that the judgement of the Supreme 
Court in the Mandal Report will review casteism, which the Constitution 
intended to end. According to him future historians of the Indian republic will 
regard J 992 as one of the saddest year in the history of our jurisprudence. This 
is the year in which Supreme Court, by a majority, ensured a fresh lease of life 
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to the canker of casteism for a long and indefinite future. Over the last thousand 
years, the greatest curse of casteism, a justice Kuldeep Singh has pointed out in 
his minority judgement. Historians agree that why foreign invaders the Afghans 
the Turks, the Mughals succeeded in subjugating the country was because 
casteism divided Indian society and assigned military duties to one caste only.'" 
1 le further Stated that the decision of the Court will promote at the 
cost of merit, generating frustration and to making the confusion worst one 
direct fall out of the decision in Article 16 (4) which for all practical purposes 
has been virtually rewritten by substituting caste by class. The crucial point is 
that under the majority judgement of the Supreme Court it is the members 
belonging to certain castes only, who are eligible to be considered for 
reservations. When you are left with are still the members of certain castes 
only. The sections of society which fall outside those designated castes do not 
qualify for reservations, however socially and educationally backward they may 
be. 
It is disputed that 50 years of independence have changed the social, 
educational and economic landscape beyond recognition. There are crores And 
crores of forward individuals in Backward Castes. By making caste, the 
essential conditions, the majority judgements have-
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a) Included for reservation all members of Baclcward Castes who do not 
belong to the creamy layer, and 
b) Hxcluded all members of forward castes, however backward and 
deserving. 
Such a classification patently discriminate against those who do not 
belong to these castes which arc listed as backward resulting in social injustice. 
A Backward Class may be given benefit of Article 15 (4) or Article 
16 (4), but the class must consist of a homogeneous group ~ the element of 
homogenity should be backwardness characterising the class. In other words, 
the link or the thread holding the class together should be the backwardness of 
the members. Such a link or thread can never be supplied by caste. Excluding 
the creamy layer of the caste would not get rid of the vice that only link, or the 
thread binding the benefited class together is caste. In other words a 
classification may be justified on the ground that it is a Backward 'Class' but 
never on the ground that it is Backward Caste. This principle was precisely 
enunciated by the Constitution bench in Triloki Nath,'^ Pradeep Tandon,'^ 
Jayashree,'^ Akhil Bhartiya Soshit.''^ The judgements were cited before the 
Supreme Court and referred to in the majority jut^ement without disapproval, 
but they are inexplicably overlooked. 
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The majority judgement did not pause to consider the reasons why 
for all the past decades the Union government had not made reservations on 
caste basis in areas of employment admissions and promotions. The practice of 
mentioning caste in scrvice rccord was discontinued by the government of India 
by 1951. The last ccnsus records to proceed on caste basis are those of 1931 
which though hopelessly obsolete, were relied upon by the Mandal Commission 
because they were the latest census records to proceed on caste basis. 
Impact of the Mandal Case 
The State of Gujrat who become the first to formally accept the 
Supreme Court verdict on Mandal Commission recommendations, providing 
for reservations in government jobs for Other Backward Communities (OBCs). 
The professional institutions, such as Engineering and Medical Colleges, will 
now have 17 percent more reserved seats.^^ 
The Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh Mulayam Singh Yadav was 
presented results of Science/Maths teachers selected 497 posts by the Chairman 
of the U.P. Subordinate Services Selection Commission. The list contains 
results of 304 selected candidates belonging to the Backward Classes and 80 to 
the Schedule Caste. It may be recalled that this is the first result of the 
subordinate services selection Commission after the acceptance of the Mandal 
Commission Report by the State.^' 
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The Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh, Mr. Digvijay Singh did not 
lay behind and that 36 percent of the jobs besides being reserved for the 
Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tnbes, only 14 percent could be reserved for the 
Backward Classes. The benefits of job reservations would be constantly 
monitored by the State government."' 
The Chief Minister of Bihar Laloo Prasad Yadav, announced 50 
percent reservation for the backward communities in the judicial services to 
ensure justicc for the oppressed and the downtrodden. The backward 
communities would also be given reservation in the Medical and Engineering 
Institutions in order to improve their social status. In his zeal for social justice 
for the oppressed and downtrodden, 30 percent of the seats were reserved for 
the Scheduled Castes and Schedule Tribes in the Panchayat election. 
Cnticizing the creamy layer concept in the reservation policy, Mr. 
Yadav alleged that it was a conspiracy to weaken the backwards. The Chief 
Minister demanded reservation for the backwards in the Assembly and 
Parliamentary Constituencies the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes 
reservation.'^ 
The left front government in west Bengal which had formed a 
commission to identify Other Backward Classes (OBCs) only after a Supreme 
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Court directive finally accepted the caste reality by announcing five percent 
reservation in government jobs for the OBCs, with this, 33 percent of the 
government jobs now come under reservation, 22 percent for Scheduled Tribes 
liaving already been kept apart."'' 
The Delhi Chief Minster Mr. Madanlal Kliurana Stated that his 
government was going ahead with the implementation of the scheme for Delhi 
Transport Corporation (DTC) bus passes to college students Scheduled Castes 
and Tribes, economically weaker sections and Backward Classes from August 
1,1994 as it had been approved by the planning commission.'^ 
Mr. Moily's Government in Kamataka by announcing hike in 
reservations to 80 percent for jobs and education in the State. The 80 percent 
reservation quota, the highest for any State in the country, came about 
following the decision to hike resonation for the vikkaliga and lingayat 
communities the two most dominant groups in Kamataka of the total 
reservation package the Scheduled Castes and Tribes have been retained at 23 
percent, while the quota for the Backward Classes was increased to 57 percent 
from the eadier 50 percent. The hike is meant to substantully benefit the 
domenant vikkaliga and lingayat communities, the urban sections of which had 
hitherto been excluded from the ambit of reervation^^. 
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The Tamil Nadu Assembly has passed a bill for continuation of 69 
percent reservation in the State in jobs and educational institutions. 30 percent 
seats will be reserved for the Backward Classes, 20 percent for the most 
backward and devotified communities, 18 percent for Scheduled Castes and one 
percent for Scheduled Tribes. 
The bill comes from in the wake of the Supreme Court order which 
States that reservation should not exceed 50 percent. To become a law 
legislation would have to get the assent of the president of India and the State 
governor, under Article 3 ] (c) of the Constitution. The State government has 
been urging the Union to amend the Constitution to ensure the continuation of 
the present quantum of reservation.^' 
The Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP), the main opposition party in the 
centre, expressed the view that all the States, barring Tamil Nadu and 
Kamataka, should stick to the Supreme Court's ruling in the Mandal Case that 
reservations for the various categories should not exceed 50 percent. The party 
is in favour of making an exception in the case of Tamil Nadu and Kamataka 
"since these two States have had reservations exceeding 50 percent for a long a 
time". In BJP's view, it would be a problem for these two States to curtail their 
extent of reservation now. Given this backdrop, the BJP has favoured 
Presidential assent to the Tamil Nadu Assembly's unanimous resolution and 
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legislation in support of continuation of the 60 percent reservation in the State 
for Backward Classes, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The BJP view 
point was put across by senior and opposition leader in the Lok Sabha, Atal 
Bihari Vajpayee at the meeting of political parties convened by Home Minister 
S.B. Chaun to discuss the issue arising out of Tamil Nadu'Supreme Court 
demand and its likely implication for other States. 
Briefing newsmen, BJP Spokesman Mr. ICrishanlal Sharma said that 
Mr. Vajpayee, at the meeting., quoted B.R. Ambedkar to the effect that 
reservations should be of a "minority nature", that is, they should not exceed 50 
percent in the interest of equality of opportunity. Having said that Vajpayee 
conceded that the State of Tamil Nadu and Kamataka were on a different 
footing. It would not be easy for them to bring down and reservations to less 
than 50 percent now. As such, the Tamil Nadu legislation for continuing with 
the 69 percent reservation should be forwarded to the president for assent. 
Mr. Vajpayee, according to the party spokesman, put forth the view 
that all other states, which do not have reservations in excess of 50 percent right 
now, should conform to the Supreme Court's pronouncement that the out limit 
of 50 percent should be adiiered to.^^ 
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Caste and Politics 
The influence of caste is writ large on our policies and programmes. 
No political party has had the courage to take a stand against caste based 
reservations in government jobs. The reaction of various parties is reflected of 
the extent to which they are steeped in outdated concepts and out of the tune 
with the new India that is struggling to emerge. At a time when the entire thrust, 
is towards individual enterprise and effort, no policy of reservations, however 
comprehensive and inclusive it seeks to be, can have legitimacy in the eyes of 
large sections of the educated class. Reservations for Scheduled Castes and 
Tribes are possibly an exception, though there has been considerable desate on 
how effective they have really been in serving the needs of the deserving 
classes. 
More than the actual jobs in government and public sector units, what 
is at stake is the unit>' and integrity of society. The government's reservation 
scheme is an admission that the problems of deprivation are not confined to any 
caste duster and that the country's economic, social and educational problems 
affect all groups irrespective of their castes status. If poor Brahmans, 
Kshatriyas, Vaishyas as well as Back-ward Castes, Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes all qualify for reservations, precisely which castes should be 
excluded from the scheme.^'' 
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Mr. R.P. Singh in his Aiticie "Identification of Backward Classes"^" 
has pointed out the practical problems involved in the identification of 
Backward Classes in the absence of data relating to the number of the 
Backward Classes and their present social and educational backwardness. The 
lists of other Backward Classes prepared b>' the Cenrie and some of the States 
are not based on any well-defined criteria to measure their social and 
educational backwardness. 
The present system of reservation benefits people belonging to 
certain arbitrarily listed castes and places them on a superior level irrespective 
of the present social and educational status of individuals of that castes. Sons 
and daughters of officer working in the government or private sector, judges, 
ministers and economically better off persons get the benefit of reservation as 
economic criterion is not considered. Persons belonging to the so-called 
forward castes are discriminated against even they are better in terms of merit 
than those belonging to the Backward Classes. There persons are treated as 
second class citizens and are being oppressed by the government under the 
pretext of providing "social justice"."" 
Is there any alternative to caste based reservations? The altematiYe. is 
to provide for reservation to the individuals who are socially and educationally 
backward. The suggested alternative may put an end to the arbitraiy 
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classification of population into "Backward Class" and "others". When there is 
no classification of populations, all persons are treated alike, caste is no longer 
the basis for dividing the people. Enumeration of one's caste at the time of 
admission to school is not necessary as it tends to create caste consciousness 
among children. The accident of one's birth in a particular caste should not be 
the sole criterion for enjoying State benefits. Social justice to be more 
meaningful requires a rational definition as to include the most vulnerable 
sections of society in terms of education and poverty rather than caste alone on 
the social, educational and economic status of individuals should govern the 
reservation policy. It is only than that equality envisaged by Article 15 (1) and 
16 (1) and (2) of our Constitution can be fostered. Abolition of arbitraiy 
classification of population on the basis of "caste" is necessary for the survival 
of our democracy, establishment of social justice and promotion of rule of law. 
There wrong in amending the Constitution to meet the requirements of social 
justice fully. 
If reservations are based on the social, educational and economic 
backwardness of individuals, all deserving persons will benefit irrespective of 
caste and differences based on caste will gradually disappear over a period of 
time. A rational scientific criterion based on socio-economic factors is a 
desideratum where every citizen should be able to enjoy the benefits of 
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reservation irrespective of their religion, caste, community or language. There 
is no need to prepare State lists or central lists of Backward Classes.^^ The 
political parties should come forward to deliver the reservation policy from 
caste reservation for backward persons will help the person who really deserve 
such help. There will be no difficulty in identifying the Backward Classes. The 
press and the intelligents can also contribute towards their the eradication of 
caste based reservations and helping the cause of to national integration. 
Abolition of Untouchabillty 
Before the commencement of the Constitution of India, a number of 
provinces and princely States enacted laws for eradication of untouchability. To 
achieve equality in all segments and classes of society may social reform 
movements were launched. Under the leadership of Gandhi, movements were 
launched for amelioration of the poor and downtrodden. Historically, it is 
proved that on the eve of independence, there were twenty seven enactments 
enacted by provinces and princely governed States for doing away with social 
disabilities of a class of Hindu known as the untouchables.^^ To illustrate 
religious tolerance, wisdom and Statesmanship the Maharaja of Tanjore's 
proclamation captioned "Temple entry proclamation" issued in 1936, (relevant 
content) can be reproduced. ^ '' 
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"Profoundly convinced of the truth and validity of our religion 
believing that it is based on divine guidance and on an all comprehending 
toleration, knowing that in its practice it has, through out the centuries adapted 
itself the needs of changing of time, solicitous that none of our Hindu subjects 
should by reason of birth or caste or community be denied the consolation and 
solace of the Hindu faith, we have decided and hereby declare, or dain and 
command that subject to such rules and condition as laid down for preserving 
proper atmosphere and maintaining their rituals and observances, there should 
henceforth be no restrictions on any Hindu by birth or religion on entering or 
worship at the temples controlled by us and our govemmenf . 
The Constituent Assembly Debate reveal that B.R. Ambedkar played 
an important role for the restoration of human dignity of the untouchables. 
Explaining, the concept of 'social Democracy', he stressed in the Constituent 
Assembly that it is a way of life which recognizes liberty, equality and 
fraternity which are not to be treated as separate items in a trinity. They form a 
union of trinity in the sense that to divorce one from the other is to defeat the 
very purpose of democracy. Liberty can not be divorced from equality which 
cannot be divorced from fraternity. It was largely due to his efforts that 
numerous Constitutional safeguards to eradicate this social evil was 
incorporated in the Constitution.^^ article 17 of the Constitution of India 
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abolishes "untouchability" and forbids its practice in any form. The 
enforcement of any disability arising out of untouchability is to be an offence 
punishable in accordance with law. It does not stop with a mere declaration but 
announces that this forbidden 'untouchability' is not to be hence forth be 
practiced in any form. 
The most important point in this regard, however is that 
'untouchability is neither defined in the Constitution nor in the Act. The 
Mysore High Court has however, held that the term is not to be understood in 
its literal or grammatical sense but to be understood as the 'practice as it had 
developed historically' in this coimtry. Understood in this sense, it is a product 
of the Hindu caste system according to which particular section amongst the 
Hindus had been looked down as untouchables by the other sections of the 
society. A literal construction of the term would include persons who are 
treated as untouchables either temporarily or otherwise for various reasons, 
such as suffering from infections diseases or on account of social observance 
such as, are associated with birth or death or on account of boycott resulting 
from caste or other dispute. In either caste such person can claim the protection 
or benefit either of Article 17 or of the 1955 Act.^^' 
In exercise of the powers conferred by Article 35 Parliament has 
enacted the untouchability (Offences) Act, 1955. The Act was amended by the 
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untouchability (Offences) Amendment Act 1976, in order to make the law more 
stringent so as to eradicate the practice of untouchability from the society. It has 
now been renamed as, the Protection of Civil Rights Acl, 1955. The expression 
'civil right' is defined as any right accruing to be a person by reason of the 
abolition of untouchability by Article 17 of the Constitution. Under the 
Amended Act any discrimination on the ground of untouchability will e 
considered an offence. It imposes a duty on public servants to investigate such 
offences. It provides that if a public servant willfully neglects the investigation 
of any offence punishable under this Act, he shall be deemed to have abetted an 
offence punishable under this Act. The Protection of Civil Rights act prescribes 
punishment which may be extend to imprisonment upto six months and also 
with a fine which may be extend to five hundred rupees or both for any one 
enforcing, on the ground of untouchability religious disabilities like -
preventing any person from entering any place of public worship or from 
worshipping or offering prayers there in (section 3) or social disabilities like 
(section 7), access to any shop, public restaurants, hotels or places of public 
entertainment (section 4) and refusing to admit persons to hospitals (section 5) 
and refiising to sell goods or rendered services to any person (section 6) or for 
other offences, arising out of 'untouchability' (section 7). This provision was 
further elaborated by the Supreme Court in the Asiad Project worker's case,^^ 
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wherein it was held that the Fundamental Right under Article 17 is available 
against private individuals and it is the Constitutional duty of the State to take 
necessary steps to see that these Fundamental Rights are not violated. 
It should be noted that Aiticle 15 (2) also helps in the eradication of 
untouchability . Thus on the grounds of untouchabilit^- no person can be denied 
access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of entertainment or the use 
of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, road and places of public resort maintained 
wholly or partly out of State funds or dedicated to the use of general public. 
In compliance with the directive incorporated in Article 46, 
Parliament has passed the. Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention 
of Atrocities) Act in 1989 which came into force on January 30, 1999. the 
object of the act is to protect the weaker sections from the Atrocities committee 
by the other sections of society. Also there is provision of special Court for 
speedy trial of the cases of Atrocities committed on Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes by the rest of section of the society. It provides stringent 
provision as it leaves no discretion to the Court regarding imposition of the 
punishment.^^ 
The ends of justice pre-suppose equality of social status for the 
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and it cannot be achieved through legal 
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norms or instruments only. It is a known fact that untouchability has been 
declared an offence punishable under law since 1955. Nevertheless, it is 
prevalent till date in one form or other. To check the atrocities, legal remedies 
are avoidable. It is a established fact that mere punitive actions are not 
sufficient for the social ti ansformation. The prime need of the hour is to change 
the outlook of the people by ways and means other than laws. The Scheduled 
Castes and Scheduled Tribes are backward people and their backwardness 
(socially, educationally and economically) is never in doubt. They deserve 
special treatment and the government is Constitutionally empowered to make 
special provisions for their uplift. 'Protective discrimination' can certainly be 
used in their favour. 
The compulsions of social justice also wrant such as action.^'' But in 
the process, other persons who are equally backward economically and 
educationally but who do not fall under these categories, equally deserve 
concessions for the States. It is only than that social justice can be established, 
else the policies of reservation has the tendency of creating permanent vested 
interests to derive economic, educational and political mileage but of it which 
in fact, can be exploited and has been exploited by almost every political party, 
to gain vote^. (i] ^ ^itWt'on can break dis-contention 9nd frustration. 
Offen it is stressed th^t tJl^ popwj^ ty pf e d u c a ^ n aj;u)ngst thp $pJjjedu)jed 
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Castes and Scheduled Tribes has caused considerable awareness amongst them. 
And often asserted they have themselves, which has invited sharp reactions 
amongst the upper classes. Therefore is to strike a just balance between the 
interests of the Scheduled Castes and Backward Classes and those of the upper 
classes. It is the duty of the State to safeguard the diverse interests of society 
without jeopardizing the Constitutional safeguards. Equal or more or less equal 
development of all segments of society is essential. 
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CHAPTER - IV 
JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO SOCIAL JUSTICE 
The judiciary is expected to play a crucial role under the Constitution 
and is the last resort of the common man for seeking justice. Where his legal 
rights are infringed. It is now necessary to know how the judiciary viewed this 
concept embodied in the Constitution. "Judges are keenly aware", said Justice 
V.R. Krishna Iyer, "of some of the social dimensions of the problem and the 
need to interpret the Constitution as a social document. The Indian Constitution 
is a great social document, hierarchical society into a modem, egalitarian 
democracy".' It is therefore interesting to analyse the judicial perspectives of 
social justice in interpreting this revolutionary "social document", the 
Constitution of India. 
It may be noted that at the initial stage of Constitutional development 
in India Judiciary did not evince much interest in referring to the Preamble or to 
the Preambular concept of social justice while interpreting the specific 
provisions of the Constitution. Later, however, the initial stance of indifference 
changed and the judiciary increasingly relied on the concept of socio-economic 
justice to solve many knotty social and economic problems that came before the 
Supreme Court. 
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Socia! Justice: Contrast to Refrain of Fundamental Rights 
In Behram Khurshid V. Bombay State' one of the issues before the 
Supreme Court was whether an individual could waive his Fundamental Rights. 
In fact, in the United States the doctrine of waiver of rights was enunciated by 
some American Judges in construing the American Constitution. This was done 
on the simple reason that since the rights were reserved by the people to 
themselves, they might at anytime on their own volition waive them. But Chief 
Justice Mahajan rejected the doctrine of waiver of Fundamental Rights because, 
according to him, it had no relevancy in construing the Fundamental Rights 
conferred by Part 111 of the Constitution of India. In this connection he said "we 
think that the rights described as Fundamental Rights are a necessary 
consequence of the declaration in the Preamble that the people of India have 
solemnly resolved to constitute India into a sovereign democratic republic and 
to secure to all its citizens justice social economic and political; liberty of 
thought, expression belief, faith and worship; equality of status and 
opportunity".^ Proceeding further he stated that the Fundamental Rights have 
not been put in the Constitution merely for individual benefit, though ultimately 
they come into operation in considering individual rights. They have been put 
there as a matter of public policy and the doctrine of waiver can have no 
32 
Judicial Response to Social Justice 
application to provisions of law which have been enacted as a matter of 
Constitutional policy/ 
Evidently, there is a deeper meaning in rejecting the American 
doctrine of waiver of Fundamental Rights and the dear Irnking of F-undameiital 
Rights as a matter of public or Constitutional policy, with such preambular 
concepts as socio-economic justice. India is a country wherein very large 
section of the society is economically weak. So, incredibly very large number 
of people are not aware of their Fundamental Rights and even among those who 
are faintly aware of the rights are not in a position to reach the citadel of justice 
to exercise those ri^ts. Added to this, if the doctrine of waiver is read into the 
Indian Constitution, the weaker sections of the Indian Society may lose many of 
the precious rights by their default, in that event important rights stipulated in 
Article -15 , 16 (4), 17 and 23 of the Constitution would become meaningless 
rights to the weaker sections. Thus social justice would remain a glittering and 
unattainable goal. As a matter of fact, similar view was expressed by Justice K. 
Subba Rao in slightly different strain in Basheshar Nath V. I. T. 
Commissioner.^ Rejecting the doctrine of waiver he said that while it is true 
that the judgments of the Supreme Court of the United States are of great 
assistance to this Court in elucidating and solving the difficult problems that 
arise from time to time, it is equally necessary to keep in mind the fact that the 
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decisions are given in the context of a direct social, economic and political set 
up, and therefore great care should be bestowed in applying those decisions to 
cases arising in India with different social, economic and political conditions/' 
Justice Subba R-ao further said that if the doctiine of waiver is 
engrafted to the said fundamental principles, it will mean that a citizen can 
agree to be discriminated. When one realizes the unequal position occupied by 
the state and private citizen, particularly in India where illiteracy is rampant, it 
is easy to visualize that in a conflict between the state and a citizen, the latter 
may, by fear of force or hope of preferment, give up his right. It is said that in 
such a case coercion or influence can be established in a Court of law but in 
practice it will be well-high impossible to do so. The same reasoning will apply 
to Articles 15 and 16, Article 17 illustrates the evil repercussion of the doctrine 
of waiver in its impact on the Fundamental Rights.^ 
In other words, the doctrine of waiver, which is easily applicable in 
an affluent society like America, will spell disaster to the social justice if it is 
given effect to in a socially and economically imbalanced society like India. In 
short, concept of social justice is antithetic to the doctrine of waiver of 
Fundamental Rights. 
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Social Justice Leads to Dynamic Socialism 
In an interesting case the Supreme Court discussed the concept of 
socialism, which spells social justice in the economic field, in relation to State's 
power to carry on trade and business to the exclusion, complete or partial, of 
citizens as provided in Article 19 (6) (ii) of the Constitution. This was done in 
Akdasi Padhan V. State of Orissa^ wherein the Orissa Kendu Leaves (Control 
of Trade) Act of 1961, which created a state monopoly in the trade of Kendu 
leaves, was challenged on the ground that it imposed severe restriction on the 
Fundamental Rights of the petitioner guaranteed by Article 19 (i) (g). Dealing 
with this point Justice Gajendragadkar said that in attempting to construe 
Article 19 (6) which enables the state to nationalize industry or establish a 
monopoly in trade it must be borne in mind that a literal construction may not 
be quite appropriate. In interpreting such a provision, one should bear in mind 
the political or the economic philosophy underlying the provisions in question, 
and that would necessarily involve the adoption of a liberal and not a literal and 
mechanical approach to the problem. 
The doctrine of state ownership is the result of the rise of philosophy 
of socialism. Pointing to the difference in approach to state ownership. Justice 
Gajendragadkar said that to the socialist, nationalization or state ownership is a 
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matter of principle and its Justification is the general notion of social welfare. 
To the rationalist nationalization or state ownership is a matter of expediency 
dominated by consideration of economic efficiency and increased output of 
production. Tliis latter view supported nationalization only when it appeared 
dear that state ownership would be more efficient, more economical and more 
productive. The former approach was not vety much influenced by these 
considerations, and treated it as a matter of principle that all important and 
nation building industries should come under state control. The first approach is 
doctrinaire, while the second is pragmatic. The first proceeds on the general 
ground that all national wealth and means of producing it should come under 
national control, while the second supports nationalization only on grounds of 
efficiency and increased output.^ 
Proceeding further the judge referred to the amendment made to 
Article 19 (6) and said Article 19 (6) (ii) clearly shows that there is no limit 
placed on the power of the state in respect of the creation of state monopoly. In 
other words, the theory underlying the amendment in so far as it relates to the 
concept of state monopoly, does not appear to be based on the pragmatic 
approach, but on the doctrinaire approach which socialism accepts. 
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Subsequently in another case. Excel Wear V. Union of India^^ the 
Supreme Court referred to the aforesaid proposition and said that the difference 
between the doctrinaire approach and the pragmatic one may enable the Courts 
to lean more and more in favour of nationalization and state ownership of an 
industry. This is particularly so after the addition of the word 'Socialist' in the 
Preamble of the Constitution. Bu the private ownership of an industry still 
continues and is recognized. It plays a very dominant role in our economic 
structure. In such a situation it becomes difficult to realize in fiill the ideals of 
socialism." The Court pointed out that in a state imdertaking, the government 
being the owner, it may not be difficult to protect the labour even by spending 
out of the public exchaquer. But in a private sector obviously the problems are 
entirely different. On the one hand the private industry is entangled in the 
question of management and on the other it must get some return out of this 
business. Besides the fact remains that private entrepreneurship contributes 
substantially to the growth of the national economy by formation of more and 
more capital. In this situation Court asks, does it stand to reason that by such 
rigorous provisions like those contained in the impugned sections all these 
interests should be completely or substantially ignored? The question posed are 
suggestive of the answers."^ 
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It may be noted that this view was expressed by the Supreme Court in 
Excel Wear case in response to two rival contentions advanced in the case. On 
behalf of the employers it was contended that the right to close down the 
business is an integral part of the right to carry on the business guaranteed 
under Article 19 (i) (g) of the Constitution of India. The impugned law, namely 
section 25-0 (1) and (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,''' which gives a 
discretion to the appropriate government to grant or not to grant permission for 
a closure of an industrial undertaking, imposes a restriction on the said 
fundamental right which is highly unreasonable, excessive and arbitrary. It is 
not a restriction but almost amounts to the destruction or negation of that right. 
The restriction imposed is manifestly beyond the permissible bounds of clause 
(6) of Article 19 of the Constitution. On the other hand, the opposite contention 
was that restrictions by the impugned law are quite reasonable and justified to 
put a stop to the unfair labour practice and for the welfare for the workmen. It is 
a progressive legislation for the protection of weaker section of the society. 
Further, it was submitted that in view of the high philosophies of jurisprudence 
in relation to the social and welfare legislations, as expounded by renowned 
jurists and judges abroad, that the action of the closing down a business is no 
right all in any sense of the term.'"* It was in the context of these two extreme 
positions taken by the parties, the Supreme Court expressed its above 
138 
Judicial Response to Social Justice 
mentioned views and effectively conveyed the idea that socialism, which spells 
social justice, must maintain a just balance between several interest, which are 
allowed to contend against each other in a society . 
It is interesting to note that both Akdasi I'adhan and /uce / Wear 
subtly equated socialism, through the medium of welfare concept, with social 
justice. This is evident from the fact that in the former case the concept of 
socialism, as explained by the Court, tries to find its justification in the 'notion 
of social welfare', and in the latter case the Court clearly said that 'principles of 
socialism and social justice' cannot ignore, with impunity, interests of different 
sections of the society. Akdasi Padhan lays stress on doctrinaire aspect of 
socialism or social justice. But Excel Wear ruling does not deny it, but it lays 
emphasis on the dynamic content of socialism and social justice. In other 
words, socialism or social justice is not a static concept indicating a single and 
only one recipe to all social situations; it is a dynamic philosophy, which has a 
dynamic role in a mixed economy, for it must maintain a just balance between 
interests of several sectors or sections which are allowed to function as integral 
part of the society. In short, social justice, according to the Supreme Court, is 
doctrinaire in its approach but dynamic in its content and efficacy. 
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Social Justice Renders Processual Justice into a Versatile Use-tool 
The Supreme Court took an opportunity in Municipal Council, 
Ratlam V. vardhichand^^ to discuss the concept of social justice, speaking 
approvingly about a Magistrate's order made under section 133 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure directing the appellant in this case to bnng about abatement 
of public nuisance, justice Krishna Iyer tned to find a new social justice content 
in the Constitution. I le said, the new social justice orientation imparted to them 
by the Constitution of India makes it a remedial weapons of versatile use. 
Social justice is due to the people and, therefore, the people must be able to 
trigger off the jurisdiction vested for their benefit in any public fimctionary like 
a Magistrate under Section 133, Criminal Procedure Code. In the exercise of 
such power, the judiciary must be informed by broader principle of access to 
justice necessitated by the conditions of developing countries and obliged by 
Article 38 of the Constitution."' This, according to justice Krishna Iyer, is the 
"processual branch" of the Indian public law.'^ In this connection, he says that 
the new attitude of procedural justice reflects what Prof Adolf Homburger has 
called "a radical change in the hierarchy of values served by civil procedure". 
Then 'social justice', i.e., with finding procedures which are conductive to the 
pursuit and protection of the rights of ordinary people".'^ 
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Thus, according to the Supreme Court, as explained by justice 
Krishna Iyer, the social justice imparted by the Constitution has rendered the 
remedial weapon into a versatile use-tool. It also means, finding or picking 
procedures which are conducivc to the pursuit and protection of the rights of the 
ordinary people. In other words, the social justice, which ensures access to 
justice to common man, does not render the procedural justice an ineffective 
vehicle of justice by putting on it a saddle bag of stifling technicalities. That is 
to say, if procedural justice is denied to common man on technical grounds, the 
procedural justice ceases to be a versatile use-weapon; and access to justice 
becomes an ineffective concept and consequently the social justice may remain 
an unattainable goal. The judiciary has clearly conveyed the idea that the 
Constitution does not give scope for such a stalemate. 
Egalitarian Social Order 
Of recently, there is a rising tide of judicial activism for rendering 
justice flowing into different channels of gender justice, worker justice, 
minorities justice, dalil justice and equal justice. A host of decisions by the 
highest Court of the land bear testimony to this trend. 
S.P. Gupta V. Union of India;^"^ is one of those landmark cases in 
this time. The Supreme Court, while discussing the independence of the 
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judiciary, explained the role of the judiciary in realizing the Constitutional goal 
of social justice. Justice Bhagwati explained as to what the true function of the 
judiciary should be in a country like India which is marching along the road to 
social justice with the banner of democracy and the rule of law.^" According to 
him, our Constitution is not a non-aligned rational charter but a document of 
social revolution. Me says that the Constitution casts an obligation on every 
instrumentality including the judiciary to transform the status quo ante into a 
new human order in which justice, social, economic and political will inform all 
institutions of national life and there will be equality of status and opportunity 
for all. Justice Bhagwati went on. "The judiciary has therefore a socio-
economic destination and a creative function. It has to become an arm of the 
socio-economic revolution and perform an active role calculated to bring social 
justice within the reach of the common man. It cannot remain to act merely as 
an umpire but it must be functionally involved in the goal of socio-economic 
justice".^' 
There is an obvious contrast between the activist role of the judiciary 
and the passive role of the judiciary. According to justice Bhagwati, the former 
is necessary for the Indian Society, which is 'pulsating with urges of gender 
justice, worker justice, minorities justice, d^///justice and equal justice between 
chronic unequals'."^ As he said in the battle between those who are socially or 
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economically unequal the judicial process may prove disastrous from the point 
of view of social justice, if the judge is merely passive or negative. They should 
adopt a positive and creative approach. Judges cannot remain mere bystanders 
or spectators. They must become active participants in the judicial process 
ready to use law in the service of social justice thorough a pro-active goal-
oriented approach."^ But, Justice Bhagwati, advocated for judicial cadres who 
share the fighting faith of the Constitution and who are imbued with the 
Constitutional values.^"^ 
Laying stress on the necessity of a judiciary which is in tune with the 
social philosophy of the Constitution, he observes, that the country must have 
"judges who are prepared to fashion new tools, forge new methods, innovate 
new strategies and evolve a new jurisprudence, who are judicial statesmen with 
a social vision and a creative faculty and who have, above all, a deep sense of 
commitment to the Constitution with an activist approach and obligation for 
accountability, not to any party in power nor to the opposition nor to the classes 
which are vociferous but to the half hungry millions of India who are 
continually denied their basic human rights. We need judges who are alive to 
the socio-economic realities of Indian life, who are anxious to wipe every tear 
from every eye, who have faith in the Constitutional values and who are ready 
to use law as an instrument for achieving the Constitutional objectives''.^^ 
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The role of the judiciary in reaching the Constitutional goal of social 
justice described by Justice Bhagwati has been supported by justice Desai, who 
pleaded for co-operation of the Executive, Legislature and Judiciary in striving 
to achieve this ideal. In this co-operative venture the judiciaiy has to be inspired 
by the values enshrined in the Constitution. This inspiration is necessary, if rule 
of law is to run akin to rule of life and a feudal society is to be transformed into 
an egalitarian society by the rule of law."^' Proceeding further he said, "the 
judiciary must keep pace with the changing moves of the day, its decision must 
be informed by values enshrined in the Constitution, the goals set forth in the 
fundamental law of the land, peoples yearning desire for a chance for the better 
and promised millennium. An activist role in furtherance of the same is a sine 
qua non for the judiciary".^^ 
In this case, the Supreme Court explained in clear terms two matters, 
one relating to the meaning of the term 'social justice' and the second regarding 
the role of the judiciary in realizing the social justice. As indicated by the Court, 
the social justice envisages a socio-economic revolution and transformation of 
the status quo ante into a new human order in which justice, social, economic 
and political will inform all institutions of national life. Further, it connotes 
gender justice, worker justice, minorities justice, dalit justice and equal justice 
between chronic unequal. Besides, it means an egalitarian social order. Apart 
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from indicating the meaning of the term 'social justice', the Court laid repeated 
emphasis on the activist role of the judiciary in realizing the aforesaid 
Constitutional goal of social justice. 
Rule of [nterpretation Making Social Justice a V'ibrant Concept 
Can drivers working in two public establishments given two grades 
of pay and perks? If they are thus treated differently will it not be a violation of 
the concept of social justice so meticulously guarded under the Constitution? In 
Randhir Singh V. Union of India,^^ the Supreme Court had to meet this 
problem. The Court laid down the proposition that the Fundamental Rights 
must be construed in the light of the Preamble and the Directive Principles of 
State Policy. In this case the Court, while discussing the principle of "equal pay 
for equal work", has said that the directive principle of "equal pay for equal 
work for both men and women" stipulated in Article 39 (d) of the Constitution 
"means equal pay for equal work for every one and as between the sexes. 
Directive principles, as has been pointed out in some of the judgements of this 
Court have to be read into the Fundamental Rights as a matter of 
interpretation".^^ 
Proceeding further the Court pointed out that "the Preamble to the 
Constitution declares the solemn resolution of the people of India to constitute 
India into a ^Sovereign Socialist Democratic Republic. Again the word 
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"Socialisr must mean something. Even if it does not mean ~'To each according 
to his need', it must at least mean 'equal pay for equal work'.^° Finally, the 
Court declared that construing Articles 14 and 16 in the light of the Preamble 
and Article 39 (d), the principle 'equal pay for equal work' is deducible from 
those Articles and may be properly applied to cases of unequal scales of pay 
based on no classification or irrational classification though those drawing the 
dilferent scales of pay do identical work under the same employer.^' The 
principle laid down has far reaching significance. The principle of "equal pay 
for equal work" is part of the concept of "social justice" enshnned in the 
Preamble. Here that principle has been rightly construed to be the part of the 
word "socialist" embodied in the Preamble. So, to the extent the "social justice" 
looks forward to the creation of an egalitarian society, wherein the "equal pay 
for equal work" is assured for every one and as between the sexes, it also looks 
forward to the creation of Socialist Republic of India. Since the concept of 
social justice pervades many of the provisions of Directive Principles of State 
Policy, the rule of interpretation that the Fundamental Rights must be construed 
in the light of the Preamble and Directive Principles has transformed the social 
justice into a very vibrant concept in the Constitution. 
As a matter of fact, the two ideas, namely, (1) social justice means 
egalitarian social order, and (2) social justice pervades many directive 
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principles, have been brought out clearly by Justice Bhagvati in his dissenting 
opinion in Minerva Mills Ltd. K Union of IndiaP Referring to the views of 
Granville Austin, he said that it is in the Directive principles that we find the 
clearest statement of the socio-economic revolution. The Directive Principles 
aim at making the Indian masses free in the positive sense, free from the 
passivity engendered by centuries of coercion by society and by nature, free 
from fuJfilling their best selves.^^ The Fundamental Rights are no doubt 
important and valuable in a democracy. But how can there be real democracy 
without social and economic justice to the common man? Creation of socio-
economic conditions in which there can be social and economic justice is the 
objective of Directive Principles which nourish the roots of our democracy, 
make it a real participatory democracy and fertilise the static provisions of the 
Fundamental Rights." '^* Then Justice Bhagwati observes, "the Directive 
Principles, therefore, impose an obligation on the state to take positive action 
for creting socio-economic conditions in which there will be an egalitarian 
social order with social and economic justice to all, so that individual liberty 
will become a cherished value and the dignity of the individual a living reality, 
not only for a few privileged persons but for the entire people of the country". ^' 
The above views of Justice Bhagwati have been examined in a 
subsequent case. It was in Sanjeev Coke Mfg. Co. V. M/S Bharat Coking Coal 
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iJd.^^'; this was done. The case relates to the issue on the validity of 
nationalization of the coke oven plants belonging to the petitioners. Justice 
Chinnappa Reddy said that Justice Bhagwati was at great pains to point out that 
the broad egalitarian principle of social and economic justice for all was 
implicit in every Directive Principle, and therefore, a law designed to promote a 
Directive Principle even if it came into conflict with the formalistic and 
doctrinaire view of equality before the law, would most certainly advance the 
broader egalitarian principle and the desirable Constitutional goal of social and 
economic justice for all. Justice Reddy continued, "If the law was aimed at the 
broader egalitarianism of the Directive Principles, Article 31-C protected the 
law from needless, unending and rancorous debate on the question whether the 
law contravened Article 14's concept of equality before the law".^^ Thus it is 
clearly conveyed that "social justice" means egalitarian social order and 
egalitarianism is implicit in the Directive Principles. The dynamic Directive 
Principles, in which the social justice, that is, egalitarianism, is implicit, 
energies the static provisions of the Fundamental Rights. It is, therefore, 
appropriate to conclude that the Fundamental Rights must be interpreted in the 
light of the social justice concept which is enshrined in the Preamble and 
implicit in the Directive Principles. 
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Social Justice: Signature Tune of the Constitution 
Another important case, wherein the Supreme Court discussed the 
concept of social Justice, is People's Union for Democratic Rights K Union of 
India.-'' This case is also known as Asiad Workers' case. This is a writ petition 
brought by way of pubhc interest litigation in order to ensure observance of 
labour laws in relation to workmen employed in the construction work of 
various projects connected with the Asian Games. In this case, while discussing 
the role and importance of public interest litigation. Justice Bhagawati refers to 
realit}' of the Indian s i tua t ion .Large number of men, women and children who 
constitute the bulk of our population are today living a sub-human existence. 
Abject poverty, has broken their back and sapped their moral fiber. They have 
no faith in the existing social and economic system. According to Justice 
Bhagwati the only solution for making civil and political rights meaningful to 
these large sections of society would be to remake the material conditions and 
restructure the social and economic order so that they may be able to realize the 
economic, social and cultural rights.''® He further says that this task is to be 
carried by the Legislature and the Executive. But the judiciary can play a role 
when it has to decide cases coming in public interest litigation."*^ Justice 
Bhagwati seems to hold that the public interest litigation is a co-operative or 
collaborative effort on the part of the people, public authorities and the Court to 
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secure observance of the Constitutional or legal rights, benefits and privileges 
conferred upon the vulnerable sections of the community and to reach social 
justice to them/" Then Justice Bhagwati said: "The time has now come when 
the Courts must become the Courts for the poor and struggling masses of this 
country . They must shed their characters as upholders of the established order 
and status quo. They must be sensitized to the need of doing justice to the large 
masses of people to whom justice has been denied by a cruel and heartless 
society for generations. The realization must come to them that social justice is 
the signature tune of our Constitution, and it is their solemn duty under the 
Constitution to enforce the basic human rights of the poor and vulnerable 
sections of the community and actively help in the realization of the 
Constitutional goals". 
The aforesaid pronouncements of the Supreme Court in the 'Asiad 
Workers' case clearly convey an idea that social justice enshrined in the 
Constitution urges unmistakably remaking of material conditions and 
restructuring of social and economic order in order to enable the vast masses of 
the Indian society, which remained for generations a vulnerable sections of the 
society, to realise the economic, social and cultural rights and to realize the 
Constitutional goals. In other words, as explained by Justice Bhagwati, social 
justice envisages a socio-economic revolution by restructuring socio-economic 
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order, and remaking material conditions to bring into existence a new social 
order of lasting value to all. The Court, therefore, has rightly described the 
social justice as "the signature tune of our Constitution". Similar views have 
been expressed by Justice Bhagwati in Handhva Mukti Morcha V. Union of 
India,^^ wherein once again he lays emphasis on the need "to make basic human 
rights meaningful to the deprived and vulnerable sections of the community and 
to assure them social and economic justice, which is the signature tune of our 
Constitution'".''" 
Social Justice Stems from Social Morality and Abhors Economic 
Exploitation 
An interesting discussion on social justice has taken place in D.S. 
Akara V. Union of India.^'^ Question raised in this case was whether the date of 
retirement was a relevant consideration for eligibility when a revised formula 
for computation of pension is ushered in and made effective from a specific 
date. Would differential treatment to pensioners related to the date of retirement 
quo the revised formula for computation of pension attract Article 14 of the 
Constitution and the element of discrimination liable to be declared 
unconstitutional as being violative of Article 14? The Court has answered the 
question and said that if the pensioners form a class, their pension computation 
cannot be by different formula affording unequal treatment solely on the ground 
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that some retired earlier and some retired later. In this connection the Court has 
referred to Directive Principles and the Preamble. It has pointed out that Article 
41 obligates the state to provide, among others, assistance in cases of 
unemployment, old atie, sickness and disablement and in other ca.ses of 
undeserved want. Then it refeiTed to the phrase "Socialist Republic" in the 
Preamble and said that "principle aim of a socialist state is to eliminate 
inequality- in income and status and standards of life. The basic frame work of 
socialism is to provide a decent standard of life to the working people and 
especially provide secunty from cradle to grave. This amongst others on 
economic side envisaged economic equality and equitable distribution of 
income". 
Old age pension aims at providing an economic security to those who 
have rendered unto society what they were capable of doing when they were 
fully equipped with their mental and physical prowess. At old age the state shall 
ensure a reasonably decent standard of hfe, medical aid, freedom from want, 
freedom from fear and the enjoyable leisure, relieving the boredom and the 
humility of dependence. The Court said that, "Article 41 aims this and contains 
the characteristics of a socialist state". 
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The Court lias pointed out that the h'beralized pension scheme is 
good, but the arbitrary selection of the criteria for ehgibility for the benefits of 
the scheme dividing the pensioners on the basis of a specified date is bad. 
[fence the Court opined that the illegal provision relating to the arbitrary 
selection of criteria for the eligibility for the benefits of liberalized pension 
must be severed from the scheme and the liberalized scheme of pension be 
given effect to. But then, it has been pointed out that rule of severence always 
cuts down the scope of legislation but can never enlarge it and in the present 
case the scheme as it stands would not cover pensioners such as the petitioners 
and if by severance an attempt is made to include them in the scheme it is not 
cutting down the class or the scope but enlarge the ambit of the scheme which 
is impermissible even under the doctrine of sever ability. Further, it is pointed 
out that there is no precedent so far where the Court has included some category 
within the scope of provision of law to maintain its Constitutionality. Saying 
that the absence of precedent need not deter them the Court held that every new 
norm of socio-economic justice and every new measure of Social Justice 
commenced for the first time at some point of history. If at that time it is 
rejected as being without a precedent, the law as an instrument of social 
engineering would have long since been dead and no tears would have been 
shed. To be pragmatic is not to be unconstitutional. In its onward march law as 
153 
Judicial Response to Social Justice 
an institution usher in socio-economic justice. In fact, social security in old age 
commended itself in earlier stages as a moral concept but in course of time it 
acquired legal connotation/' ' According to the Court, socio-economic justice 
stems from the social morality coupled with abhorrence for economic 
exploitation and the advancing society converts in course of time moral or 
etliical code into enforceable legal formulations/" 
The views expressed in Nekara case clearly show that socialist state 
envisaged in the Preamble and the social justice enshrined in the Preamble and 
Directive Principles include social security measures to provide assistance in 
cases of unemployment, old age, sickness and disablement and other cases of 
undeserved want. The social justice, according to the Court, means 'equitable 
distribution of national cake'. That is to say, the judiciary has laid stress on the 
distributive justice aspect of the social justice. Besides, according to the 
Judiciary the concept of social justice stemmed from the concept of social 
morality and eventually become an enforceable legal concept and it abhors 
economic exploitation. In other words, it envisages a society sans exploitation. 
The foregoing analysis of the judicial pronouncement would show 
that the judiciary discussed all aspects of the concept of social justice enshrined 
in the Constitution and explained its various connotations and its importance. 
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First it said that the concept of social justice is antithetic to doctrine of waiver 
of Fundamental Rights. Second, social justice, according to the judiciary, is 
socialism with a doctrinaire approach, for its goal is to bring national wealth 
and means of production under national control to subserve the common good. 
At the same time, it is explained that in a mixed economy, interests of private 
enterprise cannot be stifled unjustly. So, necessarily a just balance must be 
maintained between conflicting interest. So viewed, socialism becomes more 
dynamic than doctrinaire. Therefore, as indicated by the judiciary, social justice 
is dynamic socialism which aims at a just socio-economic order. Third, the 
judiciary is of the opinion that concern with social justice means concern with 
finding procedures which are conducive to the pursuit and protection of the 
rights of ordinary people. In short, social justice orientation imparted to 
procedures by the Constitution has made them remedial weapons of versatile 
use. Consequently, procedures are freed from stifling technicalities and access 
to justice has become a meaningful concept to common man. Fourth, the 
concept of social justice, envisages creation of a new human order and an 
egalitarian society, wherein gender justice, worker justice, minorities justice, 
dalit justice and equal justice among the chronic unequals are assured to all. An 
activist role in furtherance of the concept is a Constitutional responsibility of 
the judiciary. Fifth, the dynamic Directive Principles energies the static 
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provisions of Fundamental Rights. So, when the judiciaiy said that the 
Fundamental Rights must be construed in the light of Directive Principles and 
the Preamble, it virtually conveyed the idea that the Fundamental Rights must 
be interpreted in the light of the Social Justice. This rule of interpretation has 
made the social justice a vibrant concept in the Indian Constitutional 
jurisprudence. Sixth, the unique position of the social justice as a Constitutional 
goal has been conveyed by the judiciary when it described the concept as the 
signature tune of our Constitution. Finally socio-economic justice stemmed 
from the social morality and then became an enforceable legal formula and it 
abhors economic exploitation. Besides, the Court has not only said that 
comprehensive social security schemes are within the ambit of social justice 
concept but also laid stress on the distributive justice aspect of the concept. 
Thus, meanings attributed to, and the unique role designed for, the concept of 
social justice enshrined in the Constitution by the judiciary in its various 
decisions have made the social justice a multi-dimensional vibrant concept of 
far reaching importance. 
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M E i i i t i J 
CHAPTER - V 
PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION : A POST NEHRU 
PIIENOMENAN 
Growth of the Concept 
'Public Interest Law' has been an uniquely American development. It 
has been defined in many ways.' The Council for public Interest Law set up the 
Ford Foundation in U.S.A., in its Report, has opted for a broad definition. 
Public Interest Law is the name that has recently been given to 
provide legal representation to previously unrepresented groups and interests. 
Such efforts have been undertaken in recognition that the ordinary market 
places for legal services fail to provide such services to significant interests. 
Such groups and interest include the poor, environmentalists, consumers, social 
and ethnic minorities, and others. 
The thrust of Public Interest Litigation in USA has been to ensure 
that citizens whose lines may be affected by the government policies. Courts 
and administrative agencies that shape, implement, or enforce policies should 
be open and accessible to the views of those citizens who may be affected by 
such actions and decisions.^ 
Public Interest Litigation : A Post Nehru Phenomenon 
Before 1969, the handful of major Public Interest Litigation centers 
in operation handled issues relating to civil rights, civil liberties, and problems 
of the poor. Blacks, poor people, and dissidents were their chief clientele, and 
law suits were their principal political tool. By the end of 1975, the universe of 
Public Interest Litigation had expanded so that its specti um of issues had came 
to include consumer protection, environmental protection and land and energy 
use, tax reform, occupational health and safety, health care, media access, 
corporate responsibility, education reform, employment benefits, and 
manpower training. Its range of clients embraced ordinary citizens, factory, 
farm and mine workers, women children, the elderly prisoners, and mentally 
impaired. And the tool it employs now include administrative agency actions, 
investigative research reports, arbitration and negotiation, public education 
campaigns, and lobbying. ^  
Development of Public Interest Litigation in India has thus evidently 
been different from that USA in certain aspects. But 1 cannot quite see as how 
calling it social action litigation instead of Public Interest Litigation, as Prof 
Upendra Baxi does, and which expression also seems to have been adopted by 
justice Bhagwati,"* makes any essential difference m the basic content and 
philosophy of Public Interest Litigation. 
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Prof. Upendra Baxi observes. Public Interest Litigation activism has 
instead of generating pressures for structural changes in law and society ended 
up servicing the much exposed ideology of interest group pluralism and legal 
liberalism and relying on Trubek he "observes that indeed, public advocacy 
programmes have tended to enhance the literacy of processes that may not 
really change".' Similarly, Public Interest Litigation activism is, despite the 
affluent society, unable to overcome problems of resources, both in terms of 
person power and finances. Critiques of Public Interest Litigation activism raise 
doubts concerning its overall impact as regards both mode of decision making 
and the short and long-term results achieved. 
The precise date when Public Interest Litigation was initiated cannot 
be pinpointed. How ever, the turning point was sometime in 1978 when 
Supreme Court took cognizance of the letters written by Charles Sobraj and 
Sunil Batra from their prison complaining about the torture to which they 
fallow prisoners were subjected.^ The Court treated the letters as writ petitions 
and proceeded to engine into the conditions of the prisoners and adjucate 
accordingly. The Courts has been started taking notice of articles published in 
newspapers drawing attention to the plight of undertrial languishing in prisons 
for years together. Ms. Kapila Hingorani (Advocate), filed a writ on behalf of 
29,000 Bihar undertrials prisoners through its interim orders. Since then, the 
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range of Public Interest Litigation has spread from release of bonded labourers, 
to child labour, to Nari Neketan to street hawkers, to environmental issues. It 
may be pointed out that it was justice Bhagwati who created a climate for 
Public Interest Litigation. In a memorable judgement^ Justice Krishna Iyer 
stated that it would be unjust to send a person to jail when he is unable to pay 
his debt due to extreme poverty and illness in the family. 
Role of Public Interest Litigation in Imparting Social Justice 
Until the emergence of Public Interest Litigation, justice was a 
remote reality for our illiterate, underprivileged and exploited masses. This has 
been largely due to three major difficulties: 
1. Lack of awareness of their legal right, 
2. Lack of assertiveness due to a lowly socio-economic status; and 
3. Lack of a legal machinery to give them legal aid. 
The re-interpretation of the concept of Locus standi by Supreme 
Court has removed one of the major hurdles facing the poor and has paved the 
way for easy access to Courts of justice. According to the traditional 
interpretation only a person who has suffered the legal wTong himself can have 
encourage to the Court of law for relief. The new position is that if a legal 
wrong is done to a person or a class of persons who, by reasons of poverty or 
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disability cannot approach a Court of law for justice, it is open to any public 
spirited individual or a social action group to a file a petition on his or their 
behalf. This new approach to bring justice to the poor and the oppressed it is 
hoped, will give meaning to the constitutional objectives of socio-economic 
justice for all. 
Public Interest Litigation has been used for various types of reliefs 
for undertrial prisoners in jail, amelioration of the conditions of detention in 
protective homes for women, for medical check up of remained home inmates, 
prohibition of traffic in women and relief for their victims, for the release of 
bonded labour, enforcement of other laws e.g. full and direct payment of wages 
to workers or prohibiting the employment of children in construction work, 
acquisition of cycle rickshaws by licensed rickshaw pullers, relief against 
custodial violence to women prisoners while in police lock-up, for 
environmental protection and the like. Thus, it is essential by directed towards 
governmental lawlessness. 
The actions are as much against the non-performance of 
constitutional and statutory obligations, as against misperformance. Its thrust 
has essentially been to benefit the poor, uneducated, disabled or helpless 
persons, who put for the Public Interest Litigation would never have their rights 
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vindicated, poverty or any other disability is the hallmark of entitlement to 
relief under Public Interest Litigation in India. 
1) Worker's Exploitation 
Asicid consiniciion case,''^ Ram Kumar Misra I'. State of Bihar,'' 
Mitkesh Kumar Acivani V. State of resulted in the payment of less than 
minimum wages to the workers. Here the Court stressed the Central 
Government to ensure observance of various social welfare and labour laws 
enacted by the Parliament for the puipose of securing to the workmen a life a 
basic human dignity, in compliance with the Directive Principles of State 
Policy. 
2) Eviction of Gadular Farmers 
A vmt petition was filed in the Supreme Court against the state of 
Tamil Nadu by a local advocate, M.J. Cherian, on behalf of the poor farmers of 
Gadular who have been cultivating their lands for several years. 
The petitioner alleged that persons who had for many years been 
cultivating the land were sought to be summarily evicted without adhering to 
the principles of natural justice contained in the State Forest Act. It was stated 
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in the petition that the forest officers and the police were committing atrocities 
on Gadular Fanners. 
The Supreme Court by an interim order, stopped the destruction of 
crops and forcible eviction of farmers, the Court finally ordered that the claims 
of the farmers for grant of pattas to the lands in question should be re-examined 
by a competent authority . Those farmers whose claims were not substantiated 
ultimately could make representation on humanitarian and compassionate 
ground. The Court also ordered the State Government to consider their case 
sympathetically. 
3) The Sewa Case in 1982 
Ela Bhatt, General secretary of SEWA, alongwith three female 
vegetable vendors, also members of SEWA, filed a petition in the Supreme 
Court challenging certain provisions of the Bombay Provincial Municipal 
Corporation Act, 1949. Manak Chowk Market, the fruit and vegetable vendors 
or 'topiwalis'. These poor 'topiwalas' had to sit on the footpath to carry on their 
business of selling vegetables which was their only means of livelihood. They 
were harassed by Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad by refusing to license 
the haWkers and forcing them to vacate the foot path with the help of police, the 
municipal corporation also collected fines^ of Rs^ISO per week 'expenses' 
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towards the removal of encroachers. The Supreme Court issued an interim order 
restraining the Municipal Corporation from evicting the vegetable vendors and 
from recovering any penalties from them. In its verdict of September 1984, the 
Supreme Court directed the Municipal Corporation to accommodate 218 male 
vendors, the associate members of SFAVA, on the newly constructed teiTace of 
Manak Chowk market. 
4) Undertrial Prisoners 
In Hussainara Khatoon and others (I) V. Home Secretary, Bihar 
the Supreme Court allowed the standing to Mr. Kapila Hingorani, an advocate, 
who filed it on the basis of a series of articles in 'The Indian Express, exposing 
the plight of Bihar undertrial prisoners. These undertrials included men, women 
and children who were behind the bars for period ranging from three to ten 
years, without their trial having been commenced so far. The Supreme Court 
held the 'right to a speedy trial', a Fundamental Right implicit in Article 21 of 
the Constitution. No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial 
can be regarded as reasonable fair or just. For this reason, the court ordered the 
release of the undertrial prisoners. The same has been reiterated in many cases 
subsequently decided by the Court. 
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5) Dehumanised Jails 
In Bhagalpur Blinding Case,'^ Bhagwati J. issued directions to the 
government provide medical aid and legal representation to the victims of 
police blinding. He also directed the government to punish the police who 
committed the act of blinding the undertrials. A legal correspondent of 'The 
Statesman' brought to the notice of the Court the inhumane conditions of 
'Naxalite' prisoners in the Madras Jail.'^ 
6) Women 
In Anin Shorie V. Slatethree journalists after an expose of a 
thriving market in which women brought and sold as chatteles filed a writ 
demanding prohibition of this practice and immediate relief for the victims. The 
court, through interim directions, provided relief by ordering the payment of 
compensation to them. Sheela Barse V. Slate of Maharastra,^^ exposed the ill 
treatment and custodial violence to women prisoners in police lock-up in the 
Bombay city. 
7) The Case of Bonded Labourers 
In one of the cases forty of the bonded labourers working in Pichola 
in Bhiwani district described in a deter to the Supreme Court the miserable 
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conditions in which they were living. They wrote : "We are all Adhivasi Bhils, 
with great difficulty we are given wages from Rs.3 to 5 a day which is just 
enough for our food rations. Drinking water is supplied once in three or four 
days. Our huts are worse than those used for keeping animals. We want to go 
away from here now itself but our master and his goondas tell us that we cannot 
leave unless we pay back them loan which is Rs.2000 to Rs.8000 per family. 
Our master enters our huts and molests our young daughters and also deals 
them up. Please save us". 
Swami Agnivesh, chairman of the Bandhua Mukti Morcha forwarded 
this letter to the Supreme Court. A division bench headed by justice P.N. 
Bhagwati appointed two commissioners Mr. Jose Verghese, Advocate Supreme 
Court and a journalist to enquire into the conditions of these labourers and 
report to the Court. The expenses of the commissioners were met by the 
committee for implementing legal Aid Schemes. Through the interim orders of 
the Court several groups of bonded labourers were released from the 
contractors. 
In another case Bandhua Miikti Morcha V. Union oflndia,^^ a letter 
addressed to justice Bhagwati relating the deplorable conditions of bonded 
labourers working at two stone quarries at Faridabad was admitted a writ 
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petition. The Court appointed two advocates, and Patwardhan of ITl to cany 
out a socio-legal investigation in the matter. On the basis of the report, the 
Supreme Court while freeing the bonded labourers upheld the claim of the 
petitioners that stone quarries may come under the definition of mines, under 
the mines act and that all workers should be entitled to all benefits acquiring 
these under various other beneficial legislation. 
In the case of Neerja Chandhah V. Slate of M.P.,^^ a writ petition 
was filed by a journalist in the form of letter to the Supreme Court complaining 
that about 135 bonded labourers within the meaning of Bonded Labour System 
(Abolition) Act, 1976, working in the stone quarries of Faridabad, had been 
released by the Supreme Court's order and had been brought back to M.P. with 
a promise of rehabilitation by the Chief Minister, but had not been rehabilitated 
even after six months of their release and were living in conditions to dire 
poverty. Giving suitable directions of the state of M.P. for proper 
implementation of the Bonded Labour Act, the Supreme Court observed, "It is 
plainest requirement of Articles 21 and 23 of the Constitution that bonded 
labourers must be identified and released and on release, they must be suitably 
rehabilitated freedom from bondage without effective rehabilitation 
would frustrate the entire purpose of the Act, for in that even, the 
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freed labourers will slide back into bondage again to keep body and soul 
together". 
Chattisgarh case : This is a case of blatant exploitation of the poor 
Ilarizans and the tiibals by rich landlords in the Chattisgarh region. The 
labourers called 'Kamiyas' were bonded labourers who had taken an initial loan 
of Rs.20,300 from the landlord. The landord extracted nearly 18 hours of work 
per day and paid about one kilogram of paddy to each in return. This the 
'Kamiyas' were forced to work for basic subsistence. Under the circumstances 
they were forced to take further loans from the landlords. Debts thus 
accumulated passed on from one generation to another. The secretary of 
Chattisgarh Krishak Mazdoor Sangh filed a writ petition in the Supreme Court 
through a civil rights advocate on behalf of the 'Kamiyas'. The Court appointed 
a commission to enquire into the conditions of the 'Kamiyas'. As soon as the 
news of writ petition spread far and wide, the landlords, with active help of 
government officials and police, started harassing and assaulting the CKMS 
activists and the 'Kamiya' leaders. Supplementary writ petition were filed 
praying for police protection to the CKMS representatives. The report of the 
commission established beyond doubt that the Kamiyas were bonded labourers. 
A further reign of terror was unleashed on the poor labourers after the departure 
of the commissioner. The Supreme Court appointed one-man commission and 
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passed an interim order directing the state government to take immediate step to 
release and rehabilitate the bonded labourers identified by the first commission. 
A rehabilitation plan was formulated and implemented with the help of CKMS 
workers. 
8) Child Welfare 
In Sheela Barse V. IIman of India,^^ a petition for release of children 
below 16 years detained in jails was admitted in the Court. The Court regretted 
that despite provisions, there are still a large number of children in different 
jails in the country. It is no answer on the part of the state to say that it has not 
got enough number of remand houses or observation homes or other places 
where children can be kept. On no account should the children be kept in jails if 
state government has not sufficient accommodation in its remand homes. They 
should be released on bail. iMore significantly, the Court had stipulated that all 
young offenders should be tried and either acquitted or convicted within nine 
months of the filing of the complaint if the charge attracts punishments of less 
than seven years imprisonment. This was the first time the Supreme Court had 
set a time limit for a criminal trial. 
Subsequently to the directions of the Court, the union governments 
has recently ordered all states governments to release within a month children 
under 16 held illegally in jails. 
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9) Sanjit Roy V. State of Rajasthan 
The Public works Department of the state of Rajasthan was 
constructing the Madanganj IJamara road close to village Tilonia as part of 
famine relief work. A large number of workers, employed on a daily wages 
were required to put in a fixed amount of working failing which their wage, 
fixed at Rs.7 per day, was proportionately reduced. The petitioner filed a public 
interest litigation under Article 32 before the Supreme Court Challenging the 
non payment of minimum wages to famine relief workers. The petitioner 
contended that due to wage policy followed by the PWD workmen were being 
paid much less than the minimum wage of Rs.7 per day. The Rajasthan 
government contended that since the construction work of Madanganj Hamara 
road was a famine relief work, the Minimum Wages Act, 1964. The petitioner 
challenged the validity of the exemption Act. The Court, relying on the Asiad 
case judgement, held that if anything less than minimum wages is being paid to 
any workers, it is a violation of his Fundamental Right under Article 23. The 
Court held minimum wages is not fixed on piece rate basis and so a stipulation 
that a particular minimum wage payable would be proportionately reduced if 
the workers turns out less work, cannot be sustained. Tn such a case, the 
employer may take disciplinary action against him best he cannot pay him 
anything less than minimum wag. The Exemption Act, in so far as it excludes 
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the applicability of the Minimum Wage Act, 1984, was held constitutionally 
valid. 
10 Nulakapetta People's Struggle for Safe Environment 
About 350 families of Uaiizan labourers and artisans living in 
Nulakapetta, a village situated 7 km. to the west of Vijayawada created legal 
history when they won a Public Interest Litigation case against a powerful 
contractor, had acquired a licence to excavate mind around the village. The 
people had already been exposed dangers caused by mine quarrying.. There 
were a number of pits on account of quarrying done earlier. During the 
monsoon season these pits were filled with water and caused greater danger to 
life. The villagers, supported by the mines who were running the Adult literary 
centre in the village, decided to approach all concerned government officials. A 
report of the villagers plight appeared in the Indian Express. 
A Public Interest Litigation petition on the basis of report was 
admitted by the Supreme Court in 1983. The Supreme Court issued a stay order 
restraining the contractor from further excavation. The expert committee 
appointed to look into the matter, submitted their reports in January 1984. On 
January 1, 1985 the Supreme Court passed an order in favour of the people. 
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CHAPTER - V! 
NEirRU'S IDEAS ON SOCIAL JUSTICE 
Historical Back Ground 
The Indian National Congress was founded in December 1885. The 
Indian desire for civil rights was implicit in its formation. Indian wanted the 
same rights and privileges that British masters enjoyed, in India and that 
Britons had among themselves in England. In the early years of its formation, it 
asked for increasing Indian participation in political affairs of the country. 
Speaking from the Congress platform, Surendra Nath Baneiji, a leader in 
Bengal claimed that Indians, as bom British subjects, were entitled to the same 
rights and privileges as were guaranteed to the English by their own 
Constitution. He said that they were determined to have such rights through 
Constitutional means. Perhaps the earliest demand for recognition of 
fundamental rights commenced with the Constitution of Indian Bill 1895 
probably issued under the inspiration of Lokmanya Tilak and described as the 
Home Rule Bill by Annie Besant. A glimpse of the rights and directives may be 
found m the bill itself. Article 15 of the Bill, mteralia, contamed the rights of 
free speech and expression. The Bill also had provisions guaranteeing free state 
education and compuisory primary education. 
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A series of congress resultions were passed between 1917 and 1919 
which repealed the demand for civil rights and equal status with those of 
Englishmen. The resolution of 1917 called for equal terms and conditions in 
bearing arms, for a wider application of the system of Indians to claim that no 
less than one half of the jurors could be their own countrymen. A further 
resolution stated with the emphatic opinion that Parliament should pass a statute 
guaranteeing the Civil Rights of his Majesty's Indian subjects, which would 
contain provisions relating to equality before the law, a free press, free speech 
etc. The Statute more over lay down the political power belonged to the Indian 
people in the same manner as to any people or nation in the British Empire. 
The demand for equality, for self government exemplified not only 
the well known desire for negative freedom, but also that aspect of positive 
freedom so respectively. 
The major development was the drafting of Mrs. Annie Besant 's 
Commonwealth of India Bill of 1925, which was adopted at the National 
Convention and presented to the House of Commons by Mr. Lansbury and it 
sought to achieve for India self governing Dominion status except for Foreign 
and Defence Affairs. This Bill for the first time contained an Article relating to 
the grant of fundamental rights. Article 4 of the bill was entitled as "Declaration 
of Rights", contained the following provisions. 
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Liberty of person and security of his dwelling and property; fireedom 
of conscience and the free profession and practice of religion; free expression of 
opinion and the right of assembly peacefully and without arms and of forming 
association or unions; justice and the like; equality before the law, irrespective 
of considerations of nationality, and equality of the sexes. 
Article 8 of the Bill, the substance of which was approved by Indian 
National Congress enumerated, interaiia, provision for education standing that 
"all persons in Commonwealth of India have the right to free elementary 
education and such right shall be enforceable soon as due arrangements shall 
have been made by the competent authority". 
In November 1927, just two years after the presentation of the Bill, 
an Indian Statutory Commission was appointed under Sir John Simon to 
examine whether Indians were fit for being entrusted with a further installment 
of responsible government The Commission was appointed to the study the 
possibility of Constitutional reforms in India. 
On 17 May, 1927, at the Bombay Session of the Congress, Motilal 
Nehru moved a resolutipn for India in consultation with elected members of the 
Central and provincial Legislatures and leaders of political parties, based on 
declaration of rights, a Swaraj Constitutions to give momentum to the fight for 
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Swaraj, that is, self-govemment. In its introduction, it was said that the 
declaration of rights of Indian against others and of Indians themselves as 
against their government must indeed form the most important features of the 
Constitution. Its preamble declared Swaraj as the inherent and inalienable right 
of the people of India. The Constitution was welcomed all over the countiy and 
endorsed by the Nehru Committee in 1928. 
In compliance with the directions contained in the Congress 
Resolution of 1927 the Working Committee of the congress convened an all 
parties Conference to draft a Swaraj Constitution for India. It represented the 
views of Muslims, Hindus, orthodoxy-Brahmins and non-Brahmins, labour and 
liberals. The Conference appointed a small Committee with Motilal Nehru as its 
Chairman and seven other members, "to determine the principles of the 
constitution for India". The report of the Committee which known as the Nehru 
report was based on the principles of Dominion Status with fiill responsible 
government on the parliamentary pattern. It contained an explanation of its draft 
Constitution, that the first concern of Indians was to secure the fundamental 
rights that had been denied to them and which are not to be withdrawn in any 
circumstances. The recommendations made in the Report Contained a number 
of fundamental rights 1. The report interalia, contained rights of personal 
liberty, freedom of conspi^nce and the ft-ee profession and practice of religion 
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subject of public order and morality, the right to free expression of opinion, as 
well as right to assemble peacefully without arms and right of equality. It also 
enumerated certain social and economic rights. For example, right of free 
elementary education without any distinctionof caste or creed in matter of 
admissions into any educational institution maintained or aided by the state and 
such rights shall be enforceable as soon as due arrangements shall have been 
made by competent authority'; freedom of combination for the maintenance and 
improvement of labour and economic conditions was guaranteed to every one 
and of all occupatiion; maintenance of health and fitness for work of all 
citizens, securing a living wage for every worker, protection of motherhood, 
infirmity and unemployment. This Constitution was hailed by the Congress as a 
great contribution towards the solution of Indian political and communal 
problems. The fundamental rights of the Nehru Report were reminiscent of 
those of the American and post-war-European Constitution and were in several 
cases word for word ft"om the rights listed in the common wealth of India Bill. 
Several clause had however, a more particular Indian origin such as, no breach 
of contract of service or abatement thereof shall be made criminal offence, 
which related directly to the forced labour. The rights of Nehru Report were a 
close precurror of the fundamental rights of the Constitution. At present ten out 
of the nineteen subclauses reappeared materially unchanged, and three are 
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included in the directive principles. With the passage of time the demand for 
declaration of fundamental rights in the future Constitution of India gained 
impetus at the hands of political leaders. The Indian Central Committee 
appointed by the Indian legislatures towards the end of 1928 also supported the 
inclusion of fundamental rights in the proposed government of India. Act. The 
report was presented to the British but unfortunately, the Commission did not 
support the general demand for the enumeration and guaranteeing of 
fundamental rights in the Constitution of India. The Commission merely 
observed, "many of those who come before us have urged that the Indian 
Constitution should have contained definited guarantees for rights of the 
individuals And a declaration of equal rights of all citizens 
Experience, however, has not shown them to be of any great practical value. 
Abstract declarations are useless, unless there exist the will and the means to 
make them effeective." As nothing concrete came out of the Report, at the 
historic session of l-ahore of 1929, of which Jawahar Lai Nehru was made the 
president, it gave voice to the new militant spirit and passed a resolution 
declaring Puma Swaraj to be the Congress objective. The Congress resolution 
of 1929 also emphasized the theme of socio-economic reconstmction when it 
declared. "The great poverty and misery of the Indian people are due, not only 
to foreign exploitation in India but also the economic structure of the society. 
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which the alien rulers support. In order therefore, to remove this poverty and 
misery and to ameliorate the conditions of the Indian masses, it is essential to 
make revolutionary changes in the present economic and social structure of 
society and to remove the gross inequalities". December 31, 1929 was hoisted 
the newly adopted tricolour flag of freedom and January 26 was fixed as the 
first Independence Day, which was to be celebrated every year with the people 
taking the pledge that it was a crime against man to submit any longer to British 
rule. The inalienable right of the Indian people to have freedom and equality 
was asserted. It was said that the British Government not only deprived the 
people of India of their freedom but based itself on the exploitation of masses 
and ruined them economically, culturally and spiritually. Subsequently in all the 
three sessions of the Indian round Table Conference, efforts for the inclusion of 
a chapter on fundamental rights in the Constitutional document for India were 
made.^ 
The Indian National Congress passed a historic resolution on the 
declaration of fundamental rights at its forty-fifty session held at Karachi on 29 
march, 1931. It was stated in the resolution that the Congress was of the opinion 
that with a view to enabling to the masses, political freedom must include real 
economic freedom of the starving millions. The Congress therefore, declared 
that any Constitution to be agreed to all on its behalf should provide, or enable 
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that Swaraj Government to provide, for fundamental rights and duties and 
economic and social programme. Subsequently, the resolution was modified in 
'the all India Congress Committee meeting held at Bombay on August 6, 1031. 
The modified version of the resolution was finally adopted under the title 
Fundamental Rights and Duties and Economic Programme at the 47"^ Session 
of the Indian National Congress held at Calcutta on April, 19334. There were 
in all Seventeen Articles in this resolution, divided into four heads first 
fundamental rights and duties, which inter-alia stated that the culture, language 
and script of the minorities and of the linguistic areas shall be protected, the 
state shall provide for children fi-ee and compulsory primary education. 
Second, labour which inter-alia provided that the organisation of the economic 
life must conform to the principles of justice, to the end that it may secure a 
decent standard of living; the state would safeguard the interests of industrial 
workers, and especially adequate provisions for leave during maternity period; 
children of school going age shall not be employed on the mines and factories. 
Third tenure and rent and revenue would be reformed and an equitable 
adjustment made of burden on agricultural land, immediately giving relief to 
the small peasantry by a substantial reduction of existing agricultural land, 
immediately giving relief to the small revenue paid by them and in case of 
uneconomic holdings, exempting them fi-om rents, so long as necessary, with 
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such relief as might be just and necessary, to holder of small estates affected by 
such exemption or reduction in rest, and to the same ends imposing a graded tax 
on net income from and above a reasonable minimum. Fourth, economic and 
social programme, which inter-alia, stated that the state shall protect indigenous 
cloth: and for this purpose pursue the policy of exclusion of foreign cloth and 
foreign yam from, the country; intoxicating drinks and drugs shall be totally 
prohibited, except for medical purpose; the state own and control key industries 
and services, mineral resources, railways, waterways, shipping and other means 
of public transport, relief of agricultural indebtedness and control of usury-
direct and indirect. It is evident from the provisions of Karachi resolution that 
they reflected that we today call Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles 
of State Policy. Then there was no separation. It might perhaps have been 
thought that all these had to constitute an integral whole to bring about social 
revolution in India. The Karachi resolution was emphatic met only on the 
state's negative obligation but also on its positive obligation provide its people 
with economic and social conditions in which their negative revolution would 
have vital share in shaping India's future Constitution and the fact become the 
spiritual and in some cases the direct antecedents of the Directive Principles" 
there was an explicit pledge to end exploitation and secure real, several 
individuals and organisations responded to the questionnaire and some of them 
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worked out of the details of Fundamental Rights which they wanted to include 
in the future Constitution of India. One of such proposals came from all India 
Depressed Class League which in its memorandum submitted a detailed list of 
Fundamental Rights including the social and economic rights. An other 
suggestion came from Professor Vankataramaiah who drew a fine distinction 
between the civil and economic rights. He pleaded for the incorporation of the 
two sets of right in the Constitution; the former being enforceable in a court of 
law and the latter not.' He also gave reason for the distinction between the sets 
of rights the difficulty involved in respect of non-justiciable rights and the ulity 
of social economic rights in the Constitutional set up. Prof. Venkataramaiah in 
his memorandum on the question of Fundamental Rights observed, "Civil rights 
are of a justifiable character and they can ought to be enforced through Courts 
because they involve positive action in the form of new legislature measures, 
administrative organization, accumulation of large financial resources and 
perhaps the total transformation in some cases of the economic system in the 
country . These can be accomplished economic freedom.^ Granville Austin 
characterized the resolution as both "a declaration of right and a humanitarian 
socialist manifesto. Michael Edwards characterizes it a title differently by 
saying that it was not a particularly revolutionary document. But even with its 
cautions approach and its watered down socialism. It was to be a milestone on 
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the road of India's' political development. It led after independence to the 
endorsement by Congress of national economic planning and the socialist 
pettem of society as the natural fulfillment of the legacy. Nehru liked the 
resolution because it represented a new outlook in the congress and took a short 
step in a socialist direction by advocating nationalization of key industries and 
services and various measures to lesson the burden on the poor and increase it 
on the rich. 
The subject of Fundamental Right and its incorporation in the future 
Constitution of India was discussed at length by the Sapru Committee in 1945 
with Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru as its Chairman.^ Various associations; group and 
individuals sent their views on the desirability of India with right of writ 
remedy in case of violation of these rights and the machinery that could be 
suggested for the enforcement of those Fundamental Rights which were not 
justifiable. It was here that the separation of right started first of all through 
decrees issued by the Courts. This does not, however, mean that rights not 
justiciable and ineffective as their incorporation in the Constitution serves no 
purpose. It only means that while for enforcing some right we have to look to 
other political institutions".^ Thus anticipating the inclusion of non-justiciable 
economic and social rights in the framework of the Constitution in India, the 
Sapru Committee in 1945 considered the suggestions received, from various 
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quarters on the subject of Fundamental Rights and reached on the following 
conclusion first; protection of minority rights was absolutely necessary second, 
there was a need for laying down adequate and appropriate standards for 
legislative and administrative actions and the Courts. Third, that the justiciable 
and non-justiceable Fundamental Rights be discussed and pleaded for 
incorporation in the future Constitution. Finally, the Sapru committee in its 
Constitutional proposals recommended that a declaration of Fundamental 
Rights in Indian Constitution was absolutely necessary. Tt envisaged that 
Fundamental Right had to be of two classes - one justiciable and the other non-
justiciable. The Committee reconciled the British view of sovereignty of 
parliament with that view that in a federal structure the judiciary was supreme 
and the final proctor and guardian of the Constitution. It, however, did not 
suggest how best the division could be made. It left the whole question to be 
decided by the Constitution making body with the observation that though the 
task was by no means impossible, the proposals of the Sapru Committee, were 
definitely significant advancement on earlier proposals because it classified 
these rights into two main categories, justiciable and non-justiciable; the former 
being enforceable whereas the later were not and recommended the inclusion of 
the later in the Constitution finally Constituent Assembly drafted the 
Constitution. 
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Preamble of the Indian constitution is an abridged Version of the 
"Objectives Resolution" moved by Jawaharlal Nehru in the Constituent 
Assembly on the 13"" December, 1946 and adopted by the Constituent 
Assembly on 22"'^  January/ 1947 after much deliberation. The concept of social 
justice has been taken from the relevant part of the Objective Resolution. The 
views expressed by the Constitution makers on the socio-economic justice 
embodied in the Objectives Resolution would give an idea about the meaning of 
social justice. 
Nehru's View on Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes 
Jawaharlal Nehru was very much concerned for the Indian masses 
afflicted with poverty. He said in his speech at Madras : 1 am visiting Harijan 
Institutions and quarters in the city so that T may get some idea of the conditions 
of Harijans in Madras. I think of this problem not as a Harijan problem, but as 
the problem of the poor, downtrodden, unemployed, landless labourers in India. 
We ought to know that, at present, the biggest problem of Indian poverty is the 
poverty of the Indian masses and the problem of Indian employment is the 
unemployment not only of the masses but also of the middle classes. The 
Harijan problem is really a part of these problems. Therefore, if we tiy to solve 
these problems, we can solve the Harijan question also.^ 
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Tic did not appreciate the idea of groups of people being segregated. 
In this context, he stated, "I do not understand nor do I appreciate the idea of 
groups of people being kept apart. We must remove ail these barriers so that 
there may be no group in India which, by its work, economic position or name, 
is supposed to belong to an inferior group. Therefore, the problem is not that of 
upJigting this man or that man, but of establishing in India equality so that 
every single person in India, man or woman, may have the fullest opportunity 
for grov^h".'" 
For Nehru, social justice mean removal of economic injustice which 
the individual in a society was compelled to suffer." On the achievement of 
independence the national leadership too up the task of framing the Constitution 
being inspired by the concepts of equality and social jsutice. So our 
Constitution made special provisions for the advancement of Scheduled Castes 
and Scheduled Tnbes. 
Nehru stated in the Constituent Assembly, "Because there are great 
differences in a India it becomes incumbent upon us, not only from 
humanitarian reasons but from the standpoint of fulfillment of democracy, to 
raise up those people who are low down in the social, economic and other 
levels to bring to them every opporhitiity of growth and progress, national and 
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othei-wise. That has been the general accepted policy of this country and it is the 
accepted policy of this country and it is the accepted policy of this government. 
Now, in pursuance of that policy, certain reservation of seats was granted, for 
instance, to the scheduled castes''.'" The doctrine of "protective discrimination" 
was provided in the C'onstitution whereby reservations have been conceded to 
the persons of Schedules Castes and Scheduled Tribes in matters of admission 
to educational institutions and recruitment to public services. 
The speech delivered by Nehru in the Constituent Assembly has 
bearing on this aspect. Nehru has said, "Various Scholarships and educational 
amenities etc. have been granted and no doubt will be granted still more, not 
only to the scheduled castes but also to other backward groups in the countiy". 
There are tribal people and others who require every help. It is no 
good for us to say that we have given a vote to the member of a tribal folk and 
we have done our duty to him, having for hundreds and thousands of years not 
done out duty to him, by giving him a vote we consider ourselves absolved of 
all other duty. Therefore, we have to think always in terms of raising the level 
of all those who havp been denied opportunities in the part. I do not personally 
think myself that the best way to do that on the political plan is reservation of 
seats and the rest. 1 think the best way, and the more basic and fundamental 
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way, is to advance them rapidly in the economic and educational spheres and 
then they will stand on their feet.' ^ 
As a member of the Constituent Assembly Nehru was assiduously 
associated with the providing of safeguards for the Backward Classes which 
included Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Provisions were incorporated 
in the Constitution for ensuring the proper working of the Constitutional 
safeguards in the matter. Article 338 of the Constitution clearly ordains that it is 
the duty of the special officer to investigate all matters relating to safeguards 
provided for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes under the Constitution 
and report to the President upon the operation of these safeguards at such 
internals as the President shall cause all such reports to be laid before each 
house of parliament. Article 340 of the Constitution stipulates that the president 
may by order appoint a Commission consisting of such person as he thinks fit to 
investigate into the conditions of socially and educationally backward classes 
and the difficulties under which they labour and to make recommendation as to 
the steps that should be taken by the Union or any state to remove such 
difficulties, and to improve their conditions and as to the grants which should 
be made for the purpose by the Union or any state and the conditions subject to 
which such grants should be made, and the order appointing such Commission 
shall define the procedure to be followed by the Commission, The Constitution 
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has prescribed protection and safeguards for the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled 
Tribes and Other Backward Classes, either specially or by way of general rights 
of citizens with the aim of promoting their educational and economics interests, 
and of removing some social disabilities they were subject o. In the Scheduled 
Tribe Conference, Nehru obsei-ved, have found in the tribal people many 
qualities which I do not find in the people of the plains and the cities and many 
other parts of India and these qualities attracted me. I am not at all sure which 
way of living is better , our or theirs. But in some ways I am quite certain 
theirs is better. If that is so, then it is absolute presumption for any of us to 
approach this problem with an air of superiority, to tell them how to behave or 
what to do and what not to do and try to make them a second rate copy of 
ourselves. The approach to the tribal people should be one of learning from 
them and having leamt, to try to help and cooperate. There is a great deal to 
learn from them, especially in the frontier areas. They are extremely disciplined 
people, often much more democratic that most other in India without a 
constitution and the rest, they function democratically and carry out the 
decisions made by their elders or their own representatives almost without 
exception".'' ' 
The Constitution of India is based on the ideals of justice, liberty, 
equality and fraternity. As such it has endeavoured to do away with caste 
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politics prevalent under British administration by abolishing untouchability and 
prohibitory discrimination on various grounds, introducing universal adult 
franchise, terminating separate electorates and ensuring liberty of thought, 
expression, faith, belief and worship. India is a secular, democratic and socialist 
state permitting no room for the politics of caste and communalism. ^Nehru was 
clear on this score when he said, "1 am sure that to think of tribal and non-
tribals as people qualitatively different is wrong. Take the description in our 
Constitution of the Scheduled Caste. As you know, it is rather arbitrary 
Government, after consideration, decide whether a particular caste is a 
Scheduled Caste or not. It is not possible to draw hard and fast time that is why 
we aim ultimately at removal of all these appellations, decriptions and names 
which ideologically and physically separate the people as the depressed 
classes, the Harijans, the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and so on. 
Differences in customs and ways will continue to remain, because they are due 
to geography and climate. But this barrier of so and so belonging Scheduled 
Caste should go".'^ 
On the initiative of Nehru, the then President had appointed a 
Backward Classes Commission to equire into the conditions of socially and 
educationally backward classes and the difficulties under which they laboured, 
and to make recommendations as to steps which should be taken by the Centre 
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and states to remove those difficulties to improve their conditions. Another 
noteworthy feature is that during the time of Nehru, the Centre had passed the 
Untouchability Offences Act 1955 which has made the offence cognizable and 
punishable under law; uniformly throughout the territory of India. The evil of 
untouchability is intrinsically v^oven in the social fabric to such an extent that 
legislation is not only the answer. 
Nehru was committed for the development through planning to help 
India in overcoming her disadvantages and realize her opportunities.'^ He was 
one of the principal architects of fine year plans which were initiated in India 
since 1951-52. The main objective of the First Five Year Plan was to bring 
about all-round balanced development which would ensure a rising national 
income and a steady improvement in the living standards over a period of 
time. In December 1954 Parliament declared that the broad objectives of 
economic policy should be to achieve the "Socialist pattern of Society". Under 
the socialist pattern of society, the basic criteria for determining the lines of 
advance would be social gain and greater equality of opportunities for all, 
socialism means that the principal means of production should not be in private 
hands; and it means a large measure of equality.'^ 
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The Second Five Year Plan (1956-57 to 1960-61), under the 
chairmanship of Nehru, sought to promote a pattern of development which 
would lead to the establishment of a socialist society in India. Particularly it 
stressed that the benefits of economic development should accrue more to the 
relatively less privileged sections of society, and there should be a progressive 
reduction in the concentration of incomes, wealth and economic power. Broadly 
18 
the second five year plan aimed at the creation of a welfare state. 
The main aim of the third five year plan was to secure a marked 
advance towards a self-sustaining growth. Some of the objectives pertained to 
the establishment of greater equality of opportunity and utilization of the men 
power resources of the country to the fullest extent. Nehru had urged upon the 
guaranteeing of equality of opportunity to the vulnerable section of the society. 
Nehru desired the development of backward classes in various ways. 
He insisted on communications, medical facilities, education and better 
agriculture to ameliorate the lot of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. 
These are to be pursued on the basis of some fundamental principles''^. These 
principles are that (1) the people should develop along the line of their own 
genius and we should hot impose anything on them, (2) the tribal rights in land 
and forests should be respecled, (3) we shouW tJy to train and build up a team 
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of their OWTI people to do the work of administration and development (4) we 
should not over administer or ovenvhelm them with iimmnerable schemes and 
(5) we should judge results, not by statistics or the amount of money spend, but 
by the quality of human character that is evolved . 
Nehru's mind was impregnated with the deep pathos of human lives. 
I le felt for the sorrows of others. He was a great humanist of the kind rarely 
seen in the present day world. According to Rabindra Nath Tagore, "Nehru was 
a person greater than his deeds and truer than his surroundings"^'. 
Nehru's View on Women 
Man and woman are the two basic components of our society. The 
family and the social structures rest on these supports. In fact, they are like two 
wheels of a cart without, either of whom no progress is possible, the one is 
incomplete without the other. Here I want to focus some points on which Pandit 
Jawaharlal Nehru had a great contribution in solving the problems of women 
for their development. 
Jawaharlal Nehru was one of the greatest figures of our generation, 
an outstanding statesman whose services to the cause of human freedom are 
unforgettable. As a fighter for freedom he was illustrious, as a maker of modem 
India his services were unparalleled . His life and work have had a profound 
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influence on our mental make up, social structure and intellectual 
development^^. He had a soft comer for the children and profound sympathy 
for Indian women who were a depressed class of our society. He had 
meticulously investigated their problems and had carefully designed plans for 
their improvement. 
Firstly Nehru had said that female section should not be too 
womanish. He had preferred to lay stress on more fundamental matters 
affecting women that their participation in the legislatures and the local bodies 
of our country. He had quoted the famous Saying of a French writer to this 
effect that if you want to judge the culture and civilization of a people you can 
fmd that out by the status and condition of the women of the country. You need 
not look around to see what the man are about if you find that the women of 
that country are cultured and civilized and highly advanced in the various walks 
of life. If the women are backward. That nation is backward that is, in his 
opinion a very important way of judging a nation's advancement. ^^  
Nehru had considered the following problems of women. "What is 
the condition of the women? What are the women doing? What opening and 
opportunities have they got and what disabilities are they labouring under?" If 
we will consider the matter fi-om that point of view, the women will certainly 
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go up and a result of which the whole nation will advance. If the women will be 
backward, it is quite impossible for a nation to go ahead. Therefore, Nehru had 
addressed the nation to work for the benefit of women who, according to him, 
have for a long time been the depressed classes in India and in the world. He 
said, "we have to remove the bars and to give equal opportunity, equal 
privileges to both men and women in order to build an advance nation". 
India has rich cultural heritage of its own from point of view of 
women. There are many things in our past history which are praiseworthy and 
for which wa can take legitimate pride. But that is a bad habit, all the same, to 
be looking back all the time. According to Nehru, "we cannot live on tradition 
alone. Nor can we live on the reputation acquired by ancient heroes and 
heroines, quite apart from the fact that we cannot entirely apply those examples 
to modem conditions. Conditions change"""^ further he addes, "we may take 
inspiration from the good qualities that the ancient heroes and heroines 
possessed, we cannot exactly copy everything that might have been done in 
those times because times have utterly changed".^^ 
Nehru had tried his best to cultivate patriotism among the female 
section of our country. He had analyzed the matter of India's freedom 
movement from various angles and focused on the points where the female sex 
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should work. Here he added, "It become necessary for the women of India to 
take their full part in the struggle for political freedom".^'^ As a result of this, 
according to him, they would gain a position in the public life of the country 
from which it would not be possible to remove them. Further, he mentioned that 
the 1930 Civil Disobedience Movement played an extra-ordinary and 
outstanding part in putting an end to that system of seclusion of women. They 
came out from their houses when their men folk were in prison, they took the 
lead in the great movement, they played their part; they showed quite extra-
ordinary powers of organization, discipline and enterprice. That kind of thing 
sent up our women folk in the estimation of net our country at large but of other 
people in other parts of the world how had been in the habit of saying that 
Indian women were slaves and incapable of doing anything. They were 
surprised and astounded at the change they saw. Therefore, women should take 
the fullest part in the political struggle for freedom, political and economic. He 
advised the female sex to fight till the goal is achieved and in no time they 
should show their slightest retardation. In the language of Nehru, "You will 
have, if you want to compact it, to go on with all your strength all the time 
because the moment you sit down the inertia overwhelms you and puts on end 
to your work"^^. 
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Nehru was content to observe that women's movement were rising 
up, trying for the removal of various disabilities and seeking representation of 
women in all political bodies. It is essential that women should have a voice 
because they will not only be helpful but also reasonable sensible and peaceful. 
Nehru had also agreed to the fact that women should take part in the various 
bodies and committees, political and other in the countr}-. In this connection he 
said, "I would welcome more and more women occupying prominent positions 
in committees and boards and its executives''.^^ Nehru was unhappy to declare 
that there were not very many women at that time occupying seats of authority 
in the Congress party. That may be due to the fact that men do not like pushing 
women ahead, lie encouraged the women section to face these problems also. 
Again he added, "I hope that your push will have such strength that it will 
become very difficult for men to refuse your demands." 
About the rights and legal position of women, Nehru had various 
thoughts. He had analyzed this matter from different angles and had studied the 
structure from the East and the Wests. In this context, his views of 1934 are as 
follows. "The position of women in the west was very bad till quite recent 
times. They had few rights. English women could not even own property under 
the law; thus husband took the lot even his wife's earnings. They were, thus, 
even worse legally than women are today under Hindu law. One other 
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outstanding features of recent years has been the emancipation of women from 
the many bonds, legal, social and customary, that held them. The war gave a 
great push tx) this in the west. And even in the East, from Turkey to India and 
China, woman is up and doing and taking a brave part in national and social 
activities'""^. In early times proprietary rights of women were recognized veiy 
tardily in almost all civilizations. For a long time there was no question of 
holding any property; she herself was an item in the moveable property of the 
husband or the patriarch. The wife was under the tutelage of her husband and 
could possess no separate property at all. Even after the husband's death she did 
not become a Suijure but passed under the tutelage of other male relatives. In 
India too, in very early times, women were regarded as chattel. Nehru did not 
appreciate the legal position of women as described by Manu. It is clearly 
evident from the numerous stories in the epics that the law of Manu was not 
applied very rigidly. The women, on the other hand, held an honoured place in 
the home and in the society. The old lawgiver, Manu, himself says : "Where 
women are honoured, the Gods dwell". Viewing on the education and learning 
of women, Nehru had pointed out thus : There is no mention of women 
students in Taxila or any of the old Universities. But some of them did function 
as student some where, for there is repeated mention of learned and scholarly 
women. In later ages also there were a number of eminent women scholars. Bad 
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as the legal position of women was in ancient India. Judged by modern 
standards it was far better than in ancient Greece, Rome, early Christianity, the 
Canon Law of medieval Europe, and indeed till right upto comparatively 
modem times at the beginning of the nineteenth Century. 
Looking most other ways of distinguishing themselves, living a 
confined and restricted life, they were told that their supreme virtue lay in 
chastity and the supreme sin in a loss of it. Such was man-made doctrine, but 
man did not apply it to himself. Tulsidas in his deservedly famous poem, the 
Hindu Ramayan, a written during Jahangir's time, painted a picture of woman 
which is grossly unfair and prejudiced.^° 
It is further important to note that even orthodox Smriti writers like 
Manu have recognized that if any rules framed are found to be not conducive to 
the welfare of society, or against the spirit of the age, such rules should be 
unheritingly abrogated or modified.^' Our Dharm-sastra writers in the matters 
of rights of women had realised that circumstances had changed and therefore 
customs and institutions must follow suit. We must therefore read just the 
position of women to the new situation by introducing the changes suggested 
above by Pandit Nehru. The social organizations, the political institutions, the 
educational centres and the local bodies should come forward with a free and 
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open heart to involve themselves in solving the problems of women. They 
should attack the various problems from different comers so that developments 
will be achieved within a short period. If this is done the capacity, efficiency 
and happiness of women, and hence men, will increase and as a Consequences, 
our community will achieve necessary progress for the happiness of mankind. 
Nehru had made his effort to analyse the problems of women and, hence, his 
suggestions are inevitable to be executed for the overall benefit of women. 
Nehru's View on Weaker Sections 
Weaker Section did not only mean Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes to Jawaharlal Nehru. He was of the opinion that there were too many 
backward people in this country and besides the Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes there were backward classes. In a speech at the Community 
Project Conference, New Delhi on May 7, 1952 he had said, "As a matter of 
fact you can safely say that 96 percent of the people of India are economically 
very backward. Anyway we have to think more of those who are more 
backward because we must aim at progressively producing a measure of 
equality in opportunity and other things".^^ 
Jawaharial Nehru was firmly of the opinion that in the modem world 
things could not go on for long having big gaps between those who are at the 
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top and those who are at the bottom. According to him, no one can make all 
men equal but we must atleast given them equality of opportunity. 
In a Speech at the Inaugural Address of the l larijan Convention at 
Wardha on Nov. 1, 1952 Nehru =;aid, "'Giving government jobs to a few people 
would not solve the problems of crores Indians who are unemployed. It would 
not be possible for the govt, to find employment for everybody. If unqualified 
people were employed, the country would suffer" He said that let all those who 
were engaged in an occupation do their jobs well and production be made 
proportionate to the work done. In the words of Nehru "we have got to change 
our mentality. At present we are opt to look down on manual labour and, that 
tendency is responsible for our present plight. There are two kinds of 
unemployment in our country. There are people who do not find work and there 
are those who are not willing to work. During my recent tour of Assam I came 
across a young girls who was carrying a load of fire wood on her head I stopped 
and spoke to her. 1 was surprised because she spoke perfect English. She had 
been educated in England. Her parents had lost their all in Pakistant and were 
reduced to penury. Inspite of her background she did not hesitate to do manual 
work. T ^ most important thing is the will to work".^^ 
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Jawaharlal Nehru was basically against indefinite continuation of 
reservation for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. In a speech at Wardha 
in 1952 he said : "If we want to prosper as a nation we must have to pay 
premium on efficiency and competency and, therefore, only those who are 
competent should be given employment in the government. Nepotism, 
favoritism or reservation will lower the standard of govt. work. It worries me to 
fmd out our standard of efficiency falling. It will be dangerous to allow this 
state of affairs to continue. It is wrong to think that the govt, services are there 
to maintain people. In advanced comitries it is no honour to be a govt, servant. 
It is only in backward countries where there is a great deal of unemployment 
that govt, services are given undue importance". 
Long before he became the Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru had felt 
that very strongly attracted towards the tribal people of this country. This 
feeling was not the curiosity of an ideal observer for strange customs nor was it 
the attraction of the one who is charitably disposed and wanted to do good to 
other people Nehru was attracted to them. Simply because he felt happy at 
home with them. He liked them without any desire to do them good or to have 
good done to himself In his own words "to good to others is very laudable 
desire but it often leads to create excesses which do not result in any good to 
either the door or the recipients". 
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In the tiibal people of India the following aspects attracted Nehru 
i. Their Virility and action mindedness. 
ii. Their simplicity. 
iii. Their spirit of comradeship amongs each other 
iv. The democratic practices amongst tribes within them without a 
written Constitution. 
V. The quality of enjoyment in their life. 
Nehru saw in India as well as in other great countries that people 
were anxious to shape others according to their image or likeness and impose 
on them particular way of living. He said in a speech at the opening session of 
the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Areas Conference in New Delhi in 1952, 
"We rather welcome them to our way of living but why impose it on them? 
This applies equally to national and international fields". According to him, 
there would be more peace and harmony in the wodd if we were to desist from 
imposing our way of living on other people and countries. Nehru thought that it 
was grossly presumptions on our part to approach the Scheduled Tribes with an 
air of superiority or to tell them what to do or not to do. There was no point, he 
thought, in trying to make Scheduled Tribes a second rate copy of ourselves. 
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.lavvaharlal Nehru, therefore, had the following prescriptions for 
change in our attitude and responsibility towards S.T. : 
1. We should have a receptive attitude towards the tribal people. There is 
a great deal we can learn from them. We must try to help and 
cooperate. 
2. One of the things we have lost in our civilization is the spirit of song 
and dance and the capacity for employment which the tribal people 
have abundantly retained. We must imbile something fi-om the spirit of 
the tribal folk instead of damping it with our lone face and black-
gowns. 
3. They are our own people and work does not end with the opening of so 
many schools and so many dispensaries and hospitals. What we ought 
to do is to develop a sense of oneness with these people, a sense of 
unity & understanding. 
4. The basic problem of India taken as a whole is one of integration & 
consolidation. The greatest problem of India today is not so much 
political, but psychological integration and consolidation. Therefore, 
we must approach the tribal people with affection and friendliness and 
come to them as liberating force. If the tribal feel you have to come 
impose orders upon them or that you are going them in order to try and 
change their methods of living altogether and take away their land and 
engage our businessmen to exploit them, than the fault is ours. 
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5. An officer to be appointed in tribal areas should not merely be a man 
who has passed an examination or gained some experience on written 
work. He must be a man with enthusiasm whose mmd and even more 
so, whose heart understands the problem, it is his duty to deal with. 
According to Nehru, it is far better to send a totally uneducated man 
who has passed no examination so long as he goes to these people with 
friendships affection and who lives as one with them. The man who goes there 
as an officer must be prepared to share his life with the tribal folk. "He must be 
prepared to enter their hurts, talk to them, eat and stay with them, live their lives 
and not consider himself Supenor or apart. Then only can be gain their 
confidence and respect and thus be in a position to advice them". 
Nehru found mainly two ways of approach. What tribal people do not 
want according to him could be called the anthropological approach in we treat 
the tribals as museum specimens to be observed and written about. This was an 
insult to them because this approach did not conceive of them as living human 
beings with whom it would be possible to work and play. 
The second approach was one of ignoring the fact they are something 
different requiring special treatment and their attempting forcibly to absorb 
them into the normal pattern of social life. This would be a type forcible 
assimilation through the operation of normal factors which would be equally 
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wrong. Therefore Nehru was of the opinion that we must give them a measure 
of protection in their areas so that no outsider could take possession of their 
lands or forests or interfere with them in any way except with their consent and 
goodwill Nehru always emphasized that one must always remember that we do 
not mean to interfere with their way oi life but to want to help them live it. 
Nehru did not want to perpetuents the designations of Scheduled 
Castes and Scheduled Tribes for all time to come. Me said in an inaugural 
address at the Tribal Affairs Conference, New Delhi in December, 1954, that to 
divide the people as tribals and non tribals and non tribals and Scheduled Castes 
and Non Scheduled castes for ever is wrong . The description in our 
Constitution of the Scheduled Castes was according to him rather arbitraiy. 
Govt, consideration decided whether a particular caste is Scheduled Caste or 
not. It is not possible to a hard draw possible to draw and fast time. That is why 
he said that we must ultimately aim at removal of these descriptions and names 
which was ideologically and physically separating the people as the depressed 
class, the Harijans, the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes and so on. The 
difference in customs and way of living would continue to remain because they 
are due to geography and climate. But this barrier chart so and so belonged to a 
Scheduled Caste should not lost for ever. 
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The view of Jawaharlal Nehru about reser\'ations could be 
summarised in his own words as follows, "It is not a good thing for castes and 
groups to permanently installed in superior positions. However, every 
individual should have openers of opportunities for advancement. The real 
problem thus is of raising the level ot all depressed humanity in Indian and not 
this group or that group. We shall never succeed if we proceed group by groups 
about protection measures". However, Nehru had the firm conviction that 
protective measures should continue because we must present the incursion of 
the market economy into the tribal areas. He said, "we shall have to prevent rich 
people from acquiring land and dispossessing the tribal people. We do not want 
the tribal areas to advance in peace. They not like something alien to be 
imposed upon them. No individual can grow in alien surrounding, habits or 
customs. The museum approach is as bad as open door approach and we have 
to find a middle course". 
The way out is that we have to train people and train the tribals to 
train others. Since training takes time the progress may not be very rapid. It is 
better to go ahead on a systematic basis than by an odd job approach. 
Thus Nehru had a very broad and liberal altitude towards the 
members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. He wanted their 
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amalgamation to the main stream so that there is no continuing barrier between 
them and majority for all time to come. But this process of amalgamation would 
be done at a pace and in a way which would be conducive to the psyche and 
othos of the scheduled castes and tribes and not according to the vvays others 
would dictate. 
Nehru ' s View On Socialism 
Nehru's socialism was influenced by his earliest Marxist and Leninist 
readings and his first visit to the Soviet Union and Brussels in 1927 where he 
came in contact with Marxist and Labour leaders. He had admitted : 
A study of Marx and Lenin produced a powerful effect on 
my mind and helped me to se history and current affairs in 
a new iight^''. 
But the fundamental basis of his idea lay in his acute awareness of 
the poverty of the masses of his people, their psychology of dependence, 
feudalism, traditionalism and his conviction that neither economic nor social 
nor cultural betterment was possible except through the reconstruction of Indian 
society on socialist lines. 
Nehru did not mean define socialism in rigid and concrete terms. But 
he did define it in overall, general justice; it meant putting an end to social and 
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economic inequality and disparities created by capitalism; opposing of the 
acquisitive instinct and capitalist competitiveness and promoting the 
cooperative tendency; gradual ending of class distinctions and class 
domination; large scale Social ownership; or control over the means of 
productions^\ 
In his Presidential Address to the Lucknow session of the Indian 
National Congress in April, 1936, he said, "1 am convinced that the only way to 
the solution of the world's problems lies in socialism. 1 see no way of ending 
the poverty, the vast unemployment, the degradation and the subjection of the 
Indian people, except through socialism, that involves vast and revolutionary 
changes, the ending of the vested interests in the land industry, as well as the 
feudal and autocratic Indian State System". 
Nehru had, thus, rightly realised the exploitation, injustice and 
suffering of one class by another that's why he declared in the Lahore Congress 
of 1929 ; 
"India means the peasantry and labour, and to the extent 
that we raise them and satisfy their wants we will succeed 
in our task". 
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CHAPTER-VIl 
CONCLUSION 
The idea of justice is quite old; that of social justice is relatively new. 
Human societ\' since earliest times remained divided on the basis of different 
privileges and different duties of different groups. There divisions were almost 
taken for granted, as if divinely ordained; and justice was largely interpreted to 
consist in fulfilling one's prescribed duties within the existing framework. It 
was only since the last quarter of the eighteenth century when the Amencan and 
the French Revolutions for the first time challenged the prevailing division of 
society on the basis of privileges unrelated to function, that the idea of social 
justice began to gain ground. It is significant that the Industrial Revolution, 
which had begun prior to the American and French Revolutions, tended to 
aggravate the existing division of society by introducing a new pattern of 
production leading to concentration on economic power in fewer and fewer 
hands on the one hand, and impoverishing the rest of the community on the 
other. Gradually thus the vast economic disparities were also recognised as 
manifestation of the social division on the basis of different economic 
privileges, and considered morally untenable. 
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Iti order to meet the situation atleast three alternatives were evolved : 
a) Iluinanitarian approach which relied on charity of the rich to ameliorate 
the lot of their poor brethren; 
b) Revolutionary approach which sought to overthrow the capitalist regime 
by violent revolution, mainly relying on the class consciousness of the 
workers and their invincible strength; and finally 
c) The Constitutional method of establishing the tangible rights of workers 
who were hitherto exploited and were likely to be exploited further if the 
existing system was not changed. The idea of social justice largely stems 
from this final approach. 
The object of the present study was to investigate the basic tenets of 
social justice to inquire how far the provision of the Supreme Court conform to 
the principles of social justice. Accordingly a hypothesis was formulated and 
relevant provisions of the Indian judiciary were empirically tested in light of the 
hypothesis so evolved, especially in regard to their working in the background 
of the Indian social, economic and political life. 
It will be gleaned from the foregoing study that social justice, in 
essence, represents a logical synthesis of the principles of liberty, equality and 
fraternity. It transcends the formal aspects of these principles where liberty may 
be interpreted merely as 'absence of restraint', equality merely as 'absence of 
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discrimination', and fraternity merely as charity of the strong and privileged 
towards the weak and the underprivileged; thus preserving the existing order. 
On the contraiy, demand of social justice tends to issue from the mouth of 
reformers who seek to make an effective dent in the prevailing socio-economic 
structure. Thus as principles of social justice 
(a) liberty in the political sphere demands the due representation of the 
citizens in decision making bodies, and to make this representation real it 
is essential that electoral system is so designed that political power vests 
in true representatives of the people so that manipulative or money 
power does not serve as gateway of political office; 
(b) equality in the economic sphere demands that equality of consideration 
and equality of opportunity are not reduced to an empty form due to vast 
disparities in economic capacities, particularly in the matter of seeking 
justice in the law courts, and availing of education and other 
opportunities for self development; 
(c) fraternity in the social sphere can become a real force only when the 
spirit of fraternity ensues from the feeling of mutual dignity, especially 
from appreciation of each other's importance in social life, related to the 
function performed, not from special privileges whatsoever, nor from 
affinities based on narrow sectarian interest; incidentally it also requires 
that there are not deprived of their due representation in the decision 
making organs and role in national life because of their minority 
character; that the weaker sections are given special consideration in the 
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distribution of benefits so as to enable them to compete with other 
sections of equal footing; and that 
(d) the right to property is so regulated that an mdividual's sphere of wealth 
is closely related to the function presently performed or service rendered, 
that major portion of wealth which is largely of social origin accrues 
back to society for reinvestment in expanding and strange thing social 
services, and that production of goods and services is undertaken 
primarily to subserve the social needs rather than for earning huge 
private profit. 
Social justice and Constitutions of India, as explained by eminent 
members of the Constituent Assembly, means rejection of the existing social 
structure, promise of social security, provision for equality of opportunity and a 
smooth and rapid transition from a state of serfdom to one of freedom. In short, 
it has envisaged a far reaching social changes, a socio-economic revolution, 
through mechanism of political democracy and individual liberty. Some 
members of the Constituent Assembly felt that since the social justice 
enunciated by them and embodied in the Constitution could be achieved only 
through socialism and in a socialist state, that fact should be specified in the 
Constitution. However, at the end, they avoided mentioning specifically 
socialisi^ or socialist §tate, for they felt content with the pharase "social justice" 
which was said to have embodied contents of socialism. After the 
commencement of the Constitution, the major agrarian reform legislations ran 
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up against conservative stance of judiciary on property and on the question of 
compensation. So, a few amendments were made to the Constitution to enable 
the state to forward with agrarian reforms and to facilitate the proper 
distribution of property and economic rights in the society. Besides, with 
respect to Preamble the judiciary changed its view and started using it as a tool 
to interpret the provisions of the Constitution. Because of these facts Parliament 
by the Constitution, (forty-second) Amendment Act introduced the word 
"socialisf' into the Preamble. Thus, it has been made clear that social justice 
and Constitution of India envisages not merely the contents of socialism but 
also It format or what may be called it infrastructure. In other words, the social 
justice and Constitution of India envisions distributive justice oriented equal 
dispersal of all social primary goods coupled with protective discrimination in 
favour of "the least favoured members" of the society to achieve a new social 
order within the framework of socialist democratic republic. 
The essence of socio-economic justice as the goal of planned 
development means reduction in the equality and removal of poverty. These 
two objectives are interrelated; it need not automatically lead to reduction in 
inequality. Both the goals would have to be pursued simultaneously and 
incordination. Socio-economic inequality in India is a heritage of long history. 
India is the world's classic unequal society from the time immemorial. 
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Inequality in India's past was sanctified by the rigid caste system that had 
ordained by professions by the accident of birth in a given family or jati. 
The genesis of Article 16 (4) and scrunity of debates in the 
Constituent Assembly over the contents of reservation clause in Article 16 (4) 
revealed two significant ideas, first, the exact use and connotation of the world 
"backward" must be understood in the context of an attempt made to reconcile 
the opposing views of perfect equality' of opportunity reservation-promoted 
equality of opportunity in the matter of government employment. Second, the 
reservation of posts and appointments in service under the state were meant for 
communities, which hither-to had no "proper look-in" into the administration. 
Thus, the state authorities were expected to determine or bring with in the fold 
of "backward classes" those Clas.ses or communities, which hitherto had no 
berth in the administration and the determination of Backward classes and the 
scheme of reservations of posts were such that they did not destroy the principle 
of equality of opportunity. The ideas that emerged from debates in parliament 
and constituent Assembly over Article 15 (4) and Article 16 (4) respectively 
would show that makers of the Constitution did not consider "caste" as a 
dominant criterion for determing the backwardness of the people. 
Conclusion 
A close survey of reports submitted by various class commissions 
dunng the period of 1955 and 1990 has revealed that most of the commissions 
harped on ''caste" as an inevitable test to determine the backwardness of people. 
The Mandal C.'ommission. which was latest commission constituted by the 
C'entral government, made caste as a unit or what it called a recognisable and 
persistent collectivities for dealing with the problem of backwardness. Further, 
it said that since Article 340 of the Constitution spoke of "socially and 
educationally backward classes", the application of economic tests" for their 
identification seemed to be misconceived. It virtually discarded the economic or 
poverty test to determine the Backwaid Classes of people. This view of the 
commission is narrow and the caste test may perpetuate caste system instead of 
eradicating social evil of backwardness. 
In Balaji case, the Supreme Court examined deeply the problem of 
determing the socially and educationally backward classes of citizens and laid 
down in the following principles. 
1. The backwardness contemplated in Article 15 (4) is both social and 
educational. 
2. The dominant test to determine social backwardness of classes of 
citizens generally to poverty that is abject poverty. 
229 
Conclusion 
3. In relation to Hindus, caste may be relevant factor in detemiing social 
backwardness of classes of citizens, because it often aggravates the 
social backwardness resulting from poverty. In other words, caste-cum-
poverty test is the appropriate test to determine the social backwardness 
of class of citizens in the Hindu social order. 
4. The educational backwardness of classes of citizens may be determined 
first by determing the state average of student population in High 
Schools and then treating only tho,se communities which are well below 
the state average of student population, that is, those classes of citizens 
whose average of student population would be considered as 
educationally backward. 
One important idea that emerges from the aforesaid principles laid 
down in Balaji case is that comprehensive test to determine the social and 
educational backwardness of classes of citizens is poverty-cum-caste below 50 
percent of the state average of student population test in relation to Hindus and 
poverty below 50 percent of the student population test in relation to others. 
This test emerges from the Balaji decision and it can to rightly be described as 
Balaji doctrine or test to determine social and educational backwardness of 
classes of citizens. This Balaji doctrine or test is in conformity with the views 
of the makers of the Constitution. 
Equality in law in the sense of absence of discrimination of any kind 
has been embodied in clauses (1) and (2) of Article 15. Equality in fact in the 
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sense of different tieatment in order to attain a result which estabhshes an 
equilibriujn betii\'een different situations has been stipulated in clause 4 of 
Article 15. The concept of equality in fact is essentially different treatment in 
order to attain a result which establishes an equation between two different 
situations in which the weaker sections and forward communities are found in 
the society. This, in other words in known as "protective discrimination" and 
"compensatory discrimination". But, whether the compensatory discrimination 
stipulated in favour of weaker sections is creative in nature or destructive in 
character depends on two factors, namely, (1) the quantmn of compensatory 
benefits conferred on weaker sections and (2) the duration for which they have 
been given. 
The idea of compensatory state action was to make people who were 
really unequal in their wealth, education or social environment, equal in 
specified areas Equality of opportunity guaranteed by Article 16 (1) could be 
gauged only by the equality attained in the result Article 16(1) only a part of a 
comprehensive scheme to ensure equality in all spheres. It was an instance of 
the application of the larger concept of equality under the law embodied in 
Article 14 and 15. Therefore, Article 16 (1) permitted classification just as 
Article 14 did. 
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Analysis of the views of the judicial response to social justice has 
revealed that they accorded prime importance to it. They described the social 
justice as the signature tnne of the Constitution. The Court discussed all aspects 
of the concept of social justice and explained its various connotations. First, 
social justice means socialism, because its goal is to bring national wealth and 
means of production under state control to subserve the common good. But, at 
the same time in a mixed economy interests of private enterprise cannot be 
stifled unjustly. So, necessarily a just balance must be maintained between 
conflicting interests. With such a role assigned to socialism it become more 
dynamic than doctrinaire. As indicated by the judiciar>', social justice is 
dynamic socialism which aims at a just socio-economic order. 
Second, social justice demands the existence of reasonable and just 
procedures which are conducive to the pursuit and protection of the rights of 
ordinary people. Therefore, procedures must necessarily be freed from stifling 
technalities in order to render access to justice a meaningful concept to common 
man. Third the concept of social justice envisages creation of a new human 
order and egalitarian society, wherein gender justice, dalit justice and equal 
justice among the chronic unequal, were assured. Forth Fundamental Rights 
must be construed in the light of Directive Principles and the Preamble, which, 
in effect, means that they have to be construed in the light of the concept of 
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social justice. It is also said that the dynamic Directive Principles energies the 
static provisions of the Fundamental Rights. This rule of interpretation has 
rendered the social justice a vibrant concept of the Indian Constitutional 
jurisprudence. Fifth, socio-economic justice stemmed fi-om the social morality 
and then became an enforceable fomiula and hence it abhors economic 
exploitation. Finally, social justice contemplates comprehensive social security 
schemes and also lays stress on distributive justice. Thus meaning attributed to, 
and the unique role designed by for, the concept of social justice by the 
judiciary have made the social justice a multi-dimensional vibrant concept of 
for reaching importance. 
Public Interest Litigation which has significantly broadened the 
sphere of judicial activity, is a notable aspect of social justice. Under this 
concept, any one can bring a disputed issue, a public grievance, or any other 
such matter direct to the notice of the Supreme Court merely by sending a post 
card briefly stating the case and thus avoiding the elaborate and costly 
procedure that is prescribed for raising a matter in a Court. The variety of cases 
decided by the Courts is itself evidence of the wide scope of judicial activism. 
Some examples are bonded labour, displacement and other grievances of 
tribals, child adoption and ecological threats to society. These indicate the 
broadened view of the judiciary role in a democracy. 
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There is no denying that Public Interest l.itigation has increased the 
quantum of work of High Courts and the Supreme Court, especially of the 
latter. ITie judiciary also enters the field which is strictly that of the executive 
and the legislature. Infact, in some cases the Supreme Court has given 
suggestions and even issued directives to the legislature concerned to follow up 
a particular matter and ensure that the cause of social justice is always upheld. 
There is of course a limit to which Public Interest Litigation and 
judicial activism can go, otherwise its own workload, which is now much too 
heavy, will increase beyond measure. While it is true that society has a moral 
and Constitutional obligations to ensure that injustice is not done to any section, 
such as the tribal, bonded labour, women or any other suppressed category, the 
system cannot be strained to disconcerting limits. 
There is also a question of availability of financial resources for 
carrying out social and economic, reconstruction programmes, even though 
these programmes are dictated by the concept of social justice. India is a poor 
country and has a vast percentage of neglected, deserving people whose plight 
arouse sympathy in every human heart, except the most callous. However, 
neither social reform nor social justice can be ensured in a short time. An 
outstanding instance is that of colossal poverty . Justice demands that all socio-
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economic inequalities should be redressed. But it is not possible to remove 
poverty and bring everyone to the same level, with a magic ward as it mere. 
Social justice, therefore, is an ideal which we should all promote earnestly. 
Nehru concern for national unity, equality, dignity, justice and the 
souci-economic upliftment and welfare of the people was well known. lie 
understood the needs and ethos of his people. Mis fascination for socialism, and 
economic development was bom out of his deep concern for the suffering 
Indian masses. He was firmly committed to planned economy which, he left, 
could alone resolve the socio-economic disparities of the modem world. Nehni 
viewed that socio-political independence of Afro-Asian countries could only be 
safeguarded through economic and progress. 
In the tribal and rural sphere, Nehru laid emphasis on tribal 
integration, that is integration of tribal communities with the rest of the Indian 
population and protecting and respecting the tribal autonomy and identity from 
outside interference. He unassisted on apt utilization of tribal genius embodied 
in the techniques of production process. He adopted vital measures aimed at 
elimination of the economic backwardness of the rural populace. He was 
opposed to discrimination of any kind against any citizen anywhere on grounds 
of religion, caste beliefs and sex. He planned and implemented developmental 
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schemes for the promotion of the welfare of the weaker sections. On women, 
Nehru had equally enlightened views. He did not regard them as a separate 
class but viewed them as equal individuals who had suffered from serious social 
disabilities and handicaps, fie was staunch supporter of women's education and 
finnly believed in equalitV' of men and women. He was deeply perturbed by the 
social absurdities like dowrs' system, growth of purdah and seclusion of women 
from day to day life. 
Nehru looked upon socialist pattern of society as an extension of 
democracy and freedom. Democracy, he left had no meaning without equality 
and equality cannot be established so long as the principal instruments of 
production are not owned by the state. 
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